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Abstract 
Looking through the prism of technoscientific research, the dissertation provides a 
historical understanding of the process of agricultural modernization in India during the period 
1947 to 1975. The narrative is set at the backdrop of the Cold War politics, India’s drive for 
economic and social development, gradual capitalization and chemicalization of agriculture 
worldwide and international exchanges of knowledge, skill and manpower. In a period marked 
by close interaction between the political and technoscientific establishments, the dissertation 
demonstrates how they helped to constitute each other. The cooperation between political and 
technoscientific wings of the Indian state, the dissertation argues, stemmed largely from mutual 
interests. The scientists as a professional community were eager to actively participate in the 
economic development of the newly independent nation-state.  In doing so they wanted to ensure 
continuous government patronage, funding for their projects and access to international 
collaborations. With very little research opportunity in the private sector, government funding 
was crucial for the professional advancement of any scientists in India. Agricultural scientists, 
therefore, tried with various amount of success to claim a good portion of budgetary allocations. 
They would be particularly successful in doing so with the introduction of the green revolution 
technology in the mid-1960s. On the other hand, the primary interests of the Indian government 
in employing a large pool of scientists and engineers were to find fast and effective solutions to a 
whole range of social, economic and political problems facing the new state. To the modernizers, 
technoscientific approach looked increasingly more attractive when compared with immensely 
more complex, expensive path of structural reforms.  
       The need for modernization is a defining characteristic of the new nation-state. But 
though largely unanimous about modernization as a normative goal, historical actors rarely 
x 
 
agreed on the descriptive part. The dissertation, therefore, explores specifically how different 
political, social and professional groups variously interpreted the concept of a ‘modern’ 
agriculture and the ways in which the process of modernization was related to ‘tradition’ and 
‘indigenous’. Policy-makers and scientists largely defined ‘indigenous’ in an economic sense, 
referring mainly to material, natural and intellectual resources available within the political 
boundaries of the country. The way agricultural policy documents used the term ‘indigenous’ 
during this period had almost no epistemological connotation. Policymakers and scientists in 
India, in general selectively appropriated, and largely re-interpreted what constituted India’s 
tradition in the making of ‘modern’ India. The dissertation discusses in detail how the planners, 
scientists and politicians used both the terms till the mid-1960s to etch out an agricultural 
development model for India that was arguably more commensurable with its social, economic 
and ecological needs.  
     The first decade and a half of India’s history of agricultural modernization shows features 
that were different from the chemical and capital-intensive development model of N.W. Europe 
and the Corn Belt of the American mid-west. The dissertation explains the differences largely in 
terms of priorities: the Indian planners and scientists’ choice of agricultural technology was not 
driven so much by a concern to quickly transform the Indian countryside as a test-case 
vindicating the viability of capitalist means over communist economy; it was rather goals, such 
as social equity, large-scale industrialization and limitations of resources and infrastructure, not 
to mention agro-ecological specificities, which shaped the main contour of India’s agricultural 
development plans.  
     For a country like India, which took to the course of planned development, planning 
‘experts’, scientists and engineers achieved great significance in development planning. Their 
xi 
 
identity as ‘rational’ beings made them most eligible to plan the right path for the teeming 
millions.  The dissertation analyzes what it meant to be an ‘expert’ in India during this period 
and the role that technoscientific experts specifically played in the process of agricultural 
modernization of India.  In an age marked by ever-growing importance of scientists and 
‘scientific’ knowledge, the dissertation locates their approaches to ‘indigenous knowledge’ and 
local farming practices.  
    The dissertation also explores whether with the coming of the green revolution 
technology, the Indian government’s intended use of science and technology as the primary tool 
to understand and solve the food question led to issues of marginalization. Thus, apart from 
investigating the technological limitations that inhibited the intended uses of technoscientific 
research as a panacea to complex issues, the dissertation also reexamines how did the scientists 
responded to problems faced by farmers who had limited financial means and thus could not 
afford adopting a new technology; or what did agricultural modernization mean for farmers in 
the moisture-stressed regions of India. Apart from explaining the unprecedented scale of 
international collaboration that green revolution made possible, the dissertation also writes the 
history of dissenting scientists who critiqued the green revolution and looked for alternative 
means.  
     The primary contribution of this dissertation is to situate the history of agricultural 
research in the political, economic and social history of India in the first three decades after its 
independence. The very nature of the time period, however, takes this history beyond India’s 
geo-political boundary and connects it to international events. It is, however, the specific context 
of India-political, economic, social, and ecological, more than any foreign influences that shaped 
xii 
 
the direction of agricultural development during this period. Thus, this dissertation is beyond 
everything a history of India-its people, institutions, and nature.   
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Preface 
 
         This is a history of agricultural research in India-narrating and explaining its changing 
contour since the country’s independence through the coming of the green revolution technology 
in the mid-1960s. The narrative concludes with the tumultuous years of 1970s when amidst war 
and suspension of the parliament, the nation achieved self-sufficiency in wheat production. The 
period also witnessed the emergence of regional parties of farmers who strongly advocated fiscal 
policies that would be conducive to the application of energy and capital-intensive technology in 
the farming of food-crops. Rice and wheat, as the staple diet of the people of the region, are at 
the heart of this historical narrative, which helps to bring together the world of farmers, 
agricultural scientists, philanthropists, and statesmen from across the geographical boundaries of 
India, USA, Mexico and Philippines. The narrative also spans a number of academic disciplines. 
Commonly interpreted as an ‘applied’ science, agricultural science is not considered as one 
academic discipline, but is constitutive of a ‘large set of locales and identities’.1 Of the sciences 
that this broad field includes, this history concentrates on research conducted in the following: 
genetics, plant physiology, and chemistry.
2
  
      There are two primary concerns that have guided this historical narrative: 1) to 
understand the interaction of the technoscientific register and the political register. Doing this 
helps a historian identify how the registers have constituted each other. Though the scientific and 
the political establishment had been keen to control their interactions at a discursive level, 
                                                 
1
 Deborah Fitzgerald, ‘Matering Nature and Yeoman: Agricultural Science in the Twentieth Century’ in John Kriege 
and Dominique Pestre ed., Science in the Twentieth Century (Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997) p.701 
 
2
 The other constituent disciplines would be botany, livestock breeding, nutrition, parasitology, and bacteriology 
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regarding ‘reason’ as the only touchstone on which to base their decisions about policy, they 
could rarely achieve so. Thus, the world of the ‘experts’ was constantly ‘interfered’ with the 
more ‘unreasonable’ and hence, intractable world of social, political, and ecological issues. This 
leads us to our second concern: 2) what happened when the ‘experts’-political and technological- 
tried to rationalize, systematize and even coalesce everything into a narrative of production and 
efficiency?  This research studies the reception, contestation and impact of the process from the 
perspective of the Indian farmers, agricultural scientists and consumers.  
     Scientific research and cultivation of rice and wheat underwent significant changes that 
were brought about by the modernizing imperative of the Indian state, the Cold War politics and 
the gradual capitalization of Indian agriculture. The technoscientific research in turn shaped, 
resolved and often opened up new areas of concern for the state, transnational agencies and for 
capital. The political-administrative apparatus, the transnational agencies working in India, and 
the scientific community all wanted to use science and technology to serve various purposes: as a 
‘tool’ to achieve modernization, to rationalize ‘tradition’ through incorporation of scientific 
spirit, to make ‘indigenous’ resources more economically profitable and more. They considered 
science as ‘panacea’ to solve a large number of social, economic, political issues and what they 
interpreted as ecological ‘constraints’.  But in practice the political and technoscientific 
establishment did not possess resources or enough mastery over scientific matters to exert 
complete control over the agricultural world, undermining their goal of using science as a tool to 
accomplish desired ends.
3
 
                                                 
3
 David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
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        Agricultural scientists, both from India and the US, were closely involved with the 
modernization of Indian agriculture since the time India achieved independence from the British 
rule. With the outbreak of war with Pakistan and in response to the political position taken by the 
US government, the Indian administration wanted the American scientists to leave the country by 
the early 1970s. Over this approximately three decades of agricultural history, the definition of 
what constituted a ‘modern’ agriculture would be a highly contested issue among different 
groups of politicians, policy-makers and scientists, cutting across national boundaries. Though 
the debate over agricultural modernization achieved a degree of closure in the late 1960s, with 
the widespread introduction of capital-intensive inputs in Indian agriculture that increasingly 
depended on use of non-renewable energy, it opened up new concerns regarding environmental 
impact, socio-economic and regional marginalization caused by the new technology. Thus, 
though enthusiasm about the green revolution technology has given way to the recent fascination 
with agbiotechnology, its ramifications still inform our understanding of technology’s role in 
agricultural development. 
      Though few individuals in India, at least in terms of policy formulation, ever doubted the 
need to raise food-crop production, the technoscientific means adopted to achieve that goal 
constantly changed during the period under review. It evolved with the changing planning 
priorities of the state, with farmers’ growing political significance in national politics, and with 
the changing dynamics of international power politics.  Amidst the trans-national context of the 
Cold War, with its exchanges of students, professionals and technology across national 
boundaries, this driven by specific circumstances in India that shaped the content of agricultural 
research. At the intersection of the nation-state, it’s planning priorities and in the context of 
xvi 
 
international politics, research agendas, expertise, and uses of agricultural inputs were 
transformed. 
     Scholars have generally emphasized a political economic understanding of Indian 
agriculture, which often tends to miss the ecological aspect of technological solutions. Missing 
the ecological angle is especially easy in writing the history of a period that has been dubbed as 
an ‘age of ecological innocence’ in regards to the apathy that the country’s political leaders 
displayed towards environmental concerns. The dissertation, however, argues that the 
‘innocence’ prevailed not in terms of lacking knowledge about ecology, but in the ways that 
experts thought that they could use technology to harness natural resources for human 
consumption. While experts occasionally interspersed, discussions of agricultural modernization 
with concerns about soil erosion, but it soon gave away to the more aggressive claims of 
promoters during green revolution years, without developing into any systematic theory about 
sustainable agriculture. The research during decades of the green revolution, therefore, 
concentrated not on evolving different varieties of grains suitable to various ecological 
specificities, but on tailoring the most congenial ecology to fit the needs of the new technology. 
By studying these transformations in relation to each other, we can examine the cultural and 
ecological aspects of the technoscientific innovations in relation to its political and economic 
matrix; secondly, this history illustrates how technoscientific research became the site for 
realizing the political and economic ambitions of several actors involved with the project of 
agricultural modernization.  
     There have been many influential accounts about India’s agriculture that are mainly 
concerned with interpreting the role of capital and use of energy-intensive inputs as the logic of 
production. From such a perspective, the presence of features, such as mechanization, chemical 
xvii 
 
fertilizers, fertilizer-responsive hybrid seeds and pesticides are seen as the mark of a modern 
agricultural sector. A modern agriculture is defined as a product of scientific research, geared 
towards mastering nature and channeling natural forces towards greater yield. For the proponents 
of this model of agricultural development, any production system that lacked or only had limited 
use of these features, as had largely been the case with pre-green revolution India, was seen as 
continuing with traditional agriculture, with little role for scientific research.
4
 
    Using research reports and policy documents from the pre-green revolution period, I 
argue instead that limited use of capital-intensive inputs could be interpreted not as a refusal to 
incorporate science and technology for development purposes, but as the state’s reluctance to 
fully incorporate the development model that had been widely adopted by the farmers of the 
Corn belt of the US and NW Europe. In studying India’s agricultural modernization at the 
confluence of political economic, ecological perspectives, we will better understand the 
specificities of the food-crop production and agricultural research in India. In contrasting the 
ways of agricultural development in the ‘West’ with the model that can be abstracted from the 
Indian context, we get, as Francesca Bray has suggested in her study of Asian rice economies, ‘a 
spectrum of agricultural systems, each using land, labor and capital with a different degree of 
intensity which in some measure determines its dynamic evolution and its pattern of adaptation 
to such phenomena as modern capitalism.’5 
     Since agricultural production in India was dominated by small farmers who practiced 
labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive ways of farming, agricultural innovations in India 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed discussion on how ‘experts’ were coming up with models for creating a ‘modern’ agriculture see, 
A.T. Mosher, To create a modern agriculture: organization and planning (Agricultural Development Council, 
1971) 
 
5
 Francesca Bray, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies (Basil Blackwell, 1986) 
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concentrated on evolving cheaper, less-energy-intensive biological and chemical inputs. 
Scientific research, moreover, was not all about quantity, but about quality too-which led Indian 
scientists to look not only for fertilizer-responsive varieties but also to develop scented, 
elongated rice and amber colored, soft wheat. The goal of agro-ecological adaptation was no less 
important than high-yield or disease-resistance. Equally important was the goal of ‘social equity’ 
that inhibited the adoption of a capital-intensive model because it considered such a path of 
agricultural development to be beyond the adoptive capacity of majority of farmers. Thus, 
ecology, material condition of farmers and political economic objectives of the Indian state are 
all part of my study in understanding the development and agricultural science and technology in 
postcolonial India. 
    Driven by multiple concerns, unlike the high-yield focus of the later green revolution 
technology, the agricultural scientists during this earlier period drew from various farming 
practices of different parts of the world.
6
 They derived insight from multiple techniques, for 
example, combining ‘organic’ resources with the synthetic fertilizers and sophisticated 
technology that were more common in the more capitalized agricultural systems. Scientists 
experimented with both foreign and ‘indigenous’ varieties of seeds as possible sources of genetic 
variations, which they hoped to incorporate into the improved varieties of cereals. In 
understanding the nature of the agricultural research in postcolonial India, it is, therefore, 
necessary to look beyond the rigid binaries of organic/inorganic, foreign/indigenous and 
modern/traditional etc. Focusing on their interactions, instead, would help us to see post colonial 
Indian agriculture as a range of prevalent conditions and not in terms of a uniform closed system.   
                                                 
6
 ‘The expression ‘agricultural practices’ refers to all systems that farmers use to meet the basic needs of plants and 
animals (water, seeds, nutrients) in order to maximize output. Thus, it includes the skills to perform simple 
operations (such as plowing), the knowledge of optimal timing of operations, and the knowledge of the best 
succession of different crops (rotation).’ For a detailed discussion see Giovanni Federico, Feeding the World: An 
Economic History of Agriculture, 1800-2000 (Princeton University Press, 2005) Ch.6 
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     The use of the term ‘indigenous’ is problematic and hence requires some explanation. I 
do not claim that indigenous agronomy was a coherent and systematic theory of agronomy that 
was discursively available to peasants and scientists. I agree with Akhil Gupta’s formulation of 
the term indigenous as ‘culturally constituted recipes for dealing with the varying conditions and 
exigencies encountered in farming practices.’7 Scientists and policy-makers of the era did not 
evidently bothered with a sophisticated theoretical formulation of what they meant by their usage 
of the term ‘indigenous’. Official documents mostly used the term ‘indigenous’ to refer to inputs 
available within the geographical boundaries of India and largely known to the farmers. In 
absence of a systematic repository of knowledge about ‘indigenous’ practices, agricultural 
scientists often used their own knowledge about existing farming practices and organic resources 
to think about their effectiveness and further improvised on these in their laboratories. Scientists 
endorsed indigenous agronomic practices and resources only when these met the physical, 
economic and social requirements and not because they wanted to defend these knowledge and 
practices in the name of indigenousness. In the work of the Indian agricultural scientists of 
independent India, therefore, it is very difficult to locate instances of ‘postcolonial hybridities’ of 
the kind that anthropologist, Akhil Gupta found in the daily rhetoric and practices of farmers in 
villages of North India even in the 1980s, or, that Gyan Prakash argued were evident in the work 
of scientists in the early twentieth century in the subcontinent.
8
 Indigenous practices or resources 
rarely made their way into the scientific practices of agricultural research labs of independent 
India.  
                                                 
7
 Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Duke University Press, 
1998) p. 181 
 
8
 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton University Press, 1999) 
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      Through a close analysis of cereal research, I have primarily tried to decode the black box 
of agricultural science and contextualize it beyond the scientists’ laboratories and experimental 
fields.  Because rice and wheat were staple food-crops of the nation, the state monitored these 
relatively closely, and low grain yield in India was the subject of international concern. Since 
rice and wheat were not cash crops, their production practices showed uneven penetration of 
capital across or even within regions. So, it is possible to study a whole range of farming 
conditions and associated development of technology, pattern of resource usages by farmers and 
region-specific research work by scientists. A more practical reason for choosing rice and wheat 
to study the modernization process was availability of data. As we have learnt from the work of 
another agricultural historian, David Ludden that we inherit evidence on agriculture in 
proportion to its success and that we have most data where the state penetrated most minutely. 
Thus the volume of data on rice and wheat, being the staple crop surpass any of that on other 
cereals. A similar trend was noticeable in the colonial period when the state produced more texts 
on cash crops and plantations than for food crops because the state was more involved with the 
former for its revenue generating capacity than the latter, which was the domain of the small 
peasants, outside the purview of the state machinery.
9
 The annual reports on rice and wheat 
research offer invaluable resources for exploring the connections between scientific researches, 
specifically agricultural research, with what happened beyond the laboratory and experimental 
fields. The rice and wheat seeds-its immense varieties, its varied responses to fertilizer 
application, and vulnerability and resistance to pests and diseases, its agro-climatic adaptations, 
                                                 
9
 David Ludden, ‘Agricultural Production and Indian History’ in Ludden ed., Agricultural Production and Indian 
History (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) 4. Ludden argued that the colonial state was more concerned with 
issues such as revenue, property law, marketing and credit. Relatively few data, Ludden points out, concern issues 
most critical for farmers, such as subsistence strategies and resource management. 
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and its cultural, social and economic connotations-all make these interesting and significant for 
an academic pursuit. 
    Selecting rice and wheat as my subject of investigation in a way determined the 
institutions of scientific investigations where I would focus in my work. CRRI and IARI 
represented the most important centers of rice and wheat research in independent India. Located 
in the southern part of the national capital-New Delhi, Indian Agricultural Research Institute’s 
(IARI) geographic location is indicative of its central position in Indian agriculture. It has been 
one of the leading centers of agricultural research in independent India that contributed 
significantly to the modernization of agricultural production. The other important, though 
somewhat younger institute of cereal research, is the Central Rice Research Institute (CRRI) at 
Orissa. Both the institutes participated in several significant research projects at the national and 
international level during the years following India’s independence. For instance, CRRI 
scientists undertook countrywide surveys to build up large rice collections of both popular and 
exotic varieties that helped in the making of gene banks. CRRI also served as the main center of 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) sponsored multi-national rice hybridization 
project involving Indica and Japonica varieties, before the advent of the hybrid dwarf varieties of 
rice from Philippines. The project was the first international collaboration of scientists to evolve 
improved strains of rice by bringing together qualities of different varieties. 
       Both CRRI and IRRI are part of the central research institutes in India i.e. these are 
administratively controlled by Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and not by state 
governments. A brief discussion here of the structures and functions of the Indian agricultural 
research system illustrates the nature of one of the largest agricultural science establishments in 
the world. The Indian agricultural research effort has three institutional bases: ICAR, the State 
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Agricultural University (SAU) system, and private industry.
10
 The ICAR was set up in 1929 on 
the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Agriculture. It was always more research 
oriented than SAU, with forty-one Research Institutes (such as IARI and CRRI) under its 
administrative control and seventy-one All India Coordinated Research Projects spread over 
1291 cooperating centers all over the country.
11
 
     In 1948, India had 17 agricultural colleges and only 160 postgraduate students. The 
second National Education Commission (1964-66), headed by University Grant Commission 
Chairman Dr. D.S Kothari, recommended the establishment of at least one Agricultural 
University in each of the Indian states. India followed the recommendation of the Education 
Commission: the agricultural universities set up at the state-level evolved into an elaborate 
nation-wide system, consisting of twenty-six universities. The SAU concept owes much to the 
U.S. Land Grant college model. The second Indo-American team (1959), headed by the vice-
president of the ICAR, Dr. M.S. Randhawa, specified actions towards that end. It recommended 
that agricultural universities at the state level should address the twin needs of increasing 
agricultural production and improving the farmer’s life. These two objectives, they pointed out, 
could be met through the land grant model of integrating teaching, research and extension. They 
strongly advised that all the existing agricultural colleges, veterinary colleges, home science 
colleges as well as the State experimental stations should be integrated with the SAU in such a 
manner ‘that one agricultural programme for the entire State will be developed under the general 
direction and administration of the agricultural university.’ In their report they advocated that the 
                                                 
10
 The last continues to be dwarfed in comparison to the other two in financial outlay, research staff and scope of 
research. 
 
11
 N.C.B. Nath & L. Misra ed., Transfer of Technology in Indian Agriculture: Experience of Agricultural 
Universities (Indus, 1992); M.S. Randhawa, A history of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1929-1979 
(New Delhi : Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1979) 
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Government of India should provide no financial aid to a state for an agricultural university 
unless and until the state had passed appropriate legislation and statutes to adopt the essential 
land-grant concepts and principles to Indian conditions.
12
 
        I decided to weave my history of postcolonial Indian agricultural research around te 
Indian Agricultural Research Institute and Central Rice Research Institute because much of the 
drama of Indian agricultural research took place here. The scientists were trying to address the 
need for producing more food with limited capital. Their task was further complicated by the 
cultural preferences of consumers, the economic condition of the majority of its farmers, and the 
ecological variance that characterized cereal cultivation in India. The same institutes served as 
the primary abode of the new seeds from Mexico and Philippines, though other agricultural 
universities that were modeled according to the American land-grant universities also played 
crucial role in adapting the new technology in different agro-ecological zones of the country. 
Moreover since IARI and CRRI were under the directives of the Central Government, their 
history best embodied the relationship between the scientists and a postcolonial state-its 
underlying tension, patronage and responsibilities. The Chairpersons of various departments of 
IARI and CRRI, were renowned figures in Indian agriculture and after playing crucial roles in 
India’s agricultural development these men went on to head international research institutes such 
as IRRI, CIMMYT, ICRISAT etc. Thus these two institutions effectively served as nodal points 
to study flow of knowledge, technique and manpower between regional, national and 
transnational levels. 
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    Built in 1934, IARI’s sprawling green New Delhi campus and striking red buildings is an 
imposing presence to which the success of the green revolution (in making India self-sufficient 
in food-grains) has lent an additional aura. The tall clock tower which looms over the campus 
serves as the most popular representation of the institute. It rises from the building, which houses 
the main library of this research institute. The library contains in its archive, the records of all 
agricultural research projects that the scientists have had undertaken, ever since its foundation. It 
houses innumerable journals, both academic and semi-popular in content, reports of several 
committees constituted to reform the research establishments of the country, government 
documents pertaining to agricultural policy and valuable secondary sources on Indian 
agriculture. No other institutes anywhere else in the world has so much on Indian agriculture 
under a single roof. Materials stored in the IARI library have been extensively used to write this 
dissertation, especially the sections on wheat research. 
        Established in April 1946, CRRI was the product of the last years of colonial rule in 
India. Its establishment is associated with the tragic history of the Bengal famine in which, one-
third of the population of the province perished.
13
 The famine was caused by the devastating 
outbreak of epiphytotic brown spot disease of rice (Helminthosporium spp) in 1942. The impact 
of massive crop loss on people was further aggravated by the failure of the colonial 
administration. In the aftermath of the famine, intense public criticism forced the British 
government to take several measures, one of which was the establishment of CRRI at Cuttack. It 
was set up to intensify research on rice so that crop failures of such magnitude could be 
prevented in the future. The library at CRRI is far less grandiose. Much smaller than the IARI, it 
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however preserves the documents more carefully and systematically. The annual reports of rice 
research conducted at CRRI have been used in my dissertation as crucial primary sources to 
analyze the content and goal of rice research in postcolonial India and the factors influencing it. 
CRRI library is also a significant source on the FAO and IRRI’s involvement with India’s 
agricultural research. 
     Since the mid-1960s, the path of agricultural development that Indian researchers had 
followed since independence underwent a major shift, involving greater usages of capital and 
energy-intensive technology, price incentives to farmers, subsidies for agricultural inputs etc. 
The scholars have generally studied the changes have been as caused by domestic and 
international factors. But few studies have been done on the nature of the changes itself, apart 
from documenting a shift in political and economic policy, for example, a significant increase in 
the use of capital-intensive inputs, adoption of the policy of selective application etc. But how 
can we characterize the changes that marked the government of India’s approach to the food 
question? I argue in chapter three that what we witness was the ‘technical-rendering’ of the food 
question-a process that was further bolstered by the famines occurring around the mid-1960s, the 
ongoing food-population debate, and an increasing international pressure that was matched by 
the growing importance of domestic forces who favored capital-intensive reforms over 
institutional ones.  Under the circumstance, availability of food was no more embedded in a 
broader social, economic and political question, but seen solely in terms of higher production-a 
technical issue amenable to solution courtesy the new green revolution technological package 
available in North America. 
    The last segment of my work studies how the new technological knowledge was 
transferred into India through international collaborations among scientific communities, 
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building new universities model on land grant universities of the US that would serve as the 
nodal points of dissemination, through private foundation-government network. This flow of 
knowledge that was accomplished through international exchanges of scientists, through training 
in the use and practice of the new technology at national and international institutes, and through 
reconstitution of professional identities based on who pursued and defended the new technology 
would, however, carry serious issues of marginalization. New categories would be enforced, 
courtesy the introduction of the new technology, which would redefine the place of scientists, 
farmers and regions in the new development discourse. Eager to disavow that the new 
technology had any biases, the policy documents of both private and government agencies, 
explained their preferences in terms of national need or technological requirements.  Such 
preferences became explicit in the research work and professional life of the agricultural 
scientist, carrying grave threats of marginalization. Issues of marginalization, however, received 
little attention from either the government or the scientific community during the period under 
study. Even political parties articulating farmers’ interests, Akhil Gupta pointed out, were rarely 
vocal about farmers who were left out of the profit incurred from the new technology.
14
         
   Though a number of studies have been done towards understanding which segment of 
Indian farmers benefitted from the introduction of the new technology, relatively little effort has 
been invested in understanding whether the farmers extend any influence in deciding the ways of 
agricultural modernization. Though history of peasant movement and politics in India have 
recorded the former’s response to various fiscal, political and institutional reforms, there has 
been very little work done to understand the role that farmers’ played in determining the 
direction of agricultural research in India. In the final chapter of this dissertation I have tried to 
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understand the economic structure of the farming community in India and the nature of their 
interaction with the government and the scientific community, specifically in terms of 
technoscientific innovations. 
      Though the narrative mainly revolves around the history of agricultural science and 
technology, the introductory chapter gives a general account of the role that technology and 
science were meant to play in the cultural and economic modernization of the country. This 
intellectual history ties into instances of scientific techniques that were used in the modernization 
of the handicrafts industries of rural India. It will help us to understand how a number of leading 
figures of independent India, including Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, envisioned science 
and technology could transform India without uprooting its traditional moorings. Some of the 
ideas explored in the panoramic breadth of the first chapter help to contextualize the action of 
such Indian actors, who were involved with the modernization of Indian agriculture. Not all ideas 
would materialize, more importantly there would be contradiction between ideas and action, but 
nevertheless the trajectory of technoscientific development in independent India could not be 
studied without knowing how it conjured up in the mind of several persons from the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
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                                                          Chapter1 
Science, Technology and the Making of ‘Modern’ India 
The ideologues of independent India were animated with an intense desire to turn the 
country into a modern nation-state. The forces of modernity unleashed by practices of science 
and technology, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dreamt, would not be restricted to economic 
sphere alone, but would revolutionize the cultural life of the citizens of the new republic.  India’s 
pursuit of modernity as a normative goal was in fact as old as its struggle for self-rule. Economic 
development, as the index of modernity, and as a concomitant to social reforms had been at the 
heart of the liberation discourse of the Indian middle-class against colonial rule.
1
 But beyond a 
normative consensus, scholars have found that historical actors had rarely agreed upon the 
descriptive part of the modernization process.
2
 Thus, without risking some amount of 
generalization and simplification it is difficult to neatly categorize proponents into groups and 
label them of as holding similar opinions, on such things among others, as the place of ‘tradition’ 
in ‘modern’ India, the use of the ‘indigenous’, the goal of social equity in economic 
development.
3
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3
 For instance, the western observers who came to India, Nick Cullather writes in the Hungry World (2010), rarely 
agreed on the development path of the new nation; though they believed in the necessity of modernization and the 
important role that science and technology needed to play in the whole scheme of thing, the observers, however, 
differed on whether to emphasize community development projects or to go for an entirely technocentric 
productionist strategy. More on this will be discussed in the next chapter. Similarly, Nehru though differing greatly 
with Gandhi on the broader philosophy of industrialization had was more than willing to incorporate his ideas in the 
village development projects of independent India. On the other hand he bitterly differed with renowned Physicist 
Meghnad Saha on the ways science and technology was being put to use with the demise of colonial rule from the 
country, though, both of them technically belonged to the same pro-modern and pro-technoscience camp. For a 
2 
 
From the historical records it is evident that simultaneous to the tumultuous political 
process of claiming and stabilizing the national space, politicians, scientists, and economists 
among others strongly debated over the nature of India’s modernization and the path it would 
take. Though a degree of consensus had already been reached over the universal nature of 
‘science’ around 1930s, the leadership of the new nation-state still grappled as how to 
strategically and philosophically address the issues of ‘tradition’ in the making of ‘modern’ 
India.
4
 The ongoing debate over the nature and place of ‘tradition’ in independent India could be 
traced back in the literature produced by late colonial intellectuals on development. Eager to 
prove that their ideas were in keeping with Indian traditions or conditions, the ‘modernizers’ who 
believed in the use of machinery and the need for industrialization responded to allegations of 
westernization with a claim of ‘indigenism’. They insisted that they have a plan for development 
that would take an ‘Indian’ and not a ‘foreign’ path.5  Thus Nehru, as one of the chief advocate 
for a modern India, had been careful to draw a distinction between Western form of modernity 
and a form of modernity more adaptable to the Indian context.
6
  
Though frequently critical of many aspects of western modernity, Nehru, however, was 
emphatic on modernity having a universal valence, as did science. As claiming a difference from 
western modernity was a political imperative, so was the argument stressing on its universality: 
It would help Nehru to counter Europe’s claim to ‘exceptional internal characteristics that 
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allowed it to supersede, through its rationality, all other cultures.’7  He, however, never 
elaborated on what he considered to be the more universal aspects of modernity vis-à-vis its 
more malleable specific ones. It is in the making of a national version that we notice his keenness 
to incorporate what he understood as valuable aspects of ‘Indian tradition’. Spiritualism without 
a religious foil would be one such novel introduction by Nehru to India’s drive for cultural 
modernization. Confined largely to intellectual musings, these ideas merely reflected how Nehru 
envisioned social engineering his countrymen into modern Indians-spiritual, but not given to 
religious bigotry and infused with scientific values. 
This narrative, however, is not about the history of modernization as a study-of-
differences between India vis-à-vis the West. It does not venture to essentialize the 
developmental experience of the West and thereby prepare ‘taxonomy’ of modernity. The 
experiences of modernization historically had been varied, contested and mediated by social, 
economic and political context. Saying that it, however, needs to be mentioned that 
modernization as a theory and development as a model of economic and social measures insisted 
on using European history as a ‘historical’ template that charted the future of humanity itself . 
This approach was also evident among the American social scientists who generally considered 
the disparate countries of the ‘third’ world as faced with broadly similar problems, and therefore 
amenable to a broadly similar theoretical conceptualization and policies.
8
  
However, notwithstanding the flow of men, money and material from the U.S., it was not 
solely foreign influences that directed India’s development course. It is clear from contemporary 
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official documents that various interplay of interests, contemporary political and economic 
exigencies as well ideological commitment shaped India’s discourse and practices of 
development.
 9
  For example, rather than capital-intensive resources, the practical and ideological 
underpinnings motivated most members of the political, planning and technoscientific 
establishment to advocate usages of ‘indigenous’ material in large number of technological 
projects, especially in raising the productivity of India’s food-crop production and in the revival 
of the village industries and traditional handicrafts;  Moreover, in spite of its emphasis on 
import-substitution and self-sufficiency at the policy-making level, the government instead of 
solely prioritizing economic production planned to reconcile rapid growth rate with an equally 
important quest for social equity. Under the circumstances, the Government of India had to 
decide whether to emulate a capital and energy intensive development model that promised high 
economic growth, but accorded little or no place to ideas of social development, social equity, 
use of cheap indigenous resources, and to ‘tradition’;10 or make an attempt to‘ re-invent’ 
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traditions for the purposes of cultural modernization, recast the ‘indigenous’ in terms of scientific 
practices, and make consistent attempt to keep the goal of equity within the ken of economic 
development.           
Emerging from the self-demeaning experience of subjection to a long period colonial 
rule, many in India’s administrative echelon, including Nehru, was almost obsessed with the idea 
that India’s pursuit of economic and social development should neither appear as a plagiarization 
of the West nor subservient to its interests. In the context of the ongoing Cold War, a concern 
about neo-colonial pressures looked even more justified to the members of the Planning 
Commission.
11
 The first-five year plan, for instance, categorically pointed out that ‘of the total 
flow of private capital from the United States in 1947-49 about 78 per cent went to 
underdeveloped countries but 90 per cent of this was directed to investment in extractive 
industries working for export to the advanced industrial countries.’12  India’s development 
regime was thus careful of not replicating the centre-periphery model of the colonial regime. 
Accompanying this skepticism was an urge to form a distinct identity as an emerging power with 
its own set of priorities and lineages. As the initiator of the non-aligned movement (NAM), the 
political leadership in India refused to be seen as a lackey of any political-economic bloc. Its 
policies and practices should apparently be such that would fit-in with the image of the country 
as ‘greatly-admired’ model among the nations of the developing world.  Thus, much of the plans 
and actions of politicians, scientists and policymakers directed towards India’s development 
would be better understood when put into the context of contemporary political economy, 
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especially, if we factor-in the skepticism with which many in the Congress Party interpreted the 
‘imperatives of capitalist production’ as have had contributed to imperialism.13  
Unlike what is commonly assumed that with the adoption of the first-five year plan 
(1951-1956) basic industries overrode any concern about revival of village-industries or 
traditional crafts, the period, in fact, witnessed a renewal of discussion over Gandhian 
economics, which in absence of the man himself was joined by other activist-ideologues sharing 
his ideas, such as J.C. Kumarappa, J.P. Narayan, Ernst Schumacher etc.  At independence, the 
discussion on village-based economy as the traditional basis of Indian society went beyond from 
merely being an exercise in rhetoric to being incorporated as part of development practices. The 
idea that this could be made possible did not come entirely from either Nehru or the member of 
the Indian Planning Commission. A large part of it was derived from the work of Gandhians 
themselves. For instance, Kumarappa sought to establish the practicability of the village-based 
economy on the basis of the scientific wisdom of the principles of economic on which it rested. 
Trained in economics at Columbia University, Kumarappa was far from rejecting conceptions of 
‘modernity’, ‘science’ or ‘economic’, however, he proposed to consider modernity in a longer 
time-frame. He argued that the Gandhian idea of making the village self-sufficient should not be 
taken to imply that the artisans should be left to themselves-restricted by the older technologies. 
He proposed instead that assistance of scientific research be harnessed to village problems.
14
 In 
saying so, Kumrappa would help to bridge the otherwise unfathomable gap that a scientist like 
M.N. Saha or constitutionalist like B.R. Ambedkar felt about Gandhian economics or the role of 
handicraft/village industries. Saha, for instance, would vehemently resist going back to an age of 
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bullock carts and spinning wheels.
15
 Ambedkar, on the other hand, shared with Gandhi no 
romanticism about Indian villages.  Severely affected by practices of untouchability, while 
growing up in a Maharastrian village in western part of India, Ambedkar regarded Indian 
villages as wells of ignorance.
16
   
          At the backdrop of these political and intellectual exchanges, this chapter, therefore, 
ventures to analyze, using contemporary political and development rhetoric, science and 
technology documents and technoscientific projects, what the historical actors meant when they 
wanted to be ‘modern’ and how they grappled with the politically and culturally sensitive issue 
of tradition. Was modernity as pursued and practiced by the independent state after all a ‘derivate 
discourse’ of western modernity, with little space for tradition, as had so often been argued.17 To 
some scholars the displacement of Gandhian thoughts and of use of tradition was evident in the 
intellectual thoughts and development plans of leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru,  in whose 
imagination ‘modern’ India was apparently all about huge steel industries and hydro-electric 
dams that came to dot India’s landscape. Their preferred development discourse had little to do, 
scholars had been saying, with Gandhi’s plan for an India based on village-republics and 
traditional crafts using indigenous resources.
 18
 
Recent scholars have commented on the analytical necessity of treating ‘indigenous’ not 
as a closed system, but more as evolving practices that varied across region and community and 
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is part of the traditional lineages of the region.
19
 The concepts of tradition and indigenous, 
therefore, not only overlap, but share a close bonding with religion too. The pervasive presence 
of religious ideas had been located in the long tradition of the country’s knowledge about 
medicine, natural resources and agriculture. Such a religiously informed understanding of the 
country’s ‘scientific’ achievement could be located in writings of the Orientalists and nationalists 
who claimed for the revival of ‘Hindu’ science as opposed to the ‘dark age’ of Muslim rule. 
Under a more secular administration of independent India, how would the state accommodate 
tradition with all its religious trappings in its development discourses-in the making of the 
‘modern’ India that they aspired for?  
 Nehru found incorporation of tradition indispensable in the making of modern India. 
Aware that he was writing about a country with one of the oldest civilisation in the world, Nehru 
remarked that in India ‘old established traditions cannot be easily scrapped or dispensed with’. 
He doubted the desirability of such an act, especially in the context of the national movement 
when tradition was being used to rouse ‘a people to a high pitch of effort and sacrifice.’ Under 
the circumstance, the wisest thing to do would be to accept it; it should, however, be ‘adapted 
and transformed to meet new conditions and ways of thoughts, and at the same time new 
traditions have to be built up.’20 To recast tradition in the mould of modernity, he selectively 
borrowed ideas from post-enlightenment rationalism and socialism. Re-inventing ‘tradition’ in 
this way would be very much part of India’s cultural modernization as Prime Minister Nehru 
went on stressing the need for ‘scientific humanism’.  
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      Evidently, the crosscurrents of discourse on modernity and tradition shaped the use of 
science and technology in development plans of independent India. Whereas the basic industries 
followed largely the growth model of the developing countries-a fact picked up by many to point 
how India neglected its tradition and copied the West, the political leadership, however, tirelessly 
reiterated that the development ethos guiding these projects was very different, especially from 
those that were conducted under capitalist enterprise. Benjamin Zachariah, for instance, finds in 
the contemporary development debate an ‘emotive significance’ that was not entirely concerned 
with ‘economic development’, but of a possible India related to ideas of regeneration and 
progress. Although much of these ideas were catalyzed by ‘contemporary worldwide discussions 
about how to manage economics or how to industrialize quickly’ especially, ideas of John 
Keynes and W.W. Rostow-but these debates ‘contained and incorporated far wider concerns’.21   
       The Indian nationalists-politicians and scientists- liked to thought in terms of nation-
building project, rather than speak narrowly in terms of economic profit. Thus, plans for 
industrialization expressed broader social concerns, a strong belief in the benevolent role of 
science and technology, and on following an ‘indigenous’ path of development. Much of these 
remained confined at the ideational level though, particularly in the sector dealing with the basic 
industries.  
    Thus, to study how much of these ideas were translated into practice, and how the state 
grappled with questions pertaining to modernity, modernization and place of tradition in its 
discourse of development, we have to turn to the history of development of the agricultural 
sector and of village industries in independent India. In building a ‘modern’ India, its leaders 
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found it prudent to reconstitute a version of traditional India, rather than trying to search for an 
‘authentic’ version, if there were any.  We will also try to understand how the role of the 
‘indigenous’ and capital-energy intensive resources and that of traditional knowledge and 
practices in India’s economic development were articulated by members of the political and 
scientific establishment? Finally, we would explore how the espousal of the universalistic values 
of science would be used with varying success by individuals and institutions to legitimize 
development projects.  
‘Modern’ India and the ‘Need’ for Science and Technology 
With independence, science and technology emerged as the common underlying matrix 
of social and economic development of the new state. ‘Need for science’, Srirupa Roy observed 
in her study of postcolonial nationalism, became ‘the most common expression of postcolonial 
needs discourse in Nehruvian India.’  Such a discourse defined the nation-state as ‘a collection of 
persistent and unfulfilled problems, failures, and needs’ that were meant to be solved through the 
‘application of the objective methodologies and neutral rationalities of science.’22 Such needs for 
change were most palpable in the social and economic life of the nation, prompting the newly 
sworn-in Prime Minister to consider using science and technology in replacing the old 
framework of colonial governance and mentality with a new framework that embodied the spirit 
of progress or modernity.  
       The pages of Discovery of India are replete with Nehru’s ruminations on lack of 
modernity in contemporary India. He, however, did not explain this lacuna in terms any essential 
cultural attributes of the Indian civilisation-as did Max Weber, for instance, in explaining 
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absence of economic rationalism in India.
23
 Nehru did not dither from critiquing India’s caste 
system as an evil and root of much its problem. He was categorical in his pronouncement that the 
growing rigidity and the exclusiveness of the Indian social structure were represented chiefly by 
the caste system;
24
  Nehru, however, did not see India’s caste system as an essential feature of its 
religious life. Rigid caste system, in Nehru’s framework of historical understanding, emerged 
only with the end of the first millennium. In fact, the long historical cycle of the subcontinent 
that begins with the Indus Valley Civilisation, and ends with the first Turko-Afghan invasions of 
the eleventh century witnessed, writes Nehru in the Discovery, a period which saw the flowering 
of a great civilisation, rich and vigorous, marked by some astonishing achievements in the fields 
of philosophy, literature, drama, art, science and mathematics. The economy expanded and 
prospered, and there were widespread trade and cultural contacts with many parts of the world. It 
was thus on historical conjuncture rather than on any kind of cultural essentialism that Nehru 
based his analysis of India’s stagnation and decline. The subsequent failure of Indian society to 
match up to the universal historical norm of development was entirely explicable according to 
Nehru by the circumstances of colonial rule: it was because the dominant foreign power 
consistently impeded the growth of the forces of modernity that Indian society was found it 
impossible to develop.
25
 
     As the stultification of the national life appeared to Nehru as externally imposed, rather 
than something intrinsic, he was confident that the empowerment of the nationalists and a 
judicious application of science and technology would provide India with the necessary 
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environment conducive to social and economic development. It was only a matter of time that 
India would be able to resume its normal course of development. On the social front, science and 
technology was expected to help replace irrationality with ‘scientific temperament’; Nehru 
considered this crucial in the making of ‘modern’ Indians; and on the economic front-it should 
contribute in building a vigorous, prosperous economy to overcome underdevelopment inflicted 
by years of colonial rule. It was only in achieving these two objectives that India could be 
considered a modern, developed nation. Being rational was equivalent to being modern in 
Nehru’s mind that could be achieved through a planned application of science and technology.  
Moreover science and technology held to Nehru promise of social and economic changes 
without the dislocation and violence witnessed in other revolutions.
26
    
     It, however, took the Indian government more than a decade after independence to come 
up with a policy document to clarify how exactly it wanted to cultivate science, and use it for 
economic development and social modernisation.
 27
  The Scientific Policy Resolution (1958), as 
the document came to be known, was drafted by the famous physicist and the architect of the 
atomic programme in India, Homi Jehangir Bhabha.
 28
 With adoption of the document by the 
Indian Parliament, the Government of India stated officially that it would be its responsibilities 
to foster, promote, and sustain science and scientific research in the country, by all appropriate 
means. With little or no corporate research, scientific and technological work became a public 
sector project in India. Most of the research laboratories were set up under government initiative 
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and scientists were government employees. The independent state became an impartial arbiter to 
decide what research would best meet national needs, rather than serve private profit. The 
resolution took a comprehensive approach by emphasising all aspects of science and technology 
development: pure research to widen knowledge about nature, applied research to make 
economic use of scientific knowledge, and more extensive systems of scientific and technical 
education to train Indians in scientific spirit and technical skill. The 1958 Resolution carefully 
distinguished ‘cultivation’ of science from doing scientific research. The former had broader 
social implications, which indicated the government’s commitment not only to professional 
practices of science, but also to infuse the daily life of the common man with the light of 
‘scientism’. A country enamoured in tradition for so long evidently needed (according to its 
policymakers) the inculcation of scientific values to feel connected to modern economic 
development.  
       To meet the expanding industrial application of science and technology, the government 
promised to ensure an adequate supply of research scientists of highest quality. Leaders planned 
to fulfil this promise through several means, such as public recognition of science as an 
important component of the nation’s strength. This they thought would encourage more young 
Indians to opt for science and engineering as a career.
29
 Moreover, to give added leverage to the 
scientific and industrial research institutes, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Natural 
Resources and Scientific Research appointed themselves as the President and the Vice-President 
of the Governing Body of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) that had 
been responsible for promoting, guiding and coordinating scientific and industrial research. The 
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close association of Nehru with the prominent scientists of CSIR, at both the official and 
personal level, conferred a vital political weight to the scientific community.
30
 
      As India veered towards socialism, the activities of its government progressively 
increased and it needed more science graduates to staff its technical posts. Rather than leaving 
matters such as transport, communications, fuel, power etc, up to individual or private enterprise, 
the government gradually brought these under public sector management. All these activities 
required the use of huge scientific and technical manpower. The government decided to promptly 
initiate programme for the training of scientific and technical personnel to address the growing 
needs. To accommodate the planned expansion of scientific and technical education, either new 
research institutes were opened up, such as the national laboratories and regional polytechnics, or 
the existing ones were made more capacious.
31
 
Table 1.1 Total National Expenditure on Research & Development 
Year Expenditure (Rs. Millions) Percentage of G.N.P 
1948-49 11.0 0.18 
1958-59 22.93 0.35 
1968-69 1075.06 0.63 
1978-79 5462.01 0.63 
1988-89 30778.00 1.01 
Source: R&D Statistics (New Delhi, Department of Science & Technology, 1986-87) 
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Table 1.2 Expenditure on Research & Development (Sector-wise breakup) 
                                                                                                                                           Rupees in Millions 
 1948-49 1950-51 1965-66 1970-71 1975-76 
Central Sector 11.0 46.8 624.5 1124.7 2876.1 
State Sector N/A N/A 35.1 125.8 267.3 
Private Sector N/A N/A 24.3 145.9 423.5 
Total 11.0 46.8 683.9 1396.4 3566.9 
Source: R&D Statistics (New Delhi, Department of Science & Technology, 1976-77) 
 
Notwithstanding the purely utilitarian purposes that might have provided the initial 
impetus behind setting up research institutes, more abstract ideals as ‘acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge’ and ‘discovery of new knowledge’ recurred in SPR and in uttering 
national leaders, such as of Nehru. Similarly, though it was very clear to both the government 
and to the scientific communities that state patronage and institutional back-up would be 
indispensable to do ‘big’ science, (as was required by the state for large-scale industrialisation) 
the government at least acknowledged that huge institutions ran the potential risk of stifling 
individual initiative.  The SPR was cautious that not only was it important to build world class 
institutes, but also to ensure an atmosphere of academic freedom for those who choose to be a 
‘lone inventor.’32  
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        The 1958 resolution therefore serves as an archetypical example of how the nascent 
Indian state sought to balance, even if somewhat precariously, the demands of large scale 
industrialisation with a romantic vision of science. The resolution repeatedly referred to science 
as a benevolent entity with material and cultural benefits that the Indian government should bring 
to the people of the country. The intention to use science both for increasing production and 
social development made SPR a unique document: it planned to use science for industrial 
purposes and at the same time aspired to go beyond any specific productionist purpose. This 
approach was further evident from how Indian leaders visualised the role of science, scientists 
and engineers both as facilitators of country’s economic development and as catalysts to social 
transformation of independent Indians. 
     Inculcation of scientific spirit among Indians had been a very significant part of the 
nation-building project. Its significance, it can be argued, partly came from the need to counter 
the perception that Indians were essentially other-worldly. Max Weber, for instance, found this 
other-worldliness (‘flight from the world’, as he called it) very common to all orthodox and 
heterodox Hindu thought order. Along with ‘caste ties’, ‘authoritative fixity’ and the ‘dogma of 
the unalterability of the world order’, Weber argued that a ‘devalued sense of the world’ 
discouraged growth of a ‘rational’ economic ethic, or spirit of capitalism in India.33 Nehru 
without explicitly blaming Indian religions for India’s economic stagnation, however, 
discouraged ‘too much dependence on supernatural factors’, which he considered might lead, as 
it had often in the past to a ‘loss of self-reliance in man and to a blunting of his capacity and 
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creative ability.’34 In the making of a modern mind, Nehru urged that Indians should discard to ‘a 
large extent the philosophical approach of the ancients, their search for ultimate reality, as well 
as the devotionalism and mysticism of the medieval period.’35      
        According to Nehru, the ‘Spirit of the Age’ (Zeitgeist/Yugadharma), demanded that 
people should be governed by a practical idealism.
36
  A ‘better’ type of the modern mind needed 
to be practical and pragmatic, qualities that could be achieved through nurturing a ‘scientific 
background, a scientific approach, a scientific mind and scientific temper.’37 The Prime Minister 
was hoping to transform India from a ‘static’ to a dynamic, modern society, one imbued with 
rationalism. Nehru’s high regard for rationalism stemmed from his belief that it embodied ‘the 
temper and approach of science’. He admired contemporary scientists, technicians, and engineers 
as ‘King Philosophers’ and considered rationality as a gift of these intellectuals, a product of 
their minds, which modern nations should help to spread across society in a systematic and 
deliberate way. He urged all people to ‘possess an engineering approach (or a scientific 
approach) to the problem facing them’. Such an approach would help in systematic way of 
thinking and use of reasoning to arrive at the ‘reality’.38 Rationality, Nehru was convinced, 
should be part of a conscious master plan for the ordering or modernisation of society. 
      In Nehru’s exaltation of scientists and engineers, however, lurked the danger of 
prioritizing the role of ‘expert’ over the masses and civil administrators. The members of the 
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Indian Planning Commission, for instance, were looked upon as a kind of ‘expert’ in 
development matters. Nehru expected that the members because of their dispassionate and 
scientific approach would be most eligible to decide what would be the appropriate development 
path for India. Though theoretically committed to make planning a social process in which, at 
least in some parts, every citizen should have the opportunity to participate, it would, however, 
be difficult to overlook the preponderance of the experts in the entire planning mechanism.  Each 
subcommittee of the Planning Commission was staffed and assisted by professionals with 
expertise on various subjects. In fact one of the most crucial factors behind the commission’s 
enormous authority over lay person and even over various government ministries was definitely 
the huge amount of expert data at its disposal.  
       The only significant effort made to incorporate political voices at the drafting stage of the 
development plans was through the institution of the National Development Council (NDC), 
which was platform comprising of the members of the commission as well as the Chief Ministers 
and other important ministers of the center and the states. As the council was constituted not of 
elected representatives, but hand-picked by the Prime Minister, the NDC could have been 
expected to play a political role in balancing of the authority of the Planning Commission. But, 
officially it merely acted as a conduit to bring to the table their understanding of the ground 
reality. In a federal structure with a strong center, the influence exerted by the Planning 
Commission with the backing of the Prime Minister ensured that main contour of the 
development plans were drawn largely by experts-maintaining a safe, detached distance from the 
rigmarole of political process. 
    The powerful group that formed around Nehru, sharing and influencing much of his 
vision, consisted of prominent scientists, such as Physicist-Statistician P. C. Mahalanobis, 
19 
 
Physicist H.J. Bhabha, the architect of CSIR, S.S. Bhatnagar etc. Scientists were not only seen as 
crucial for their expertise in technoscientific matter, but also to mould the cultural identity of the 
new nation. Scientists and engineers became the ideal of the ‘new’ society who would inspire the 
masses to conform to the norm of modernity and rationalism. 
    Thus, in spite of all the populist rhetoric of the age, ‘masses’ all too often entered the 
picture ‘only as the somewhat abstract ultimate beneficiary’ whose active participation was 
rarely envisaged by either the political or the technocratic establishment.
39
 In consonance to its 
plan to bring science to the masses, the Planning Commission made provisions for the 
establishment of Vigyan Mandirs or rural science laboratories in the villages. The term Vigyan 
Mandir can be best translated as ‘temple of science,’ a phrase that implies the exalted status of 
science learning in India, equivalent to worshipping a god.
40
 The object of the Vigyan Mandir 
scheme was to create popular interest in scientific development, to disseminate scientific 
information, and to bring applications of science closer to the everyday life of the rural 
population. By the end of the Second Plan, in the early 1960s, India had set up thirty-nine Vigyan 
Mandirs to make science more socially relevant, and hundreds of others were being planned.  
These institutions made available simple literature on agriculture and public health matters, plus 
exhibits of insects, preserved specimens, and models for illustrating plant diseases.  These 
Vigyan Mandirs demonstrated hand-operated spraying and testing equipment for insecticides and 
fungicides to villagers, giving them the first introductions to the use of expensive agro-chemical 
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inputs. The Indian government established these centres for popular dissemination of science in 
close association with educational institutions under community development projects, so as to 
infuse scientific practices in day-to-day life of the common Indians, from school-age children to 
adult farmers.
41
 
       Along with scientific temper, Nehru insisted that citizens of modern India should work on 
fostering a new work culture. In a colonial society which Nehru criticised as a ‘static’ society, it 
was the administrators and lawyers who played the most important part. In modern India, 
however, Nehru envisioned the engineers to be the ‘basic elements’ in building up of the 
country.
42
 He discounted the kind of thinking that grew out of lawyers and administrators as not 
being closely related to work. It was rather what he thought as ‘ordering about other people to do 
work.’ Nehru’s call to engineers was to individually take up cudgel to build a modern nation and 
also to inspire others to work.
43
 
    Nehru’s grandiose scheme of economic and social development with the aid of modern 
science and technology, however, remained lacking in many aspects. Limited finances, 
bureaucratisation and lack of private endeavour slowed the pace of development. But as the 
leader of the nation, Nehru was untiring in his exhortation of the virtues of modern science and 
technology. He imagined that its proper application, keeping in mind the specific needs of the 
country, would be successful in removing much of the ailments that were plaguing India’s 
industries, agriculture and culture.      
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      Nehru was not alone in his ‘tryst’ with science.  His contemporaries, irrespective of 
ideological convictions, both in India and in other newly independent countries kept a similar 
trust in the transforming capacity of science and technology.
 44
  Moreover, the work of the 
development theorists in the USA helped to further bolster the potential use of science and 
technology as a tool of economic prosperity. In his inauguration speech on January 20, 1949, 
President Harry S. Truman eloquently declared that a ‘bold new program’, encompassing the 
benefits of American scientific advances and industrial progress, would be applied for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
45
 The President was confident that successful 
application of specialised knowledge and skill would relieve the suffering of the masses in the 
developing world. He believed that greater agricultural and industrial production is the key to 
prosperity and peace, in achieving which scientific and technical knowledge would play a crucial 
role.
46
 A particularly appealing aspect of the President’s speech was his suggestion that people 
who had so long been categorised by the European colonialists as uncivilised, uneducated and 
backward, could now in fact work towards development and vertical progress in the hierarchy of 
states.
47
 Historians and critics of the development doctrine look back at this programme, more 
popularly known as the ‘point 4’48, as having inaugurated the ‘development age.’49  
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        The unquestioned desirability of economic growth that was evident in the development 
rhetoric was closely linked to the revitalised faith in science and technology.
50
 The United States 
government and few US private organisations, such as the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation 
played crucial roles in application of this development model in India.
51
 US assistance mainly 
came in the form of financial and technological aid. Science and technology, the participating US 
agencies believed, would assist the underdeveloped nations to shift away from their dependence 
on natural forces, which observers dismissed as not having the rationality, slickness and 
efficiency of modern science. W.W. Rostow, the patron-saint of the development’ theory 
vociferously recommended that twentieth-century humans should come to regard the physical 
environment not as ‘a factor given by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if 
rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change…’52 
Reflecting that same mindset, this particular developmental paradigm was biased against 
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handicraft because it rarely made any explicit use of large scale technology or scientific 
principles.  Backwardness, it argued was to be eliminated through development, which was a 
‘better’ way of organising man and nature, based on the rich insights of up-to-date science.  
      The drive to advance big industry in the developed countries was paralleled by an equally 
powerful project to reorganise society along scientific lines, applying the principles of 
rationality, empiricism and enlightenment to human society. Many of the new independent 
nations, heavily committed to development, joined ‘experts’ during this period in embracing 
science as an attractive instrument to remake their people in the image of what they believed was 
an advanced form of man, ‘freeing’ them from the irregularities linked to gender, race, 
‘traditional’ values, and autonomous opinions. 53 The agenda of transforming men and society 
were encouraged as crucial to the development projects. Modern societies were treated as 
discrete objects that would be bereft of all its natural, historical and social references that were 
not conducive to economic development. The new societies as opposed to the traditional ones 
would be cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of change, 
and characterised by a complex division of labour.
54
 
      The development model, on its adoption, promised a prosperous and modern society. Its 
proponents stressed on its universal applicability and drew attention to the underlying simplicity 
of the model. The claim to universal replication, however, necessitated that its proponents gloss 
over all regional characteristics that might act as potential hindrances to the path of development. 
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In extending technological and financial aid, the US government and the private agencies 
expected that the recipient countries would generally adopt the ways and means endorsed in the 
development discourse.  
      Historically, David Ludden pointed out in his study on India’s development regime, India 
have shared the ‘cognitive terrain’ with the developed countries in term of the following 
precepts: 1) ruling powers that claim progress as a goal 2) ‘people’ whose conditions must be 
improved 3) an ideology of science that controls principles and techniques to effect and measure 
progress, and 4) self-declared, enlightened leaders who would use state power for development.
 
55
  Beyond these generalized notions about development, however, at the level of practices many 
variations were visible. For a country like India driven by its own complex social, economic and 
political dynamics and its engagement with the question of modernity and tradition, the adoption 
of this development model was only partial and selective. Even with the adoption of the capital-
intensive technological package of the green revolution days, its dissemination would be 
selective-limited by agro-ecology, infrastructure and economic condition.  
Foreign Technology and Technological Autonomy 
       In the initial years after independence, India did not have the technological capacity to 
equip its industries. The country, therefore, encouraged import of foreign technologies through 
tax benefits and other fiscal measures. A specific kind of technology transfer, known as the 
‘turn-key’ technology, took place between India and the developed countries. Typically, in such 
a case, suppliers from Northern countries would transfer complete factories and industrial plants, 
installing equipment and then training technical personnel of the purchasing country to operate 
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and maintain it. In some cases, the supplier’s technical personnel themselves operated and 
maintained the plant for quite some time, before local technical personnel were able to ‘take 
over’ the plant. As a historian of Indian science and technology has argued, all the early mining, 
power, steel and chemical plants in India that came up during the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
were built with this type of technology transfer.
56
 
            The other logic used in accepting foreign technologies was that as a late starter in the 
history of industrialization, India should be open to benefits from the technological knowledge 
bank that had already been developed by industrialized countries. Technology transfer and 
foreign technical collaboration, however, always remained a highly contentious issue in India’s 
development, because it problematized the concept of ‘technological autonomy’ that national 
leaders held so dear. The dilemma was that India needed basic industries for its economic growth 
but did not have the technical know-how to build them up. For that it needed to borrow both man 
and material from the already industrialized countries. But a continuous borrowing of foreign 
technology only reinforced India’s dependence and delayed the goal of ‘technical autonomy’.57  
      A number of research sectors that had to heavily depend on foreign collaborations often 
justified it on grounds of either a quicker take off, or stressed on the ultimate benefits that it was 
imagined to bring for the country. For instance, H.J. Bhabha, later dubbed as the ‘Father of 
Indian Nuclear Programme’, held much hope for the role of atomic energy in raising people’s 
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living standards to levels comparable to that of the industrially advanced countries.
58
 In absence 
of any national tradition of atomic research, such a feat could be achieved, Bhabha argued, only 
if the country imported ‘one or two really first-class men from abroad for a limited period…’ to 
give ‘…experimental work in Nuclear Physics and Cosmic rays a great fillip.’59 On the other 
hand, Meghnad Saha, who had been a vociferous advocate of ‘national initiative’, insisted that 
India first needed to address the ‘dearth of good mechanics, laboratory men’. He drew attention 
to the lack of engineering and manufacturing firms for the production of ‘machinery, electrical 
goods, scientific instruments or chemicals.’60 Saha insisted that Indian scientists and 
technologists should be associated at all stages of a scientific project, and pointed out to Nehru 
that there could be no development of atomic energy in India without the development of an 
atomic instruments industry, and of associated chemical and metallurgical industries.
61
 Saha’s 
plans for self-reliance went beyond the question of expedient uses of technology; he insisted on 
technological development being based on socialist economic planning. Saha, therefore, not only 
challenged foreign control over India’s technological development but also ‘distorted 
concentration of capital’.62      
      Bhabha in turn was so convinced about atomic energy’s role in India’s development that 
he unhesitatingly asked for more resources, demanded absolute autonomy to avoid any 
interference from the country’s political establishment, and adopted a veneer of secrecy on their 
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activities at Trombay Atomic Research Centre that kept them immune from any unwonted 
queries from fellow scientists.
63
 Bhabha, later in his career, attempted to balance the role of 
‘indigenous’ efforts and ‘foreign’ collaboration in following terms: ‘indigenous science and 
technology plays the part of an engine in an aircraft, while foreign collaboration can play the part 
of a booster. A booster…can give a plane an assisted take-off, but it will be incapable of 
independent flight unless it is powered by engines of its own.’64 The planning documents bore no 
evidence that at the policymaking level foreign assistance was discouraged, but, while agreeing 
on the role of advanced technology on securing higher productivity, the Planning Commission at 
the same time insisted on techniques especially suited to local conditions; they pointed out that 
the problem was not merely one adopting and applying the processes and techniques developed 
elsewhere, but of developing new techniques specially suited to local conditions.
65
         
      Under the charged atmosphere of the Cold War, the issue of foreign technological 
assistance became further politicized. Though foreign assistance was a consistent feature in 
India’s economic development, especially in sectors related to atomic energy, heavy industries 
and in agriculture, there was a palpable ambivalence about it among the political leaders that did 
not escape the American officials either. After inaugurating the Technical Cooperation 
Programme in India on January 5, 1952,
66
  the American Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles,
67
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reported back home how sensitive the Indian leaders, especially Nehru, were about receiving any 
kind of foreign aid.  Merely the proposal for accepting Western assistance, Bowles recalled, 
risked evoking a feeling of submission to a stronger power.
 68
 Indian leaders wanted to rapidly 
modernize their people and living conditions, and sought technological and scientific assistance 
to achieve that aim smoothly and in a reasonable period of time, but they were haunted by the 
specter of being subjected to a political camp in the ongoing Cold War politics of entente 
formations. Similar views were expressed in the October 1956 conference of U.S. Consuls 
General and political officers in India. The participants concluded that although ‘many 
responsible Indians desire close ties with the West and although India’s need for foreign aid will 
be great for several years, the psychological barriers to accepting such close cooperation and 
assistance are very great. It has to be recognized as a political fact, the American political 
officers argued that due to a lifetime of struggle against colonialism, Indians generally have a 
very strong objection to the slightest hint of foreign influence or control-they do not even like to 
have foreigners managing factories in India.’69   
     Thus, factors such as the pressure of Cold War politics, the historically felt need to have 
modern industries, the desire for technical autonomy -all motivated the Indian government 
towards adopting a balanced program of research, covering every sector of the economy under 
state patronage. For promotion of scientific and industrial research, the plan was to set up eleven 
national research laboratories under state patronage. Most of these research laboratories were 
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built up as specialized institutions dealing with problems of specific industries such as 
metallurgy, fuel, food technology, drugs, glass and ceramics, roads, building, leather, and 
electro-chemical technology.
70
 The National Laboratories were intended to study ways to 
improve techniques to increase production and also ways to augment national resources by 
substituting cheap and abundant materials for those in short supply and by finding new purposes 
for unutilized materials.
71
  
      As capital always seemed to be at a short supply for decades after independence and 
certainly in those early years, planners, therefore,  strongly emphasized not only on the goal of 
developing technology through national effort, but also on making better uses of ‘indigenous’ 
raw material. For instance, the Central Leather Research Institute investigated possible methods 
to make more use of indigenous tanning materials and to develop substitutes for materials like 
wattle bark, which India did not produce in any significant quantity. In the face of persistent 
shortages of cereal crops, the Central Food Technological Research Institute undertook a series 
of investigations into the nutritive value of various Indian foods, roots and tubers that might be 
processed and fortified to substitute for cereals. To assist the paint and varnish industry and in 
manufacturing of phosphate fertilizers, the National Chemical Laboratory (NCL) conducted 
research to replace Tung oil with ‘Kamala’ seed oil (Mallotus philippensis), which grew 
profusely in India. The National Metallurgical Laboratory (NML) investigated different types of 
ores found in various parts of the country and studied alloy steels of interest to production in 
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metallurgical industries. National Fuel Research Institute conducted widespread surveys to 
determine the national availability of coal, which turned out to be crucial for the large power 
plants that the post-independence government was setting up.
72
   
        The insistence on usages of ‘indigenous’ material, however, did not in anyways implied 
an ideological abhorrence of the ‘foreign’ scientific communities. In the initial years, several of 
these labs had foreign scientists as head of their institute. For instance, in 1948 S.S. Bhatnagar, 
who was responsible for setting up the chain of national laboratories, appointed George Sachs, an 
American metallurgist, as director of NML. He also appointed British chemist J.W. McBain, as 
director of the NCL and the Austrian-American glass scientist N.J. Kriedl as the Director of 
Central Glass and Ceramics Research Institute in Calcutta.
 73
  As long as Nehru lived several 
foreign experts such as Niels Bohr, Joseph Needham, J.B.S Haldane and others visited India on 
short-programs. Critics of foreign control, as we see in case of Saha too, were open to the idea of 
foreign collaboration at a personal level, but had reservations about such collaborations on a 
government level, as it implied a kind of dependence and loss of self-reliance.
74
  
      Much has been written on the indubitable importance given to industrialization in the 
development of Indian economy after independence.
75
 Nehru’s view that no country could be 
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politically and economically independent unless it was highly industrialized had been quoted 
umpteenth number of times to illustrate the primacy accorded to capital-intensive technology by 
the new government. Industrialization was evidently considered indispensable by Nehru not only 
to achieve or maintain high standards of living and liquidate poverty, but also not to ‘upset the 
world’s equilibrium and encourage the aggressive tendencies of more developed countries.’76 
Partha Chatterjee used Nehru’s exhortations on ‘spirit of the age’ to argue that for the Indian 
Prime Minister, ‘the question of a choice between two alternative paths of economic 
development, one based on large-scale heavy industry and the other on decentralised small-scale 
industry, simply did not arise.’77  
       The importance of reviving cottage industries and village industries, practiced for 
centuries by artisans and craftsmen in Indian villages and town, have been seen as more 
concomitant to Gandhi’s ideas of economic development, rather than to the economic vision of 
modern India.
 
 However, the planning documents and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 
and 1956 carried substantial evidences of provisions made for the development of various types 
of small-scale industries India. The first three five year plans, roughly covering the period from 
1951-66, allotted 2, 4 and 2.8 percent of the total expenditure of each plan respectively for its 
development.
78
 The moderate investment figures can and will be interpreted by many as 
indicative of the relative insignificance of the sector compared to say heavy industries. It would, 
however, be misleading to use these figures to ascertain the role played by cottage/village 
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industries in the initial two decades of India’s independence for following reasons: first, cottage 
industries were not meant to cost as much as the highly mechanized basic industries. If it did, it 
would have flouted the basic principle that governed its existence. Cottage/village industries 
were meant to create employment, (especially to women folk) without costing much, using 
simple tools and local products.
 79
  Secondly, cottage industries were surely not planned to be an 
alternative for large-scale industrialization; thus, it would be wrong to find parity in investments 
made for their respective development. 
       The economic and technological impetus to the small-scale industries were planned with 
an assumption that these would provide ‘immediate and permanent employment on a large scale 
at relatively small capital cost, meet a substantial part of the increased demand for consumer 
goods and simple producer's goods, facilitate mobilization of resources of capital and skill, 
which might otherwise remain inadequately utilized and bring about integration of the 
development of these industries with the rural economy on the one hand and large-scale industry 
on the other.’ The small industries were also expected to offer ‘a method of ensuring more 
equitable distribution of the national income and avoiding some of the problems that unplanned 
urbanisation tends to create.’ However, it was only with ‘improvement in techniques and 
organisation’ and not in its use in its existing form that these industries offer possibilities of 
growing into an ‘efficient and progressive decentralized sector of the economy’, the planners 
explained.
80
  
      The plan to create more employment through revitalizing handicraft industries could be 
traced back beyond Gandhi to the thoughts of the nationalist economists of the late nineteenth 
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and the early twentieth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the indigenous 
industries of India had either decayed beyond recovery or were on the road to ultimate ruin, 
while modern industry was yet to reach considerable proportions. The early Indian national 
leaders bemoaned the fact that the ‘industrial prostration’ of the Indians under colonial rule was 
the result of the conjunction of these two factors. Evidently, spinning and weaving and other 
handicrafts had provided whole-time or part-time employment to millions of men and women, 
but with the deliberate destruction of Indian handicrafts, there was an increased ‘rustication’ of 
the country. It resulted not only in an overdependence on agriculture for livelihood, but also a 
‘loss of power, and intelligence, and self-defence.’ To the nationalist leaders, this lack of 
indigenous industry as an alternative means of income also helped to explain the repeated 
famines of colonial India. Thus, they made protection, rehabilitation, reorganization, and 
modernization of handicrafts into an important plank in their program for halting further 
regression in the material condition of the masses and for the economic revival of the country.
81
 
    To Gandhi India’s traditional cottage industries, unlike the machineries of modern 
civilization, which engendered ‘greed and want’ and widespread unemployment, appeared ideal 
for the country’s economic development as these were labor-intensive, used simple tools and 
were local resource-based.
 82
  Gandhi’s critique of modern civilization was put in the language of 
an economic theory by a German economist, Ernst Schumacher.  Schumacher’s ideas of 
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‘intermediate technology’, which was argued to be best applicable in the context of developing 
countries, were selectively put to use by the Indian government in the technological development 
of its cottage industries. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Jayaprakash Narayan, a Congress-
Socialist leader was one of the early supporters of Schumacher’s ideas in India. The two soon 
build up a personal and ideological rapport.
83
 Convinced of the applicability of Schumacher’s 
ideas in the context of India’s development, Jayaprakash informed Prime Minister Nehru of 
Schumacher’s work. Consequently, in January 1961Schumacher was invited to be a speaker at 
an international seminar on ‘Paths to Economic Growth’ held in Poona. In 1962, following 
prompting from Nehru, Jayaprakash invited Schumacher to come to India for six months as 
advisor to the Planning Commission.
 84
 It was evidently during this trip that Schumacher came to 
realize the need to develop a level of technology ‘appropriate’ to the needs and resources of a 
developing society; he specifically mentioned four characteristics of a technology: it would be 
small in scale so that it could fit into small market situations; it would be simple, so that 
sophisticated manufacturing skills, organization and finance would be unnecessary; it would not 
be capital-intensive, and would therefore keep the cost per workplace down; and it should be 
non-violent, which meant that an appropriate technology would be one that was completely 
under human control, that it would not have unintended side effects, and that it would not cause 
social or environmental disruption.
85
 
    Though it is evident that Schumacher’s ideas did not influence the technological 
development of the Indian economic sector in its entirety, his ideas had an impact on the 
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development of cottage industries in independent India. This was especially so because neither 
Schumacher nor his immediate successor, George McRobie were dogmatic in defining 
appropriate technology; they insisted that it was by no means certain that all the criteria could be 
satisfied in every case; any one of them, or combination of them would be valuable for the 
purpose.
86
 Development of cottage industries in India reflected this flexibility; without explicitly 
committing itself to non-violence, the government found it economically prudent to advocate 
alternative technologies for cottage industries. Such technology being more labor-intensive 
helped to increase employment; it raised productivity with little capital-investments, and created 
products that would meet the needs of the economically disadvantageous.
87
   
       These ideas would be further brought into fruition through government’s support for 
village industries in rural development programs. The planners were aware that rural arts and 
crafts had both social and economic significance; economically, it would not only help to arrest 
increasing pressure of population on land, but also use local raw materials and simple techniques 
to supply goods to the local markets.
88
 In fostering organic unity and culture of the villages, the 
government expected that village printing, embroidery, pottery, and the crafts of tribal people, 
would continue to play an important role, just as it had done in the past. All these prompted 
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extension of government patronage in the development of these crafts, which it admitted to have 
suffered much from the economic development of the past few decades.
89
       
     The government’s plan to revive cottage industries was closely associated with the spirit 
of self-reliance. Though from the outset, it might seem that the idea of self-reliance had a 
Gandhian lineage, which it had, but, there was a difference in how it was defined by Gandhi and 
by government of independent India. For Gandhi swadeshi or self-reliance was a mean to fight 
dependence on British goods, capitalism and also materialism. He defined it as the ‘spirit in us 
which restricts us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the 
more remote…In that of economics I should use only those things that are produced by my 
immediate neighbours and serve those industries by making them efficient and complete where 
they might be found wanting…’90 The two most important elements that linked Gandhi’s 
espousal of swadeshi to his plans for cottage industries were that the society must be capable of 
supplying the basic minimum needs of the people without dependence on external sources, and 
maximum uses of indigenous resources and technology.
91
 For Gandhi, as we see from his 
definition of the swadeshi, by ‘external’ sources not only meant foreign imports, but also 
anything beyond the immediate neighborhood. This was in congruence with his idea of an India 
made up of self-reliant village republics. But for most leaders of independent India, the call for 
self-reliance did not hinge on anything that insular. Their insistence on using indigenous 
resources came more from a practical concern of saving valuable foreign exchange and 
developing national capacity. The government of India planned to use its research establishments 
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and natural resources to revamp the ailing handicraft sector and turn it into a valuable foreign-
exchange earner. 
       With that view in mind, the Central Government constituted a Handicrafts Board with 
advisory powers.
92
 The planners realized that apart from financing handicraft industries, the 
government needed to organize research to develop it. Research in handicrafts would involve 
study of local art, skill and tradition, as well as the study of materials. This would mean 
developing a number of institutions across different parts of the country to undertake research on 
handicraft production. Planners also urged the Central Government to consider the possibility of 
establishing a central institute for the study and preparation of designs, which could work in co-
operation with arts and crafts schools, institutions like Shantiniketan, and industrial departments 
in several States.
93
  
     Given that the technical development of cottage and rural industries constituted a 
significant part of India’s anticipated economic development, the newly founded national 
laboratories were expected to play a decisive role towards that end. Since cottage and rural 
industries did not have the requisite finance to create their own research and development 
departments, the national laboratories brought the latest technology within their reach, aiming to 
help medium and small-scale producers to reduce costs and improve quality of their products. 
Other than these, a Central Research Institute for Village Industries under the All-India Khadi 
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and Village Industries Board was established in western India at Wardha that worked on 
developing and designing products and tools to be used by small-scale industries.
94
  
          Thus, the independent Indian government made a selective appropriation of Gandhi’s 
ideas of cottage industries. Instead of using it as an alternative, however, the Indian government 
encouraged its simultaneous growth by integrating it with institutionalized research 
establishment.
  Nehru suggested coordination between the two types of industries in India’s 
economic development, arguing that industrialization could play a complementary role in the 
growth of cottage industries. He wrote, ‘Without industrialisation no country can have political 
or economic freedom, and even cottage industries cannot develop to any large extent if economic 
freedom is absent… the development of cottage industries is helped greatly by the supply of 
cheap power and suitable machinery for cottage use which are obtainable from the working of 
large scale enterprises. To some extent, handicrafts and large-scale industrial enterprises are 
complementary to each other. The problem before the country, therefore, is one of coordinated 
growth in both directions and the avoidance, so far as possible of conflict between cottage 
industry and large-scale industry.’95  
     A coordination between cottage and large scale industries was attempted through a 
'common production programme' that reserved areas of production for each, levied cesses  on the 
big industries to develop related small enterprises,  and gave a price advantage to the smaller 
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units through differential taxation, subsidies, sales rebates, etc.
96
 At the level of policy 
formulation, the Indian state would continuously claim that its goal was not to let the handicraft 
and village industries perish in face of the demand for rapid industrialization, but rather to bring 
small enterprise within the fold of state patronage and make those economically productive by 
instilling technological improvement. This could be seen as an extension of the state authority in 
a previously unorganized sector through the formation of government sponsored credit 
cooperatives and organization of training facilities. No attempt, however, was undertaken at the 
government level to bring about a large scale mechanization or mass production of handicrafts in 
factories. 
       Unlike in the case of big factories, the research enterprises for the small-scale industries 
concentrated upon producing low-cost, simple equipments that were build using locally-available 
resources. For instance, to meet the requirements of yarns for handlooms, instead of setting up 
mechanized mills, the government encouraged researchers on devising a technically sound and 
low-cost charkha. The second-five year plan reported that technical tests were being conducted 
on what came to be known as ‘Ambar charkha’, a three-unit spinning set consisting of a carding 
machine, a drawing machine and a four-spindle spinning wheel. The Khadi and Village 
Industries Board launched a pilot program, which included in its initial phase more that hundred 
training centers across the country to train people on use of technically improved charkhas and 
production of the same.
 
Similar steps were taken to popularize hand-pounded paddy instead of 
using power-driven rice mills. As advised by the Rice Milling and the Village and Small Scale 
Industries Committee (KVIC), the government proposed that all power driven rice mills should 
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be licensed and that no new mills should be allowed to be set up nor expansion of capacity of the 
existing mills allowed, except where it was considered absolutely essential in the public interest 
in special circumstances.
 
This however meant that the level of technical efficiency and output of 
hand-pounded rice needed to be improved upon. A scheme was undertaken to come up with 
improved ‘Assam dhenkis’ and winnowing fans. 97  
      The vegetable oil industry was also incorporated within the ambit of small-scale industry 
and instead of using mechanical power to crush oil seeds at the mills, the government insisted on 
using the traditional ghani technology. A ghani though varying in designs over regions was 
essentially a ‘mortar-and-pestle device made of stone or wood that uses a perambulating animal 
to extract oil under pressure from oil-bearing seeds…’98 whose existence could be traced back to 
Sanskrit texts of Panini of the sixth century BC. In the 1930, when the All India Village 
Industries Association was formed in Wardha with the backing of Mahatma Gandhi, Jhaverbhai 
Patel was put in charge of improving the ghani oil sector. The best features of six regional 
designs were put together and tested by building models, to yield the Maganvadi ghani in 1943. 
This incorporated improvements which, Gandhiji wrote, ‘have lessened the labour of both men 
and animals who work at the ghani and at the same time have improved the output of oil.’99 
Further technical improvements on this model led to the Wardha ghani in 1954.  
       By 1958, some 5,800 improved Wardha ghanis had been introduced by the KVIC, and in 
the next decade the figure had risen to over 32,500. The popularity of the ghani comes from its 
overall high working efficiency and reduction in cost. The provision of automatic stirring and of 
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an oil drain both reduced the strain on the artisan. The pestle did not have to be removed each 
time, so one person could look after two ghanis. The strain on the animal was reduced by the 
introduction of ball-bearings in the pestle cap, and the provision of a trenched track in which to 
move. Capital and recurring costs were both reduced. While the cost of the ghani itself was 
unaltered, the low pestle meant that a very high shed was not needed. Besides, the availability of 
replaceable standard parts had the advantage that the whole ghani did not have to be replaced. It 
was not that improvisation of ghani stopped with this; in 1968, KVIC recommended that electric 
power be introduced to replace bullock power to give a better monetary return to the oilmen, 
without compromising the flavor of oil or driving anybody to unemployment.
100
 
Cultural Modernization and the Scientific Temper 
     With all his fascination for a modern state populated by rational modern men, Nehru’s 
attitude to modernity was marked by significant ambivalences that surfaced in spite of all his 
optimism. He observed that modern civilization that developed first in the West and spread 
elsewhere ‘produces an unstable society which gradually loses its vitality. Life advances in many 
fields and yet loses its grip; it becomes more artificial…’101 As the ‘basic’ cause of this 
decadence, Nehru identified spiritual malaise, ‘something effecting the mind and spirit of 
man.’102 Nehru earnestly believed that India is the place, where with her own tradition of 
spirituality, the destabilizing effects of modernization could be curbed. In the cultural 
regeneration of Indians, therefore, spiritualism substituted religious traditions to counter 
undesirable impacts of modernization on society. Being part of the modernization plan, 
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spiritualism was considered as not antithetical to rationalism or to science in general. Science 
and spiritualism would coexist in any modern Indian, as was the expressed desire of Nehru. He 
termed this coexistence as ‘scientific humanism’.103  
      A convincing conceptual coalescence of science with spiritualism required Nehru to 
redefine both.  The much coveted scientific spirit, Nehru pointed out, should not limit man into 
exploring the material world, rather it should help to face life with ‘the temper and approach of 
science allied to philosophy and with reference to all that lies beyond.’104 Through this 
reformulation, Nehru attempted to find a harmony between the world of fact and world of spirit. 
According to Nehru’s own admission, it was through his idea of scientific humanism that he tried 
to find an answer to the much vexed question of how to reconcile the phenomenal life of the 
world with the inner spiritual life of the individual. It was only through practicing scientific 
humanism that I see Nehru trying to bridge the private domain of spiritualism with the public 
domain of science. A modern Indian, inspired by scientific humanism, would be a reflection of 
the synthesis of both these worlds. 
     As science, spiritualism needed a redefinition too and Nehru especially had to distinguish 
that spiritualism was not something dependent on supernatural factors; it was a ‘necessary’ faith 
‘in things of the spirit which are beyond the scope of our physical world, some reliance on moral, 
spiritual and idealistic conceptions’; he considered faith necessary for without it there would be 
‘no anchorage, no objectives or purpose in life.’105 In the cultivation of this spiritualism, Nehru 
saw no giving away to feeling of abstention, the much-criticized ‘otherworldliness’ of Indians, 
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but rather the ‘detachment’ of a ‘matured’ civilization. He explained that, ‘as a man grows to 
maturity he is not entirely engrossed in, or satisfied with, the external objective world. He seeks 
also some inner meanings, some psychological and physical satisfactions. So also with peoples 
and civilizations as they mature and grow adult. Every civilization and every people exhibit these 
parallel streams of an external and internal life.’ Thus, Nehru found in India, as elsewhere, these 
two streams of thoughts and actions-the acceptance of life and detachment from it- developing 
side by side, with the emphasis on the one or the other varying in different periods.
106
 
       Nehru located this spiritualism in an idealized construction of India’s past and in the 
achievement of its people. Without any visible effort to historicize his observations, Nehru 
wrote, ‘…the buoyant energy and love of life and nature of our forefathers, their love of truth 
and beauty and freedom, the basic values that they set up, their understanding of life’s 
mysterious ways, their toleration of other ways than theirs…’107 These selective gleaning of 
‘Indian traditions’ well-suited Nehru’s vision of a modern India; it was spiritual without being 
dogmatic or biased to any particular religion; it was material in its proclamation for love of life 
without being crudely acquisitive, and above all it successfully demonstrated Nehru’s hypothesis 
that India’s capitulation to foreign domination or present backwardness was not something 
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inherent to the character of its people, but because of conjectural social, economic and political 
factors. 
      Of the actors who were involved with formulating development policies and conducting 
scientific research in India during this period, few if any doubted that science and technology had 
a transformative role to play. But, what remained a relatively contested issue was in what ways 
should techno-scientific research be put into use so that higher production could be achieved 
without stretching the economic means of the practitioners, cultivators, consumers and then 
state? On the political front the state did not want to compromise with its goal of social equity 
because doing so carried the danger of causing large scale fissures in an already class-caste 
ridden Indian society. Apart from political-economic concerns that characterized much of the 
technoscientific effort during this period, there were significant cultural and ecological issues. 
Though the modernizing elite was more often than not convinced about the potential use of 
techno-science as a tool to mold cultural specificities according to own requirements, and 
overcome ecological constraints, it could not, and therein lies the most important lesson of this 
historical study. 
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Fig 2.1 Rice & Wheat: Agricultural Production Area of India c. 1970 
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Chapter 2 
Looking Past the Green Revolution: Agricultural Research and the Modernization of 
Indian Agriculture 
        
Independent India was a hungry nation. With the transfer of power on August 1947, the 
national government inherited from the British a starving and malnutritioned populace.  In 
colonial India, famine was a recurrent feature -caused by inclement weather and aggravated by a 
callous colonial administration.  Jawaharlal Nehru remembered his utter shock at witnessing 
famished Indians dying in the streets of Calcutta in the Bengal Famine of 1943, vindicating his 
understanding of the despicable futility of the British rule over India.
1
  After independence, the 
task of eliminating starvation and preventing famine assumed crucial policy significance for the 
national government. The Planning Commission of India, for instance, pointed out that ‘for the 
large sections of the community which live near the margin of subsistence, a certain minimum 
supply of food grains at reasonable prices (would) constitute the rock-bottom of the standard of 
living.’2  A successful execution of the ‘food for all’ policy would help, the Indian government 
expected, in distinguishing it from the incompetent foreign regime of the past, and, bolster its 
moral legitimacy to rule. 
                                                 
1
 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (The John Day company, 1946); Economist Amartya Sen described, 
how in the famine of 1943, abject poverty condemned millions in India to what he called a ‘disentitlement’ to food. 
The crux of Sen’s theory of famines is that fairly rapid changes in the economy (especially in the agricultural sector) 
plunge certain of the poorer vulnerable groups in a society into an exchange entitlement situation characterized by 
insufficient purchasing power to buy enough food. This can happen either by the collapse of a person’s endowment 
(e.g. loss of crops in the case of cultivators, animals in the case of pastoralists or physical ability to work in the case 
of laborers) or by an increase in the cost of food capable of reducing the exchange options below that of enough 
food. A.K.Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (OUP, 1981); John Abraham, Food 
and Development: The Political Economy of Hunger and the Modern Diet (WWF & Kogan Page Ltd, 1991). 
 
2
 Planning Commission of India, First Five Year Plan (FYP) (New Delhi, Government of India, 1952), Ch.11. 
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      Moreover, because of the commitment of Indian government to large scale 
industrialization, its planners inextricably linked the need for larger food-crop production to the 
question of industrialization. Food-crops were not grown in India as an export commodity, thus, 
neither rice nor wheat was a potential foreign exchange earner such as jute. Not valuable as 
source of capital, the Planning Commission of India, therefore, explained the significance of 
food in terms of sustaining the huge labor force working in industries and construction jobs. It 
was expected that working men would have bigger food requirements, which have to come not 
directly from the families, but from the marketable surplus available in the system, necessitating 
increased food production.
3
  National food production and its proper distribution were seen as 
critical for industrial development, so the first FYP (1951-56) aimed to keep food prices at a 
level accessible to the population. The government knew that even a moderate shortfall in the 
supply of food grains would likely to raise their prices more than proportionately, leading 
directly to increases in the cost of living and in production costs across the economy.
 4
  
    In spite of its emphasis on providing food for all, it has been forcefully argued by many 
that the Indian government showed little enthusiasm to invest significant amount of capital to 
augment the country’s food-crop production. The recurrent observations made by various social 
scientists, scientists, bureaucrats and others, both from India and outside, had been that the 
national leadership was prioritizing industrial development over food-crop production, ignoring 
                                                 
3
 First FYP, Ch.11. 
 
4
 At the same time, the planners insisted that there should be a growing demand for food, because falling food prices 
were indicative of insufficient investment effort and low purchasing power in the community. The Indian 
nationalists under the British rule and the national government in the initial years after independence would share 
the same skepticism about rising food price. Bipan Chandra pointed out that the protagonists of economic 
nationalism in India argued that the price rise was not a sign of the higher purchasing power of the masses but a 
grave symptom of falling national production and declining agriculture. Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of 
Economic Nationalism in India: Economic policies of Indian national leadership, 1880-1905 (People's Pub. House, 
1966) p. 37.  
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wheat over jute and was more eager to peruse the goal of social equity than to raise production. It 
is evident from these narratives that relevance accorded to capital investment is the most defining 
characteristics of any ‘modern’ agricultural system, and India was no exception-its presence 
meant a ‘modern’ agricultural sector and its absence implied, without a doubt, a traditional 
production system. According to its very definition, a modern agricultural production system 
would have a highly mechanized countryside, where farmers would be integrated with larger 
economic system beyond its immediate locality, uses of biological and chemical inputs, such as 
hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides would be rampant and profit-driven. Moreover, 
these inputs would be systematically studied and improved by technoscientific experts at 
research laboratories; markets and not individual farmers or inter-farmer informal exchange 
network would be the source of these inputs anymore.  
     According to this analytical framework, therefore, it was only with the Green Revolution 
of the mid-1960s that Indian farmers and scientists would get to witness and more importantly 
participate in a modern agricultural production system. The new technology based on 
sophisticated breeding methods, stipulated agronomic practices, emphasizing on the use of 
capital-intensive input, and advocating high prices of food-crops to encourage investment 
heralded the beginning of modern agriculture in India. The period that preceded the coming of 
the green revolution was bereft of most of these features. Not blessed by large-scale capital 
investment-either by the state or private corporations, it was seen by scholars to be deprived of 
the fruits of technoscientific research too. If raising production was the sole criterion of receiving 
attention from the scholars studying India’ s agricultural system, then, institutional reforms, such 
as land reforms and village cooperatives were certainly a failure compared to the Green 
Revolution technology. But, nonetheless it has merited extensive reviews from political 
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economists, historians, sociologists, policy analysts etc. Interpreted as being central to the Indian 
government’s economic policy during these years, its close association with the state mechanism 
made it a significant object of study.  
    On the other hand, because of far less investment made in agricultural science, the Indian 
state have been portrayed as unenthusiastic about its application in raising agricultural 
production. The first task, therefore, is to locate science and technological research in the state’s 
plan towards augmenting yield of food-crops and not just cash-crop. If we can successfully argue 
that the Indian state was indeed interested about agricultural science, we can then ask how 
exactly it planned on using its scientific establishment. Instead of concluding that with limited 
availability of capital, scientific research had almost a non-descript place in agricultural 
development policy, we can shift our focus from primacy generally accorded to capital-intensive 
inputs into studying the research conducted on use of cheaper, locally available biological and 
chemical resources. In doing that, we make a significant departure from studying the history of 
all agricultural modernization in term of the ‘Western’ model, which historically developed 
mainly in NW Europe and corn-belt of the American Midwest, keeping in consideration only 
farmers, who owned large or medium size farms, capable of high capital investment.
5
 
     Studying the nature of food-crop research in pre-green revolution independent India 
would help us to see how a government, not keen to thoroughly capitalize the food sector was, 
yet, committed to use of science and technology for variety of development purposes, including 
raising production. Science and technology, contemporary political leaders and India’s scientists 
believed, was neither eastern nor western, but universal. But as the social and economic context 
                                                 
5
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of each nation-state differed, so did its development plans and the way its government 
considered using technoscience in the fulfillment of those development objectives. The Indian 
government and its research establishment, for instance, worked towards formulating a research 
policy that would allow them to use scientific principles to its economic advantage, according to 
its planning objectives and without having to enter into a political-military alliance with any 
Cold War power blocs. 
   The complexity that pervaded India’s agricultural research establishment, therefore, 
raises the crucial question as to what was the nature of technoscientific development of India’s 
food-crop sector before the coming of the green revolution technology?-did it turn its face from 
any usages of capital intensive resources, or was there a selective appropriation? Did use of 
cheap indigenous inputs implied a commitment towards ‘traditional’ agricultural practices, or did 
‘modern’ India shared a rather uneasy relation with ‘tradition’ as embodied in ancient texts on 
farming and in the varying  practices of farmers? Lastly, including agroecological factors, such 
as lodging nature of the existing seed varieties, pattern of rainfall, moisture stress etc in our 
analysis help us to understand beyond the political and economic compulsion of the time, and, in 
doing so it gives us a more comprehensive understanding of the practices and inputs 
recommended by agricultural scientists during this period.  
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Table 2.1 Trends in Area and Production of Wheat & Rice in India, 1956-1989 
                                                                  *Measured in million hectares           **Measured in million tons 
 
Year  India (Rice) 
Area*                         Production** 
India (Wheat) 
Area*                          Production** 
1955/56 31.52 27.56 12.37 8.76 
1960/61 N/A N/A 12.93 11.00 
1964/65 36.46 39.31 13.42 12.26 
1967/68 36.44 37.61 14.99 16.54 
1970/71 37.59 42.22 18.24 23.83 
1975/76 39.48 48.74 20.45 28.84 
1978/79 39.42 42.33 22.64 35.51 
1988/89 41.86 70.67 24.90 53.99 
Source: Estimates of Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, Indian Agricultural 
Statistics, and Fertilizer Statistics, 1955/56 through 1989/90 
 
 The U.S Involvement in Indian Agriculture and the Cold War Imperatives 
     By late 1950, India was caught in the grips of its most serious food shortage since 
independence. Drought, preceded by floods, spread to several locations in northern states. 
Reports arrived from Bengal and Assam, documenting hundreds of deaths due to malnutrition 
and starvation. ‘We should live on the food we produced after two years, or die in the attempt,’ 
Nehru had declared in 1949. Two years later, Nehru visited ravaged districts and reportedly 
asked inhabitants of one village, ‘Why do you shout slogans in my praise, when I cannot feed 
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you to keep strong?’6 As drought widened, food production plummeted, and pressures on supply 
intensified. Black markets and corrupt handling of the government’s procurement and rationing 
efforts only exacerbated the disaster. The initial calculations showed that India needed to import 
six million tons of food-grains. It was only by reducing daily rations to nine ounces per person, 
stretching foreign exchange resources to the limit, and arranging for purchases from abroad, 
India was able to reduce its grain deficit to two million tons. It had to turn to the US with a 
request for these two million tons of wheat. America’s prompt sanction of wheat for India helped 
to ease the food situation. 
        The decision of the US government to extend food aid was, however, not solely governed 
by humanitarian concerns at relieving distress. The ongoing Cold War gave a political context to 
the policy of food aid. Within the Truman administration, Henry F. Grady, the US Ambassador 
to India, had vociferously, yet unsuccessfully, advocated the necessity of US aid to Indian 
agriculture for the political and economic stability of the country.  The political nature of the US 
aid is brought out even more clearly in the State Department’s decision to help the Indian 
government in carrying out the Grow More Food policy soon after the Communist’s victory in 
China, and with the outbreak of the Korean War. 
7
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           Fig 2.2 Major Agricultural Resource Flows: U.S. Economy to Less Developed Countries like India 
 
        
George McGhee’s June 1950 proposals for ‘Economic Aid to South Asia and the Near 
East,’8 which Truman approved at the wake of the Korean War, focused almost wholly upon 
agricultural programs. In his August 1950 memo to the president, McGhee also noted in passing 
that the ‘first emphasis’ of the South Asia program would be toward achieving a ‘prompt and 
                                                 
8
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December 1951. 
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substantial improvement in the indigenous food supply.’ McGhee argued that the development of 
food security was a prerequisite for social and political stability in the region.
9
 As a consequence 
to all these policy initiatives, American diplomats signed a $4.5 million Indo-American 
Technical Agreement in December 1950. 
      The major US foundations were quick to join in the struggle for Asia. Leaders of both the 
Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations believed that expanding their international missions was 
critical to the nation’s interest. John Cowles,10 a member of the Ford Foundation’s Board of 
Trustees, frantically responded, ‘…If we lose India, as we lost China, we shall certainly lose 
South East Asia with the repercussions running all the way through Africa. It is difficult under 
such circumstances to see how Japan could be held in line, and it would not be too long before 
we would find ourselves driven back into (a) ‘citadel’.11 At this critical juncture, Ambassador 
Chester Bowles arrived and became involved in the Indian planning process. Chester Bowles 
considered India to be a ‘perfect test Point IV concept’. He pointed out all the reasons why India 
should receive technical aid: it is the ‘second largest country in world in a key strategic position 
in Asia. Present government devoted (to) democratic way, sound development program ready to 
go, great natural resources, willing people. Short on food, capital, (and) technical know-how.’ 
Bowles’ incessant anxiety was that if the United States did not adequately help the democratic 
government, Indian citizens would sink into deep despair that would mark an open invitation to 
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the Communists waiting to take over.
 12
 Bowles immediately set out in search of a way to put US 
aid money to work.  
     Under Bowles initiative, a bilateral treaty was signed between the Indian and the US 
government on 5 January 1952. It brought India under the coverage of the Technical Cooperation 
Program, also known as the Point Four program of the US government. It formally established a 
joint fund of $54 million for the purchase of supplies and hiring of technicians not available in 
India.
13
 According to the terms of the Agreement, US government decided to help India 
strengthen the system of agricultural research and education. 
      Sympathetic to Bowles’ plans, Paul Hoffman, director of the Ford Foundation, 
encouraged the ambassador to visit Indian government project sites in the districts of Etowah and 
Faridabad, which had recently undertaken reformist approaches to rural development.
14
 Building 
on the Etowah-Faridabad examples, Bowles envisioned a program of ‘community development’ 
that would divide India into a series of ‘development areas’.15 In these areas, promoters would 
supply farmers with improved seed, tools, irrigation facilities, and fertilizers. Village-level 
workers, one for every 5 or so villages, would help distribute these items and teach peasant 
cultivators how to use them. On Thanksgiving Day, 1951, Bowles presented to Nehru a rough 
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draft of the proposal. It called for the creation of an All India ‘Development Authority’ to 
implement a wide-ranging Community Development Program (CDP) that would raise health and 
literacy standards, expand agricultural extension, and generally improved rural living conditions. 
The principal economic and social aims of CDP were to increase food production, to improve the 
quality of life of rural India, and to lay the groundwork for India’s capitalistic development. 
Politically, the American ambassador hoped that these development projects would make non-
communist India a stable and reliable friend of the US. 
16
 
      The Rockefeller Foundation’s specific involvement with India started towards the end of 
1951, when it sponsored a team of agricultural specialists- Warren Weaver, J. George Harrar and 
Paul G. Manglesdorf to India.
17
 The Rockefellers, unlike the Ford Foundation, did not involve 
itself in the CDP. It preferred concentrating on agricultural research to help evolve improved 
varieties of food-grains. They believed that students benefiting from the new postgraduate 
curriculum of IARI, which they helped to open in 1956, would be able to contribute more 
directly towards developing Indian agriculture, than any effort to reconstruct India’s 
countryside.
18
 The Rockefeller Foundation might have considered the rural development projects 
too ambitious in scope and time, and not entirely focused on the more crucial problem of low 
production. Their conviction on the efficacy of a specifically production-centric technological 
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approach was especially bolstered by Rockefeller’s success in making Mexico self-sufficient in 
corn by 1948.
19
  
      Consequently, the Agricultural Development Council, an organization attached to the 
Rockefeller Foundation appointed John W. Mellor as visiting research fellow to India in 1959. 
He argued that increased use of fertilizers, increased water control, further research into crops 
and techniques and the expansion of human capital in agriculture would lead to direct gains in 
agricultural employment, output and productivity. This new pattern of per capita income would 
lead, arguably, to major structural changes within the economy. A higher rate of agricultural 
production, Mellor pointed out, would help to ensure improved dietary standards and larger 
expenditure on consumer goods. The resulting growth of a labor-intensive industry would let 
India shake off the dead weight of massive unemployment, Mellor believed. 
20
  
     The actions of the Rockefeller Foundation in India was based on the assumption that the 
urgency of raising agricultural production warranted it being treated separately from the more 
complex problem of rural development; Bowles and the Ford Foundation, however, did not deem 
such a separation appropriate. Agricultural production, for them, was part of a larger social 
problem. Where all the three actors agreed, however, was in their belief that agricultural 
improvements could not possibly ignore greater capital investment in technological 
development. The Rockefeller Foundation insisted on immediate capacity-building and 
international collaboration towards technology transfer; the Ford Foundation, on the other hand, 
was more willing to satisfy the urgent technological needs through import, rather than 
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immediately start building research institutes in India; Bowles wanted technological assistance to 
complement community development projects. For Bowles the ideal way to modernize India’s 
agricultural sector would be to combine institutional reforms with use of advanced technology.  
He insisted that India’s use of advance technology and improved tools should not depend entirely 
on import; it should rather plan on how to use local expertise.
21
 
Table 2.2 India: An Estimate of Food-grain and Fertilizer Requirements, 1952/53-1979/80* 
Year Estimated 
Population** 
Estimated 
food grain 
requirements 
Increment in 
food-grain 
requirements 
above 
1952/53 
Estimated fertilizer 
requirements to 
produce 50% of food-
grain increment 
N                   P2O5 
Food-grain 
availability per 
person*** 
 
Lbs/yr         cal/yr 
1952/53 370,000,000 66,100,500 0 100,000 10,000 316 1388 
1959/60 398,632,000 72,800,000 6,700,000 352,000 143,000 319 1400 
1964/65 424,177,000 80,200,000 14,100,000 628,000 288,000 330 1450 
1969/70 451,359,000 88,300,000 22,200,000 932,000 448,000 341 1500 
1974/75 480,283,000 96,900,000 30,800,000 255,000 618,000 352 1550 
1979/80 511,062,000 106,100,000 40,000,000 600,000 800,000 363 1600 
* Prepared by the Foreign Agricultural Services, United States Department of Agriculture, July 1954. 
This estimate assumed that 50% of the increment in food-grain requirements above 1952/53 would be met 
by increased production from expansion of the area sown, improvements in irrigation, and all other 
approved cultural practices except chemical fertilizer, and that the other half of the increment would come 
from increased use of chemical fertilizer.       
**Net increase in population computed at 1.25% annually. 
***Computed at 87.5 percent of food-grain requirements to adjust for seed, waste, and industrial waste. 
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     Apart from Cold War imperatives and economic logic behind desiring a change in the 
agricultural situation of the developing world, the US government and the private foundations 
were confident that they had sufficient technological experience to help bring about this change 
in the developing countries. With the establishment of the land grant institutes since the middle 
of the nineteenth century, the United States continued to enjoy the benefits of a concerted effort 
towards agricultural education, research and extension. During the Second World War a greater 
emphasis on agricultural science and technology helped to change further American agriculture; 
agricultural acreage expanded about 5 percent and productivity increased by 11 percent, largely 
because of the increased use of hybrid seeds, pesticides, insecticides, fertilizer and 
mechanization. It changed American farming from being a way of life to one pursued largely for 
economic gain. At the end of the Second World War when a devastated Europe was famine-
stricken and looked to the US for agricultural commodities, the latter was the only one with 
enough resources to bring about a change in the developing world.
22
   High-yielding seeds, 
which constituted an important part of agricultural development, were already being 
commercially produced in the US. The American experts drew from their past technological 
experience with hybrid corn to produce in high-yielding, disease and insect resistant varieties for 
other developing countries.    
     Confident that expensive biological and chemical inputs could create the same opulence 
for other countries, the US agencies sought to undertake a speedy ‘modernization’ of Indian 
agriculture. Instead of analyzing deep seated problems within India’s unique historic context, 
these experts attempted to graft their development model on India. In reality, the complexity and 
variations of Indian agriculture made it unlikely that any measures could prove to be a perfect 
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universal panacea. The desire to try an already tested model for India often blinded the 
supporters of industrial agriculture to the complexities of tropical agriculture that were reduced 
into some enumerated essential features. Rather than treating farm components as an 
interconnected whole, the reductionism broke it down, comparing each component with that of 
more advanced nations. 
‘Modernizing’ Tropical Agriculture  
         In an agro-climatic demarcation of the world, India belongs in the tropical zone, which 
biologists commonly assumed to offer a climate less favorable to agriculture and human 
settlement than that of temperate zones. In the absence of adequate artificial irrigation facilities, 
rainfall seemed to represent the most significant factor in tropical agriculture. For most 
agricultural scientists, this dependence on nature, rather than on irrigation and techno-science, 
made India’s food system backward from its very beginning, in comparison to agricultural 
practices in Europe, North America and Japan. India’s subsistence farmers in small farms 
practiced a type of tropical agriculture involving extremely small financial resources. The low 
levels of capital investment in tropical farming prohibited the use of expensive industrial 
products such as chemical fertilizers and agricultural machineries. Poor farmers maintained soil 
fertility through regular fallowing or by applying manure, in the form of household and animal 
refuse, on heavily cropped homestead farms and gardens. Experts in industrial agriculture 
usually scorned this tropical agriculture as ‘associated with under-developed farm technology’.23  
         Historian Francesca Bray has discussed how the Western model of agricultural 
development was traditionally presented vis-à-vis the ‘static’ Asiatic societies. She writes that 
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‘the concepts of the Asiatic Mode of Production, of hydraulic societies and of Asian feudalism 
all presumed that an essentially unchanging rural world was for centuries systematically drained 
of its riches by political elite, thus discouraging any tendencies towards development.’ Outside 
experts drew on the historical experience of the New World’s grain belts and of Northwestern 
Europe (in particular the Netherlands and Britain where ‘high farming’, scientific methods and 
mechanization made especially rapid progress). While tropical wetland rice cultivation did not fit 
principles of efficiency following the western model, Bray argued, the specific agro-economic 
conditions prevailing in the tropics proved the long-term utility of their practices.
24
   
          Operating from the perspective of developed countries, agricultural experts tend to 
reduce the diversity of tropical agricultural practices to a simple categorization of ‘several 
common features’. As their ‘first task,’ these scientists sought to find a ‘satisfactory 
classification or checklist of the principal factor affecting agricultural productivity,’ so they 
could ensure ‘proper diagnosis and prescription for any particular situation’. 25 Robert F. 
Chandler, head of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), for instance, tried to delineate 
all the common factors which would help ‘any country that is plagued by low yields and a rice 
deficit’ transition to a modernized, successful rice production program. As an example, he 
pointed out that for many decades the Philippines had never enjoyed ‘a high national average 
rice yield.’ Philippine agriculture needed to overcome this backwardness through four elements, 
Chandler wrote: ‘credit, the transfer of the new technology (including a massive publicity 
program), price support for rice, and the provision of low-cost fertilizer.’ Chandler graphically 
portrayed how leaders had selected pilot barrios (villages) within municipalities for their 
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‘progressiveness’. One trained technician was assigned to five or six barrios, picking out the 
better farmers and getting them to experiment with a new package of practices on their land. 
Technicians would advise farmers on the appropriate pesticide use and fertilizer application for 
their particular soil type, while conducting widespread trials of improved varieties of seeds.
26
 
         Similar to Philippines’ experience with the IRRI, the Rockefeller Foundation’s team after 
its two month long survey of Mexico identified the major problems of Mexican agriculture and 
recommended technical-research based solutions, such as: improvement of soil management and 
tilling practices; introduction, selection, and development of superior varieties of grains and 
legumes, and control of pests and diseases on a national scale. The general nature of the 
recommendations indicate how unproblemetically uniform the developing countries appeared to 
the developed ones. It is not to claim that developing countries were not plagued by common set 
of problems, but the simplified nature of the assessment becomes apparent at the realization that 
no local specificities were taken into consideration while formulating the ‘panacea’. As one 
historian aptly observed, the Rockefeller Foundation in advocating expensive practices or 
technological inputs for adoptions, safely assumed that most Mexican farmers had financial an 
infrastructural provisions similar to the United States.
27
 The preferred solutions, evidently, did 
not provide alternatives for those who did not fit into their typology. Clearly, agricultural 
development did not care for ‘lost souls’ as it was seen as commercial enterprise and not a 
charity.
28
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     The specter of rising populations and consequent land crunch provided the context for the 
rhetoric of agricultural modernization that repeatedly stressed the significance of fertilizer in 
transforming the food production scenario.
29
 India’s signing of the TCP with the United States 
government was vital in leading the way for expanded fertilizer import and technical trials.
 30
  
Committed ‘to bring about an increase in agricultural production’, the very first project initiated 
by the TCP in India was to supply free fertilizers to the farmers.
 31
 In 1954, when the program of 
fertilizer demonstration was initiated, India did not produce either urea or ammonium sulfate 
Nitrate. The idea was to import these from the US until India’s own fertilizer factory at Sindhri 
could start producing these indigenously. The mission aimed to popularize commercial fertilizers 
by laying out demonstration plots in cultivators’ fields, thus demonstrating the usefulness of 
these modern products.  This phase of agricultural outreach in India became the world’s largest 
fertilizer demonstration program, allowing scientists to collect volumes of data on fertilizer use 
in India under different soil and climatic conditions.
32
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      During 1954-56, researchers under TCP conducted extensive experiments on soil fertility 
and fertilizer, believing that the results could inform ‘intelligent long term planning on fertilizer 
needs and use in Indian agriculture.’33 The mission also established a cartographic and a 
radiotracer laboratory at the IARI that could conduct national-level soil surveys and prepare soil 
maps. The TCP opened twenty-four soil testing service centers throughout India, which would 
receive soil samples from farmers for testing, then give specific recommendations and advice on 
what kind and amount of fertilizers the farmers should use on different crops.
 34
 These activities 
marked the beginning of a systematic study of soil types and soil nutrients in independent India.  
        This fertilizer-centric chemical analysis of the soil types replaced the more generic 
knowledge that Indian farmers possessed about physical properties of various kinds of soil, use 
of manure and on crop production over the centuries. Agricultural treatises, such as Krishi-
Parashara (300BC -300AD) and Kashyapiyakrisisukti (700AD-800AD) show that 
agriculturalists in India based their assessments of soil on its physical and biological properties.  
For instance, the description of a ‘good’ land in Kashyapiyakrisisukti was that it should be 
devoid of stones and bones; a pliant (plastic) clay, very unctuous (greasy) with reddish and black 
hue, and glossy with water; neither too deep nor too shallow; water absorbent, and replete with 
beneficial organisms such as earthworms, thickly set and compact, and heavy when it was 
lifted.
35
 Devoid of any use of sophisticated technique or analytical framework, the treatises were 
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more based on observation of successful agricultural practices and trial and error method. It 
seems to be more of a compilation of collective knowledge that did not make any discernible 
distinction between knowledge generated by an expert and information collected from the 
farmers.  The soil surveys of the TCM on the contrary were not only based on use of 
sophisticated technology but largely ignored any possibility of farmers as sources of knowledge. 
Information on soil would be collected, analyzed and commented upon by the experts so that the 
farmers could be a beneficiary of this new knowledge.   
      Though the American scientists working in agricultural projects in India were largely 
instrumental in initiating large-scale fertilizer trials, there were many Indians who equally shared 
with them the conviction that an effective transformation in food-crop production could only be 
brought through extensive use of fertilizers and sophisticated technology. The work of TCP was 
particularly facilitated by the enthusiastic participation of many Indian scientists, such as Dr. 
N.P. Dutta and Dr. P.C. Raheja. Trained in American universities, they demonstrated much 
interest in the fertilizer field-trials conducted under the guidance of US experts. As the Chair of 
the Department of Agronomy at the IARI, Raheja played a very useful role in involving his 
institution in the projects conducted by the TCP.  
      As projects under TCP pushed for greater fertilizer use, many important Indian officials 
often found it useful to blame farmers solely for limited application of fertilizers in Indian 
agriculture. They saw in this the sole cause of lagging productivity of India’s food-crop sector. 
P.N. Thapar, the Secretary to the Indian government’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture, for 
instance, complained to the US agricultural attaché stationed at New Delhi of the lack of 
fertilizer applications and other improved farming practices that were holding back Indian 
agriculture, compared to its neighbor, China. He squarely blamed prejudices and religious beliefs 
67 
 
of farmers for perpetuating this backwardness. 
36
 Many like Thapar found in US’s technological 
help a deliverance from the quagmire of peasant’s backwardness that were supposedly holding 
back Indian agriculture. 
        The TCP’s work on agricultural development also became an important part of the 
development plan of the Indian government, which was aiming for an increase of 7.6 million 
tons in production of food grains over the first five-year plan period (1951-56).
37
  It planned to 
reach the proposed target through development programs involving major and minor irrigation 
works, extension of cultivation, reclamation of barren lands, and ‘intensive’ farming. 38  The plan 
for intensive cultivation grew out of contemporary agricultural research, which focused on 
developing improved seeds, facilitating high-doses of fertilizer usages, and on adopting effective 
measures against pests and diseases. The Planning Commission reports optimistically calculated 
that between 1951 and 1956, India could increase cereal production by a total of 6.51 million 
tons, with 1.21 million tons of that total coming from use of better seeds, manures, and 
fertilizers.
39
 The plans bear similar other evidences of government’s encouragement to 
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‘technological farming’, using latest research on ‘biochemical inputs’, as well as mechanical 
inputs such as tube wells, tractors, and threshers.
40
 
      The plan to introduce ‘technological farming’ probably came from the awareness that the 
country faced diminishing options for increasing total area under cultivation. Putting the 
remaining fallow land into agriculture might help increase production of coarse grains, but the 
country really needed to increase the production of superior grains such as rice, wheat and maize. 
The members of the Commission anticipated a rise in national income that would increase 
demand for those crops, and so they focused on such techniques that helped to raise yields by 
making agricultural production more efficient, rather than simply multiplying acreage. The 
second FYP (1956-61) extended those assumptions in projecting a further ten-million ton rise in 
grain production, of which 3.5 million tons would come from use of improved seeds and wider 
application of fertilizers and manures.  
       The Planning Commission reports seem to indicate that the India government had plans 
to gradually increase the consumption of fertilizers through stepping up domestic production, 
rather than leap-frog into a capital-intensive phase of agricultural development based primarily 
on foreign investment and assistance. Thus, any news of high production mark reached at Sindri 
Fertilizer factory received widest coverage in the national press. As the most important public 
sector initiative towards chemical fertilizer production, Sindri came to symbolize national pride-
indicating what India was capable of achieving in terms of self-sufficiency, higher food 
production, and technological sophistication.  
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      Though routinely praised in the press for its service to the Indian farmers
41
, fertilizer 
factories similar to Sindri, either under public or private sector initiatives would be far between, 
keeping fertilizer production low throughout the period.
42
 Of the many reasons limiting the 
growth of a domestic fertilizer industry, the important one was inadequate government funds for 
such investments. Scholars have repeatedly pointed out the reluctance of Prime Minister Nehru 
and that of the Planning Commission in diverting scarce foreign exchange from building heavy 
industries to either importing fertilizer or to set up fertilizer industries.
43
 Moreover as no 
understanding could be reached with foreign investors over distribution and pricing rights of 
chemical fertilizers during this period, there was little chance of private capital supplementing 
public sector initiative in building fertilizer factories in India.
44
 
       A serious crop failure, soon after the launching of the second FYP, however, reinforced 
the debate on the best way to push up the yields; policymakers and national leaders argued 
whether to stick to institutional reforms and less capital-intensive strategy or to shift to a more 
intensive use of chemical fertilizers.
 45
 Facing acute food shortage and sharp rise in prices in 
1957, the Indian government responded by setting up a Food Grains Enquiry Committee.  Its 
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head, A. Mehta, was highly skeptical that India could possibly reach the Second Plan’s higher 
food production target. To improve the production scenario, the Committee urged the Indian 
government to expand agricultural research facilities, to ensure better application of research 
results by strengthening the extension service and back it up with proper credit facilities for 
farmers.  Given existing resource constraints, the Committee favored the idea of concentrating 
efforts on the better farms only in areas with the greatest potential for improvement.
 46
 Following 
such a capital-intensive and selective development strategy, however, had two important 
consequences: first, it meant going against the principle of social equity, considered so integral to 
social and economic planning in the first decade-and-a-half after India’s independence and47 
secondly, it would divest the industrial sector of precious foreign exchange, which would have to 
be spend on either importing synthetic fertilizers, or in setting up factories to enlarge the quantity 
of its domestic production. 
      To the members of the Planning Commission the consequences of following a thoroughly 
capital and chemical intensive agricultural policy appeared unacceptable, because it would mean 
compromising the two most important goals of independent India-import substitution in basic 
industries and quest for a social and economic system based on social equity. With agriculture 
claiming a share on already scarce foreign exchange, India would hardly be in a position to 
realize its goal of being the industrial hub of Asia.
 48
 Accepting Mehta Committee’s 
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recommendation for a selective approach in matter of fertilizer distribution would contradict with 
the principles of socialism in which most members of the Planning Commission members were 
publicly committed to. It was a widely known fact that Nehru as the chair of the Planning 
Commission hand- picked its members based on their political orientation. All of them 
considered the process of development in broader terms, rather than simply economic growth. 
Thus, the chief concern of the Planning Commission was the transformation of the existing 
social order and the establishment of an egalitarian and socialist pattern of modern society.
49
 
     Thus bypassing the Mehta Committee’s report, the Planning Commission continued to 
urge scientists of national research institutes to come up with cheaper, ‘indigenous’ alternatives 
to expensive or imported ones. Instead of selective approach they wanted the improved farming 
techniques to be largely applicable to various regions of India with differing precipitations and 
soil types and to be used by farmers of varying economic capacity. The decision of not adoption 
a capital-intensive technological approach was, however, not easily taken. Agricultural policy 
turned out to be a fulcrum of power struggle between the ‘state bosses’, the central Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture and the ‘right-of-center’ and the ‘left-of-center’ factions of the ruling 
Congress Party. As the constitutional responsibility pertaining to agricultural development was 
jointly shared by the state and the central government, the former representing the interests of the 
local elites of large farmers and merchants tried to persuade on an agricultural policy based on 
‘scientific principles’. They urged on for ‘remunerative prices for rice and wheat in order to 
provide an incentive (to farmers) for increased private investment in improved inputs.’50 A.P. 
Jain, the Food and Agriculture Minister, before tendering his resignation taking full 
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responsibility for the dire food situation prevailing in the country, urged that there should be 
greater investments in seeds, pesticides, fertilizers.’51 
      Though there might had been little disagreement over the necessity of basing agricultural 
production on ‘scientific principles’, but the real bone of contention was the difference in 
interpretation as to what goals scientific research would accomplish. Would it concentrate on 
evolving a technological package constitutive entirely of capital-intensive inputs and designed 
for well-irrigated fertile tracts of the country alone, or would it be concentrating on evolving 
inputs based on indigenous resources that did not vie with industries for resources, or seriously 
jeopardize the goal of social equity. Known for his indispensability in winning elections, the 
‘state bosses’ found it hard to ignore the policy preferences of Prime Minister Nehru. 52 Nehru 
personally played a decisive role in the adoption of an equity based and less-capital intensive 
agricultural model. Under this policy, use of chemical fertilizers was encouraged, but not made 
an essential constituent of what the state meant by modern agriculture. 
    Rather than claiming that this emphasis on less capital-intensive development model 
would mean a rejection of agricultural science and technology, as had so commonly been 
assumed in so many of the narratives on Indian’s agriculture, I would argue that it influenced the 
work of researchers at the CRRI and the IARI to grow in a particular direction that emphasized 
uses of cheap organic resources, and wide agroecological adaptations. Raising yield became part 
of a broader democratic dream of improving the condition of rural India, encourage participation 
of villagers and infusing the daily agricultural practices with benefits of modern research.  
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      However, it was not the objectives of the state alone that solely influenced the research 
work of contemporary scientists. A political economic approach to development tend to exclude 
the influence that ecology and cultural preferences of consumers might have had played on 
formulation of research projects. A search for a slender, aromatic rice variety was as important as 
obtaining high-yield; similarly, before formulating high doses of fertilizer applications designed 
towards bumper crop the scientists had to ensure that the existing varieties were responsive to 
such doses. Moreover evolving high-yield varieties suitable to the well-irrigated field condition 
was not sufficient because large part of India either had bad drainage or suffered from moisture-
stress. Thus, the problems of agricultural scientists were complex and the solutions thus had to 
be varied and not always easily found in terms of obtaining high-yield.     
India as a Laboratory of Agricultural Modernization 
        At the second annual meeting of the newly formed Board of Agriculture, held at the Pusa 
Research Institute in January 1906, Sir Albert Howard, as head of the Botanical section, was 
asked to prepare an outline of future work which could apply to the whole India. Barely four 
years after this first official assignment, in December 1909, the book entitles Wheat in India 
appeared. By 1924 Albert Howard and his wife Louise E. Howard were jointly responsible for 
writing something like thirty one papers on wheat cultivation in India. The Howards showed 
unusual sensitivity to the various specificities of cultivating wheat in India. In his outline, 
Howard urged other scientists to keep into consideration not only various agricultural practices 
concerned in the production of wheat in India, but also the ‘great range in climatic conditions’ in 
the various tracts in which wheat was grown. His contention was that ‘the length of the growth 
period and the moisture conditions are the chief factors in the production of Indian wheat, and 
these materially influence the varieties grown and the practices of the various agricultural tracts.’ 
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Stressing on the need to know why so many different practices prevailed in various wheat 
growing regions, Howard pointed out that ‘the smallest differences in procedure are closely 
bound up with differences in local conditions,’ such as monsoon rainfall, soil moisture, 
temperature, growth period, average size of the farmers’ holdings etc. All these factors 
influenced the kind of seed varieties that were used by majority of Indian farmers as well as the 
methods employed in harvesting, threshing and in the storage of the produce. These methods, 
Howard cautioned other fellow scientists, might ‘appear very primitive at first sight, but they are 
simple and efficient.’53 
     Howards’ observation about wheat can as well be extended to understand the dynamics 
of rice cultivation in India. Grown over 75 million acres, rice cultivation extends from 8 degree 
to 35 degree N latitude, covering varying conditions of rainfall, altitude and climate. Over the 
centuries, cultivators have selected numerous rice varieties, such as Dharical, Dular and the 
Tilak Kacheri, which were adapted to different soil types, topography and agronomic practices in 
eastern India. More than wide adaptability, farmers have concentrated rather on selecting rice 
varieties that were suitable to specific agroclimatic condition. For instance, in the dryland of 
Medinipur district of West Bengal, farmers cultivated upland varieties like Kelas and Bhutmuri 
that needed no irrigation to grow. Similarly, farmers in South India preferred growing varieties 
like Kappakar and Samba Mosanam because these were tolerant to the clayey soil of Madurai 
and ill-drained tracts of Trichy districts respectively.
54
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       Unlike wheat, the high-yielding varieties of which Howard claimed could not be easily 
grown in India because of restricted supply of soil moisture and the short period of growth, rice 
had always been a relatively high-yielding crop. Characteristics that determine the yield potential 
of rice cultivars are the nodal number of ‘productive’ tillers per hill panicle density i.e. number 
of grains per panicle and grain weight. Among the local varieties in cultivation, Punjab-sal, 
Bahupuri, Jugal, Kabiraj-sal and Darka-sal all had a mean panicle weight of 4g or more. Of 
these, Punjabi-sal and Kabiraj had high particle density too. But most of these varieties being 
long straw yielding ones were useful for farmers for thatching their homes and as fodders were, 
however, prone to lodging. Most of the existing ‘indica’ varieties in cultivation were inherently 
prone to the problem of ‘lodging,’ excess growth that caused stalks fall to the ground with high 
doses of fertilizer application. Researchers explained this problem by suggesting that over 
centuries in Asia, an unconscious selection had produced crops able to grow moderately well at 
low nutrient levels but which lost most of their capacity to respond to applications of fertilizer 
for higher fertility.
55
 
The problem of lodging would remain a prohibitive factor for India’s adoption of any 
agricultural development models premised on high fertilizer application till the coming of the 
dwarf varieties in the 1960s. For instance, soon after independence, some Indian experts tried 
copying the Japanese method of rice cultivation to raise production. Many in India regarded 
Japan as an instance worthy of emulation, the only Asian country which was comparable with 
the West for its achievements.
 56
 But when comparing Japanese methods with the practices 
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followed in India, the CRRI scientists found that Japanese practices of field manuring actually 
reduced the yield in comparison to local recommended methods.
57
This discovery prompted a 
series of experiments to ascertain the relative efficacy of different types of manures and 
fertilizers for the traditional rice varieties grown in India. CRRI investigators concluded that 
Indian rice farmers would get maximum yield by applying doses of between 20 and 40 lb. of 
nitrogen per acre.
 58
  Indian researchers found that to make traditional varieties produce more, 
high doses of nitrogen could be counterproductive; the ‘optimum’ result came from sufficient 
supplies of organic manure without chemical fertilizers.
59
  
     The CRRI scientists were aware that to significantly push up the yield of food-crops, it 
would be necessary to concentrate on breeding more fertilizer-responsive varieties. Such 
varieties, they hoped, would facilitate application of relatively higher doses of fertilizer. The 
CRRI director, Dr. Ramiah requested the FAO to initiate a hybridization program to produce 
‘improved’ varieties of seeds that would not lodge to fertilizer application. The FAO’s 
International Rice Commission decided that the program should develop hybrids between the 
Indian (indica) lowland rice and the Japanese (japonica) strain. In doing this they wanted to bring 
together the qualities of both the varieties and overcome their respective limitations. Indica had a 
long grain, was adapted to hot climates and poor soils, but did not respond well to fertilizers. On 
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the other hand, japonica had a short round grain, was adapted to cooler climates, needed good 
soils, had stiff straw, and produced very high yields in response to fertilizers. 
60
  
        Most of the varieties bred under the FAO scheme were initially suitable only for irrigated 
and fertile lands, excluding thereby large tracts of land that were dependent on rainfall in India.
 
Researchers therefore evaluated these promising strains for their performance under moisture 
stress conditions. The objective (in light of the policy of social equity) was not to restrict 
cultivation of these high yielding varieties among well-endowed farmers, owning or having 
access to well-irrigated and fertile tracts, but to reach a larger geographic and economic cross-
sections. The rainfed ecosystem, however, had its own set of problems that made cultivation of 
the newly bred varieties a challenging task for the scientists. Not only was there the high 
possibility of the crop yield suffering from moisture stress, the weed problem was more severe 
because of low rainfall. Diseases like blast and brown spot occurred more frequently. All these 
limitations needed immediate attention from the scientific community if the benefits of growing 
the new varieties were to be made available to farmers of these regions. Courtesy the widespread 
practice of Mendelian genetics since the early years of the twentieth century, it was already clear 
to the Indian scientists by the 1950s that the capacity to resist conditions of drought is genotypic 
and could, therefore, be controlled through the incorporation of specific genes for resistance to 
droughts in desirable varieties with good yield.  
Just like drought, large tracts of farm land situated in the deltaic and coastal parts of India 
suffered from flood and from saline and alkaline soil too. Water-logged submerged areas 
impaired total dry matter production, caused high tiller mortality and spikelet sterility and 
created difficulty in fertilizer management. Rice growers in these regions especially had to 
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contend with the problem of soil salinity that affected crop in the field at any stage of its growth. 
There were discoloration and often leaves slowly dried up and drooped from plant. Scientists 
realized that they needed to counter these conditions with varieties that would be able to give 
good yield, yet capable of withstanding submersion for a particular length of time as were 
lowland varieties, such as Jabra, Lakshmi dighal, and Pantara, which grew upto 18 inches above 
water in seasonal wetlands. All these experiments were conducted with the purpose of 
developing ‘all-purpose’ cereals that would cater to diverse farming situations across India. It 
culminated with the release of N.P800 series of disease-resistant wheat varieties in 1959 by plant 
breeder B.P. Pal and pathologist K.C. Mehta. For eighteen years the duo made multiple crosses 
on a large scale to bring together resistance to all three rusts, combining it with suitable 
agronomic attributes and adaptability to Indian conditions.
61
 
    The varieties, which developed under the FAO project, however, only partially succeeded 
in attaining its objectives: widely adapted to grow in various agro-climatic conditions and 
resistant to diseases, they soon regained the low response characters of the indica varieties that 
the scientists had been hoping to evade. The cultural preference of consumers for slender 
varieties prompted the abandonment of the original goal of a fixed rice type with high fertilizer-
responsiveness similar to the japonica varieties, and resulted in selecting back towards the indica 
parent.  Controlling the quality of the improved cultivars was another problem that continued to 
plague Indian agriculture until the government decided to pass the seed act in 1966 to start 
specifying and labeling the ‘minimum limits of germination and purity’.62 The lack of quality 
control was aggravated by the very limited number of seed farms in contemporary India. The 
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Indian government was committed to a system of decentralized multiplication and distribution 
process, entrusted to the hands of the village cooperatives, with it supervising from the outset.  
The arrangement, however, proved inadequate to satisfy India’s growing need for improved 
varieties of seeds. Rice and wheat cultivation in India continued depending mostly on seeds 
available on-farm or as part of inter-farmer commerce, as was in mid-nineteenth century USA. 
   The use of synthetic fertilizers though championed by many for its role in achieving high-
yield remained controversial for its role in soil depletion. In 1947, Dr. S.C. Chang of Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry of China along with couple of other agricultural scientists remarked that 
continued use of ammonium sulfate might cause deterioration of fertility and decline in rice 
yields.
63
 In the following year, scientists D. Rhind and U. Tin of Department of Agriculture, 
Burma (Myanmar) published an article in Nature, noting that 112 kg/ha per annum of 
ammonium sulfate gave yields always significantly higher than those not treated, but, after the 
first three years the increase in yield declined from a maximum of 1190kg/ha to a minimum of 
360 kg/ha. These observations suggested that the balance between nitrogen and other fertilizing 
elements required judicious adjustments.
64
 That the Indian Planners were undoubtedly informed 
of such findings is clear from their recommendation that chemical fertilizers, especially 
ammonium sulfate, should be used only in conjunction with bulky organic manures. They 
publicly expressed a fear that continuous application of chemical fertilizers, in absence of any 
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bulky organic manure, would lead to soil deterioration and progressively lower yields over a 
number of years.
65
 
       Sections of Indian farmers had shared the concern of scientists and the planners about 
unbridled usage of chemical fertilizers on soil fertility. Anthropological work done on Indian 
agriculture showed that farmers found chemical fertilizers problematic at different levels-it 
affects the taste (swad) of the food, dries up the soil, and plants can’t take hold of the land, 
strength of land declines etc. In such rhetoric, the anthropologist has traced the influence of 
‘indigenous’ humoral or substantist theory, which is very different from the language of bio-
science.
66
 The Indian scientific community and planning commission members had, however, 
not borrowed from any ‘indigenous’ episteme in either critiquing chemical fertilizers or 
endorsing organic manure. They rather preferred borrowing selectively from the argument of a 
well-known, English botanist, Albert Howard who wrote on organic ways of farming and 
contributed significantly to the ‘early organic movement’ in England.   
     Howard was sharply critical of high applications of synthetic fertilizers to the soil. 
Howard traced the origin of what he termed as the ‘NPK mentality’ back to the late nineteenth 
century when ‘the use of artificial manures became firmly welded into the work and outlook of 
the Experiment Stations…’ Howard insisted that in focusing on use of chemical manures, 
promoters had overlooked two key factors, the preservation of soil fertility and the quality of the 
produce.
67
 Howard wrote several books elucidating his stand on organic fertilizers of which, An 
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Agricultural Testament, turned to be most influential. Published in England in 1940, it was well-
known to most contemporary agricultural scientists.
68
  From the annual research reports of IARI 
and CRRI, it is evident that Indian scientists shared some of Howard’s concern about the impact 
of continuous use of chemical fertilizers on farm soil, as they were experimenting on it for a 
decade after independence. 
69
 However, an emphasis on organic fertilizers did not imply that 
Indian scientists or policymakers were trying to fit Indian agriculture along the philosophical 
contours of the organic movement. They did not share the activists’ conviction that any 
chemical, mechanistic or purely economic approach to agriculture was inadequate and 
potentially harmful. Advocating a cautious and balanced approach, the scientists betrayed no 
such belief that human beings should seek through science to work with the God-given natural 
order rather than exploiting the environment out of greed. The appeal of the organic fertilizers to 
the scientists and policy-makers in India lay in its cheap availability and wide applicability, 
rather than symbolizing in any ways the goodness of rural life over urban encroachment, as was 
among the proponents of the organic movement in England.
70
 
        Apart from concerns regarding soil erosion, a far graver problem that encouraged usages 
of organic manure was the high costs of importing synthetic fertilizers. Since India did not have 
a natural source for good quality sulfur, the government faced apparent limitations in plans for 
indigenously producing ammonium sulfate. The Program of Industrial Development (1951-56) 
proposed to double the production of sulfuric acid.  Yet even those increased levels would leave 
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a gap between Indian consumption and production, which would have to be made good by 
imports. Chemical Age, the journal of India’s Chemical Manufacturers Association, wrote in a 
special issue prior to the country’s second FYP that importation was not the best option when 
compared to building indigenous means. The magazine pointed out that most sulfur deposits 
were located in the USA, which the magazine worried had not been consistently friendly to 
India.
71
 
      During the second plan (1956-61), importing chemical fertilizers became an even more 
costly proposition because of the closure of the Suez Canal. The price of ammonium sulfate rose 
by Rs.35 per ton due to the increased cost of indigenous production, the increase in general tariff 
of ocean freight for import of fertilizers, and extra costs connected to diverting shipments after 
the Suez closure. Thus, India’s agricultural ministry continued to express particular interest in 
the value of using compost manure for stepping up production.
72
  
      Compared to China and Japan, experimenting with composting was generally a 
dwindling practice among farmers and scientists in contemporary India. Most farmers did apply 
some amount of organic manure to their field and knew the uses of humus, but rarely was it 
sufficiently, or as ‘experts’ claimed, systematically applied. Ancient Indian texts, such as Krishi-
Parashara (Agriculture by Parashara), Vrishkayurveda (The Science of Plant Life) and 
Kashyapiyakrishisukti (A Treatise on Agriculture by Kashyapa) among others carried several 
references to practices of organic manuring.  Most of these agricultural practices recommended 
in these texts were, however, lost over the centuries. After independence, neither the Indian 
government, nor the agricultural scientists showed any interest in reviving this body of 
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knowledge as part of India’s ‘scientific’ heritage. Thus, Kunapajala and other popular organic 
manure of the past remained outside the purview of scientific research. This might apparently 
look incongruous with the government’s plan of using traditional/indigenous inputs in achieving 
higher crop yield. The answer could be found in the very careful use of the word indigenous or 
tradition made by the Indian scientists and policy-makers. They used it interchangeably in 
referring to natural resources that were available within India’s geo-political boundary. Being 
part of the national heritage or popular body of knowledge did not guarantee incorporation in the 
scientific practices of modern India. Preferences for organic manure stemmed from a political-
economic consideration, rather than from any simple urge to revive/reinstate India’s past. 
Scientists and especially policy-makers evidently harbored doubts about aspects of industrial 
agriculture, but they were unrelenting to show their commitment to modern science rather than to 
either ‘Indian’ or ‘Hindu’ science. Thus, Indian scientists found it more professionally acceptable 
to follow the recommendations of Albert Howard’s book, The Waste Products of Agriculture: 
their Utilization as Humus,
73
 which was based on his systematic study of composting at the 
Indore Laboratory.
74
 
         The acceptability of Howard’s work to the Indian scientists probably also had to do with 
the fact that he standardized the process of composting animal manure and vegetable residue that 
he learnt from ancient texts. This enabled him and later scientists to comprehend and better 
control the intricate bio-chemical and biological processes going on in the compost heaps. The 
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emphasis on standardization, which comprised the core of any scientific experiment, however, 
stood in sharp contrast to most of the manuring recipes mentioned in the ancient texts. For 
instance, in the constitution of Kunapajala no standard formulation was prescribed in any of the 
Vrikshayurvedas. This flexibility might have been helpful for farmers, who was free to use 
locally available substitutes, but did not match the standard of scientific exactitude coveted by 
contemporary scientists.
75
  
      On Howard’s retirement, his place was taken by Dr. A. C. Acharya, who initiated on a 
nation-wide scale the work of composting both town and village wastes in India under the 
government initiative.
76
 After independence, the government anticipated that better usages of 
sewage and sullage could irrigate over 34,000 acres of land and yield about 56,000 tons of 
additional food-grains. Like Howard, however, it noted with frustration that in rural areas 
nightsoil and urine were not generally being utilized as manure. It stressed on the necessity of 
devising new latrine for villagers that would be hygienic, convenient, fly-proof and portable. To 
keep down the expenses, the planners suggested these latrines be build using local materials and 
financed through the sale of the manure that would be made available.
 77
  In doing this, the 
administration tried to ensure a cheap source of nitrogen and at the same time keep the 
countryside clean. But, considering the fact that human waste had largely been an anathema in 
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many societies, and definitely to Indians, there is scanty evidence that this turned out to be an 
effective measure to raise yield.
78
  
       As human waste turned out to be an unreliable source of manure, the government 
concentrated more on animal manure. It made plans to train men in techniques of compost-
making and appoint them as compost inspectors for each of the country’s National Extension and 
Community Project blocks.
79
The state governments of Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Bombay, Bihar, 
Orissa, Mysore, Hyderabad, PEPSU and Madhya Bharat modified their Municipal Acts to 
require municipalities to convert all available refuse into compost manure. During the Gram 
Sudhar Saptah (Village Development/Improvement Week) celebrated on the first week of 
October to commemorate Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday, villagers participated in community 
development schemes, including digging compost pits and composting of refuse.
80
 The scientists 
recommended using compost as basal manure followed by a spray of chemical nitrogen 
wherever possible. However, the use of FYM suffered owing to its limited availability. Though 
far cheaper than chemical fertilizers, it was not easily available to all farmers because its 
availability was dependent on owning a large herd of cattle. Moreover manures from cattle were 
also used as fuel. To poor to buy kerosene, farmers depended on manure cakes to cook meals 
every day. 
       To supplement the limited availability of FYM, scientists started experimenting on green 
manures. A study on the relative efficacy of organic fertilizers in 1951 revealed that the inclusion 
of a legume such as peas in the crop rotation definitely increased the yields of the subsequent 
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crops. Scientists concluded that by introducing pulses and other leguminous crops, small 
cultivators could not only improve their soil’s nitrogen contents, but also produce an important 
source of protein to an otherwise protein deficient population. Experiments on the effects of 
manuring on the nutritive quality of rice demonstrated that the thiamine (Vitamin B) content of 
rice obtained with green manure was higher than the nutritive value of rice from unmanured 
plots, proving that it was more effective in this regard than ammonium sulfate.
81
   
        Several additional benefits of planting green manure crops were experimentally proven 
by a research project conducted in 1955-56 that showed most of them to be considerably drought 
resistant, making them suitable for use in the upland rice fields that had minimal artificial 
irrigation. A few types of green manure, such as Sesbania aculeate (dhaincha), proved resistant 
to the water-logging commonly seen in low lying areas along India’s coast. Such wide 
adaptability of green manure plants made them a very effective practical substitute for chemical 
fertilizers, which were much more expensive and needed perfectly-regulated water regimes to be 
effective.
82
 
           Discussions over the potential of indigenous manures spilled outside the confine of the 
national laboratories into national forums, such as the Indian Science Congress. The plant 
pathologist, Dr. S.P. Ray Chaudhury, for instance commented on the options that indigenous 
manures, such as rock phosphate, bonemeal, nitre-earth, gypsum and non-edible oil cakes offered 
for extensive use on crops. Chaudhury reported in detail on experiments that Indian scientists 
had conducted to judge the usefulness of each of these organic manures in different types of soil 
in India. For instance, the tests indicated that inexpensive rock phosphate was useful in acid soils 
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and in combination with organic matter, particularly on paddy soils. Field experiments also 
supported use of bonemeal, as having a beneficial effect on acid soils, and in combination with 
organic matter on paddy.
83
 With about 85.5 million tons of gypsum reserve, it was extensively 
used in many parts of the country, particularly where Gangetic alluvium from long-term 
irrigation had created alkaline problems in the soil. Even scientists, such as Dr. A.D. Desai, who 
saw ‘no escape from the use of artificial fertilizers like ammonium sulfate and superphosphate’, 
endorsed use of gypsum as a substitute material when there were shortages of organic 
fertilizers.
84
   
      It is through the use of biological and chemical inputs, especially that of seeds and 
fertilizers that we have tried to locate and understand the role of scientific research in the 
development of agriculture of independent India. It is clear from the narrative that the close 
association of agricultural science with India’s agricultural development did not have to wait till 
the coming of the green revolution. The agricultural scientists and the Indian government were 
keen to apply the results of agricultural research to raise the productivity of cereal ever since 
independence. It would, therefore, amount to misinterpretation of historical facts, if we label pre-
green revolution Indian cereal research as perpetuation of the ‘traditional’ or the upholding of the 
‘indigenous’, just because it did not accept use of synthetic fertilizers as the only way of raising 
soil fertility or for including usages of organic manure. Moreover, in the official documents, 
‘indigenous’ was not essentialized into a singular model of doing agriculture; it rather implied an 
emphasis on locally available resources. The emphasis was based purely on utilitarian ground 
and showed little commitment to India’s tradition per se. Neither the spirit of nationalism nor 
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that of revivalism could be traced in the use of organic inputs, which were tested strictly as per 
modern scientific practices. This history of food-crop research, therefore, helps to de-center the 
common narrative of agricultural modernization that dominates most political-economic view of 
postcolonial Indian state.
89 
 
                                                                      Chapter 3 
Hunger and Technical Rendering of the Food Question 
 
           Soon after the second five-year plan was launched in 1956, the country faced severe 
difficulties in several fronts. By late 1957 India’s foreign exchange difficulties reached ‘crisis’ 
proportions.
1
 In response, the Indian government cut all, but the most crucial plan projects and 
placed restrictions on the importation of nonessential items. The closure of the Suez Canal 
increased the costs of transportation of India’s export and import goods, and proved to be a great 
impediment for India’s foreign trade. Moreover, there were severe droughts in Eastern India. In 
1957-58 foodgrain output declined by ten percent and its prices registered an increase of fifty 
percent from October 1955 to August 1957. All India Congress Committee (AICC) in its annual 
meeting underlined that it was urgently necessary to regard self-sufficiency in food as an integral 
part of national self-defense.
2
  The government agreed, but the issue was how to raise 
agricultural productivity? There was unanimity over the goal but not the means. Different parties 
that were associated with the food and agricultural sector such as the foreign agencies, the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Planning Commission, and various farming groups had 
their own standpoint regarding the matter. The government of India dispatched two study teams 
to China in 1956 to study that nation’s revolutionary cooperative movement. By imitating the 
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Chinese example of labor-intensive, cooperative agriculture, Indian planners reasoned that their 
nation could raise production with only limited financial investment.
3
 
     At the Nagpur meeting of AICC in 1959-60, a resolution was adopted by the Working 
Committee of the Congress Party calling for land ceilings (outlining the maximum amount of 
land that a farmer can own), service cooperatives to provide farmers with tractors, fertilizers, 
seeds etc. at convenient prices, urged joint cultivation to overcome the difficulties of cultivating 
small parcels of land and insisted on state trading in food grains.
4
 The call for cooperative 
agriculture predictably met stiff resistance from Indian landowners, particularly politically 
influential, large planters. Nehru later lamented that the Nagpur resolution had to be put into 
deep freeze because of reactions within the Congress Party and other ‘feudal’ interests, who 
interpreted plans for cooperatives as a move towards collectivization, which they apprehended 
would take away their land.
5
 
      In midst of this discontent, confusion and half-heartedness that marked the institutional 
reforms, the Ford Foundation Team visited the country in 1959 to inspect the food situation and 
recommend measures towards its ‘development’.  The Foundation Team evaluated the food 
situation in terms of food production vis-à-vis the rising population of the country.
 6
  In terms of 
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plain figures they could foresee a crisis situation-India needed more than ten million tons of food 
to feed its growing population! The Foundation estimated that India would need about 110 
million tons of food grains to permit a net daily consumption of per person of 15 ounces and 3 
ounces of pulses for the prospective population of 480 million.
7
 Based on these facts and figures, 
the Foundation experts concluded that food production must, on an average, increase at the rate 
of 8.2 per cent per year for the next seven years.  
    Advocating ‘an all-out emergency’ program to reach the target of 110 million tons, the 
Foundation saw improving agricultural production through large-scale adoption of capital-
intensive biochemical resources such as improved varieties of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides as 
the only solution of the food crisis in India. They suggested that the Indian government give 
credit and undertake water conservation and price support measures to facilitate introduction of 
the bio-chemical resources. They wanted adequate number of personnel trained and assigned to 
the job of increasing production. Thus a hierarchy of experts was proposed to transfer knowledge 
from the laboratories to the peasants. Moreover, to make the new production program work, the 
Foundation-experts recommended an effective coordination among all involved participants 
from planners to farmers. 
     Recognizing that India did not have adequate amounts of new seeds, fertilizers, and 
pesticides to fulfill the demand, the report strongly advised the Indian government that, instead 
of dribbling the resources across the entire country, it should concentrate these advanced 
resources in areas that were adequately equipped to utilize them. Following this strategy meant 
that the resources should be pumped into areas already enjoying a relative advantage on account 
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of good irrigation facilities, fertile soil, active credit infrastructure etc.
8
 The Ford experts’ 
recommendation, however, conflicted with the long-standing position of the Indian government 
against any such ‘selective’ policies. The Planning Commission and the socialist elements within 
the national leadership had been consistently disapproving, as we have seen, selective approach 
as economically imprudent and against the principle of social equity. 
    With a possible technical solution to the food question at hand, the Foundation experts in 
their report discouraged land reforms as a way of improving the Indian agrarian sector. They 
considered ‘insecurity of tenure’ brought about by land ceiling measures as having a ‘retarding’ 
effect on food production. They did not want to destabilize the landed peasantry or put them 
through a period uncertainty over land tenure issues as they trusted this group of farmers as 
possible patrons/consumers of capital-intensive inputs. The Foundation representatives hoped 
that if the well-off farmers could be assured that no further reforms would risk their possession, 
they would be encouraged to make the requisite investment in acquiring the new inputs. To allay 
any doubt that they were not sympathetic to the plight of the landless peasants, the Foundation-
experts remarked that ‘We recognize the need for considering programmes for the relief of those 
who have no land, and of those who cultivate too little land.’ But they found it ‘imperative’ to 
achieve this objective in ‘ways that will not retard the increases in food production which are 
vital to national welfare.’ The Report specifically pointed out that ‘care should be exercised’ so 
as not to break up farms that are ‘efficiently and productively operated’.      
    Indian agricultural officers were influenced by a similar approach to land reforms as it 
became evident to a researcher during her field work in Tamil Nadu. She wrote that the 
agricultural officers she interviewed never mentioned land reform themselves. Whenever she 
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would bring it up as an issue they would say that ‘it was not necessary.’ Agricultural officers did 
not see land reforms as being related to production, except negatively. They reportedly 
commented that if the government takes away land from the better-off farmers, ‘this could only 
decrease production because the poor will not have the facilities to cultivate properly.’ The 
author somewhat despairingly commented that in many of the interviews, she felt that the 
officers being interviewed might have been quoting straight from texts from the United States, or 
those thoroughly written by westernized Indians. In such schemes of thing, the idea of 
cooperative farming to help small holders apparently took a backseat compared to plans for 
technological development or price support to encourage larger farmers to grow the high-
yielding varieties.
9
 
       Thus in the plea for increased food production that was urged in the name of national 
needs such as population growth, defense and development, a technocentric solution (backed by 
price support) was given precedence over a more complex and time-consuming social-political 
and economic measure such as land reforms. To develop what they considered an ‘efficient’ 
agriculture, they wanted only the ‘intelligent and capable’ farmers to assume leadership of the 
new program. How would it be determined which farmers fall into this category of ‘intelligent 
and capable’? The experts followed a cyclic, self-referential logic here. Any farmer adopting the 
new technology was considered ‘progressive’ and ‘progressive’ farmers were by extension of the 
same logic expected to adopt the new technology.
10
 
      I would argue in this chapter that the strategy of agricultural development as proposed by 
the Ford Foundation team exemplifies the process of ‘technical rendering’ of the food question. 
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In identifying low productivity as the main problem of Indian agriculture at the exclusion of all 
other structural and institutional constraints and in focusing on capital-intensive technoscientific 
means as the only panacea for the food crisis, it manifested what James Ferguson and Tania 
Murray Li had argued in their studies on development at Lesotho and Indonesia, as parallel 
practices of ‘problematization’ and ‘rendering technical’.11 These two practices, the authors 
argued, should be studied together to understand development projects undertaken by experts 
with ‘the will to improve’. The practices of problematization focus on identifying ‘deficiencies’ 
that need to be rectified. Both Ferguson and Li suggested that the identification of a problem is 
intimately linked to the availability of a solution. They co-emerge within a governmental 
assemblage in which certain sorts of diagnoses, prescriptions, and techniques are available to the 
expert who is properly trained.  Other than the Ford Foundation Report, I will analyze the Indian 
Department of Agriculture’s report on the food situation12 and the Approach Paper13 presented 
by the Planning Commission of India to understand the implementation of the two practices. 
     Fergusson and Li go on to argue that questions that are rendered technical are 
simultaneously rendered non-political. For the most part, experts entrusted with ‘improvement’ 
tend to exclude the structure of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and 
prescriptions. This feature led James Ferguson to describe the apparatus of planned development 
as an ‘anti-politics machine’ that ‘insistently repos[es] political questions of land, resources, 
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jobs, or wages as technical ‘problems’ responsive to the technical ‘development intervention.’14 
Experts, Li pointed out, are trained to frame problems in technical terms. Their claims to 
expertise depend on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solution 
that fall within their repertoire.
15
 
       Li has argued that technical rendering of development issues often benefit the ruling 
faction or contribute to the existence of the state. Fergusson observed that development ‘may 
also very effectively squash political challenges to the system’ by its insistent reposing of 
political questions in technical term.
16
 In this chapter, I will explore how similar trends were 
observed in the Indian context: the issues of famine and starvation created what Akhil Gupta has 
termed a ‘crisis of sovereignty’17, which the government tried to diffuse through reposing famine 
and droughts as questions of technological backwardness. An all out effort was made on behalf 
of the government to transfer the new seeds and related resources to augment production.  
‘Selective’ Approach and the Wind of Change 
     Following publication of the 1959 Ford Foundation report, Sherman Johnson of the 
USDA reportedly had a long conservation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru over the observers’ 
recommendation of ways to meet the food ‘crisis’. Johnson later remembered Nehru’s initial 
reluctance in admitting that the Indian situation could be seen as a crisis situation.  But once 
Johnson made clear to Nehru that in the coming years, India would face a food deficit of ten 
million tons (a shortfall that could not be met through import alone), the Prime Minister 
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reportedly gave up and decided to endorse the recommendation for distributing capital-intensive 
resources in selected districts of India. 
            Johnson’s account of his interview with Nehru reveals interesting facets of the food 
question when read along with a more academic work, for example, that of Francine Frankel’s 
magnum opus, India’s Political Economy. Frankel concentrates on a more complex set of 
political and economic causes to understand the reasons that prompted the Government of India 
to launch the Intensive Agriculture Development Program (IADP) in 1961.
18
  Johnson, however, 
stressed on a more simplistic and humane account behind IADP. He explained his success in 
convincing Nehru and the Indian government to selective use of capital-intensive resources, not 
in term of how it would have helped the Indian government to pacify different agrarian groups, 
but, how it would help towards prevention of hunger. Thus to foreign agencies working in India, 
the emphasis was to present and interpret issues in apolitical context-more in terms of 
development.   
      A brief description of IADP would help us to contextualize how it reflected the 
recommendations of the Ford Foundation Team and introduced new trends that contradicted with 
agricultural policies of the past. For instance, the Indian government took steps to saturate the 
entire cultivated areas of selected districts, with improved varieties of biochemical resources. 
Policymakers ensured that the total requirements of inputs were made available at the 
appropriate time and at places, within easy reach of the farmers. Leaders stimulated an additional 
flow of credit, to meet the demands (at least for short-term loans) of all cultivators participating 
in the program. The Planning Commission wanted these districts not only to be centers of higher 
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production but also to be models, where they tested the adoption of new agricultural methods and 
innovations at the block and the village level.
19
 
         To the proponents of selective approach and capital-intensive resources, the IADP looked 
promising, as it started showing some expected results. For instance, the use of fertilizers as an 
‘essential’ ingredient of the package of ‘improved’ practices, increased in significant quantity 
over the years, and many of the IADP districts led the way in this rising rate of application of 
fertilizers. Ludhiana district was exemplary in this matter as there, the rate of application of 
nitrogenous fertilizers per hectare of wheat increased from 100 kg in 1961-62 to 136 kg in 1963-
64. In the case of phosphate fertilizers too, the rate of application increased from just 58 kg per 
hectare in the first two years, up to the recommended rate of 104 kg per hectare.
 20       
        Use of new seed varieties also showed promise. At the end of the Second Plan, the 
estimated area planted with improved varieties of seeds was 55 million acres. The Planning 
Commission expected that it would increase to 148 million acres in the course of the Third Plan. 
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture proposed to establish a Seed Corporation to ensure seed 
production at selected farms, under conditions of efficient management, to maintain purity and 
maximum yield. The Government of India also started considering legislation for controlling the 
quality of seeds and regulating their production, marketing and movement.
21
 Thus from a 
decentralized seed production of the yesteryears, this constituted a massive shift. Seeds, as mean 
of production, had been produced and stored by farmers with very little or no state intervention. 
Any improvement brought about was gradual, and rarely planned by a centralized authority, 
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making them an open resource, not subjected to a regulated quality control or standardization.  
Popular consumption patterns, instead of state legislation or expert opinions, played a more 
crucial role in regulating the type of seeds that the farmers cultivated. Seed, as Kloppenburg 
pointed out has a unique position in the production process-it is both the mean of production and 
the final product.
22
 In the technical rendering of the question of hunger, it was this aspect of seed 
as the mean of production rather than its quality as the final product-the food-that received more 
attention from the scientists. Scientists in their effort to increase yield was keen to lay down 
norm for attributes related to higher production; this necessitated a central agency with the 
authority to impose certain standards to come into being. Yield is a more quantifiable component 
(than taste) of a production process that made the technical experts to claim it as their domain. 
Thus when definition of good taste remained a subjective and varied attribute worldwide, what 
constituted good yield was very strictly defined and imposed through legislation. 
     Greater use of fertilizers and seeds, however, were not sufficient to create any immediate 
relief for the nation’s food crisis. This was partly because, following the selective approach, 
there were very few districts where the IADP program was introduced, and there was great 
regional disparity as to the amount of cropped area that could be brought under the new plans for 
extensive use of fertilizers and high-yielding varieties of seeds. For example, in the West 
Godavari district, 83.7 per cent of the gross cropped area was covered by IADP, but in 
Sambalpur, Bhandara and Cachar the percentage fell to 7.2, 8.5 and 10 respectively. Of the 
fourteen districts under IADP, only two (Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh and Ludhiana in Punjab) were 
entirely devoted to wheat cultivation, while Pali in Rajasthan had both millet and wheat among 
the crops cultivated. Moreover, it is essential to note that the development program covered only 
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314 blocks out of the total number of 5240 blocks into which the country was divided in 1964-
65. The gross cropped area of these districts was about 8.1 million hectares, which formed a little 
over five percent of the total cultivated area in the country. 
23
 The implementation of the new 
policy was at such a miniscule scale that its impact was hardly visible. 
      Agricultural production showed little progress in 1960-61 and 1961-62, and then actually 
declined in the next two years. Food prices rose rapidly, unchecked even by grain imports from 
the United States. Nehru was jittery about the food situation. Not sure what exactly went wrong, 
he said to the Indian Parliament, ‘I am…naturally disappointed at many things, more especially 
our performance in agriculture…You may of course apportion blame between the Planning 
Commission, the Government of India, myself and the state governments.’ At various places and 
times, he admitted that all the elements of the institutional strategy-land reforms, cooperatives, 
panchayats-had failed. 
24
 China’s attack on India in 1962 came as a sudden jolt to the political 
leadership of the country. Nehru, already distraught by the food crisis, linked the drive for 
national defense to the quest for agricultural prosperity. He pointed out that the ‘fact that we 
produce enough in our agricultural sector is as important as guns…Real war is governed by 
scientific advance. Today you want scientific knowledge; you want scientific processes for 
production.’ 25 Thus under pressure situation, the national leadership expressed a lack of 
confidence in a slow paced, gradual institutional reforms as a mean of improving agricultural 
production. Technoscientific means, in moments of crisis, appeared as a more reliable and 
quicker deliverer. 
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          To enable science and technology to have a greater bearing on agricultural production, 
the Third Plan (1961-66), provided for an outlay of Rs.280 million to agricultural research in 
Indian laboratories. For cereals, the central government undertook to develop its own research 
facilities on a regional basis, in addition to the agricultural knowledge gained from the United 
States and other foreign powers. This regional or local approach was in endorsement of the 
recommendations of the Ford Foundation Production Team. Indian government wanted to 
connect the mission of agricultural colleges to specific blocks in their vicinity, to assure that 
research could directly contribute to increased agricultural production. In 1963, A.D. Pandit, the 
Vice President of Indian Council of Agricultural Research, proposed ways to orient research to 
solving farmers’ most basic problems rather than indulge in cultivation of science. He advocated 
that India, as a developing country, should concentrate more of its scientific resources on applied 
research, which should be based on the body of fundamental research already available from 
developed countries. Pandit observed that India’s central institutes such as IARI had larger 
resources of scientific personnel and equipment, which made them relatively well-equipped to 
undertake fundamental research. But he emphasized that smaller state institutions should 
concentrate on applied research for regions with distinct geographical/climatic characteristics; 
when those scientists came across any problems of fundamental research in their work, they 
should refer such issues to the larger central institutes. Thus, Pandit envisioned a projected model 
of Indian agricultural science research that was supposed to work as a two-tier system, in which 
the responsibility to generate knowledge would be in the hands of relatively fewer institutes, 
whereas, the other centers of research would carry on with the practical applications of the 
research results. India, it was pointed out, was challenged in terms of resources to support a large 
number of research institutes of international standards to perform fundamental research on 
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various major crops.  Instead, India should engage in scientific dialogue with countries, which 
already had the expertise and the experience, to receive the latest oeuvre of scientific knowledge 
and then experiment on ways of applying it to the national context. India’s central institutes such 
as the IARI and the CRRI became examples of this pattern of technology transfer. These 
institutes were expected to undertake crop research of national importance, utilizing the 
knowledge received from various international institutes such as CIMMYT and IRRI. Under the 
new scheme of development, they were expected to make their contributions to the knowledge 
pool by making international findings in agricultural research more locally adaptable. The 
country’s regional institutes would assist in that search for local agro-ecological adaptations by 
organizing numerous field trials, experiments and farm demonstrations.
 26                                               
            
In 1963, Indian government requested an international Agricultural Research Review 
Team to undertake a survey of the nation’s research establishments and to suggest ways to make 
that knowledge system more effective in solving the food crisis. The team, comprising eminent 
scientists from India, U.K. and the USA, and led by Dr. M. W. Parker, a senior agricultural 
scientist of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, submitted its report on March 1964. According 
to the recommendation of the Research Review Team, the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research should be given the necessary powers to develop and administer a national program of 
agriculture and food research commensurate with the country’s needs. This was a clear shift 
from the prevalent system in which Indian agricultural research institutes conducted theoretical 
research even when it did not have immediate visible application.  The dominance of theoretical 
science instead of need-based research came to be disregarded as a colonial hang-over, reflecting 
the British style of higher education, which the Review Team argued, neglected the practical 
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application of technical knowledge.
27 
To guarantee a greater impact of technoscience on the food 
question, the Review Team pointed out the importance of having India’s best scientific talents 
attracted to agriculture, which was not the case till then. The best minds went to engineering, 
medical science or in civil services. The team considered that the situation could be remedied by 
taking steps towards raising the status of agricultural research by providing the agricultural 
scientists better salary, recognition and greater autonomy.  To enable the agricultural scientists to 
act, independent of the Indian bureaucracy, the 1964 report recommended that the executive 
head of the ICAR should be a career scientist, instead of a member of the Indian Civil Service, as 
was the custom. 
     Within two months of the publication of the research review report, the country went 
through a political transition, as Prime Minister Nehru succumbed to a heart attack on May 1964. 
Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru as the next prime minister of India in June 1964. 
Confronted with stiff food price rises all over the country, the new prime minister immediately 
set up a Price Commission under his chief secretary L.K. Jha to get expert views on price policy 
for the 1964/65 season. Jha argued in his report that while the immediate crisis might be 
addressed with proposals for price controls, state trading, and rationing, reaching a more long-
term solution to the food problem demanded a substantial increase in production.
28
 These 
recommendations of the Price Commission incidentally reflected the opinions of India’s food 
minister, C. Subramaniam, who had just been transferred from the steel ministry by Prime 
Minister with the hope that he would successfully replicate his industrial production successes in 
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the new ministry too.
29 
The fact that the Prime Minister and the future Food and Agriculture 
Minister thought that the success of the Steel sector could be replicated in matters of agriculture 
too reveals the technocratic mindset. It clearly brings out how the whole food question and, in 
that matter, the question of non-availability of food specifically was equated with the technical 
question of production increase.
 
 The parallels simply ignored the social and agro-ecological 
complexity
 
of the food question.
  
Application of better techniques is enough to remove the 
production glut of steel, but food availability is related not only to production but also to efficient 
distribution and the question of entitlement.
    
        
As the new food minister and faced with multiple crisis, Subramaniam found a technical 
rendering of the food question as the most feasible option. He called this the ‘new agricultural 
strategy,’ which was defined by a national commitment to capital-intensive technological 
resources, backed by price incentives and organizational reforms. One of the first statements that 
he made immediately after becoming the Union Food and Agricultural Minister was that every 
country that had improved its agriculture, had done so only by introducing modern science and 
technology into farming, and that India could not be an exception. 
30
 The fulcrum of his 
technocratic approach to agriculture would be fertilizer and better seeds.
31
 To make the Indian 
farmers increasingly use capital-intensive biochemical resources, Subramaniam wanted the 
Indian government to give them price incentives. As a crucial constituent of his technocratic 
approach, Subramaniam was eager to give agricultural scientists a central role in the new 
agricultural strategy. The new strategy was a trailblazer in many aspects and therefore 
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politicians, economists, and scientists soon joined in the debate over the suitability, 
shortcomings, and implications of the new agricultural strategy.  The outcome of this debate over 
the new policy will soon be influenced by both agrarian and non-agrarian questions such as acute 
food shortages, painfully high food prices, Indo-Pak war, and international diplomatic and 
economic pressure. 
 Troubled Time and the New Seeds 
    By fall 1964, Union Ministers openly declared that the country was passing through a 
‘national calamity’ in terms of food process. In spite of the bleak situation, Subramaniam as food 
minister remained publicly optimistic that the ‘crisis would blow over in two to three months,’ 
thanks to substantial aid flowing from the United States and better harvesting of crops in India 
that he thought would help to bring down the present high-prices.
32
 Contrary to his optimism, the 
food situation only deteriorated further. The rising food prices shook confidence in the national 
government among all communities of citizens, to varying degrees. The opposition parties, 
except the right wing Swatantra Party, took advantage of the general swing of national opinion, 
seizing the opportunity to pass a no-confidence motion against the Congress government in the 
Lower House of the Indian Parliament.
33
 
    The national press remarked with some amount of bitterness that the no-confidence 
motion was only successful in introducing some amount of chaos in the legislative body; it failed 
to give a concrete alternative as how to tackle the food crisis. 
34
 Faced with such animosity from 
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the opposition members of Parliament, the Union Food Minister aggressively blamed them for 
accentuating the food crisis. Subramaniam argued that the ‘crisis of confidence’ manifested 
among the non-Congress Member of Parliament had been actually creating a ‘scarcity 
atmosphere’ and further helping the traders to sell food at unjustly inflated prices. In other 
words, the government blamed the opposition parties for contributing to the rampant black-
marketing that became a common occurrence. 
35
 
     The effort of the Union Food Minister to deflect the attack of the Opposition through 
strategies of counterattack proved futile. To add to the drama of the situation, the Communist 
leaders from South India went on to hold a personal fast in the lobbies of the Indian Parliament, 
in protest against the Central Government’s alleged nonchalance to the people of Kerala 
suffering under the food crisis. Since Kerala was always a stronghold of the Communists, the 
leaders of that state took a leading role in both houses of the Parliament to strongly critique the 
food policy of the government. The Communist party led a nationwide agitation against rising 
prices. Demonstrators appeared in the thousands, and police soon made about 1300 arrests to 
keep the situation from spiraling out of control. There were student riots in different parts of 
India. 
36
 
     While conceding that stagnating output since 1961/1962 could be a possible reason for 
the food shortages, government planners, however, insisted that price increases of the present 
magnitude could not be explained entirely by shortfalls in production. They assigned greater 
blame to hoarding activities by the ‘farmer-trader axis’. The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and 
even the Congress Party’s Working Committee all accepted the Planning Commission’s 
                                                 
35
 Times of India, September 11, 1964. 
 
36
 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, p.249. 
106 
 
assessment. This explanatory stance taken by the Commission seriously questioned the 
possibility of solving the food crisis entirely through technoscientific means because the latter 
did not dwell on questions like who has ‘control over the means of production, and structures of 
law and force that support systematic inequalities.’37 By questioning the technical rendering of 
the food question, the Planning Commission members brought to the forefront more complex 
political and economic questions that were not originally addressed by the Food Minister, the 
Research Review Team or the Ford Foundation members. It was not ignorance about the 
complexity of the food question that prompted the kind of response that it repeatedly did from 
the agents of capital-intensive development of Indian agriculture. It was rather, in my argument, 
the very awareness of the difficulty of a holistic appraisal of the agrarian scenario that 
discouraged them to do so. They wanted a quick-fix remedy, which they knew will not be 
possible if political and economic issues were addressed. Moreover, as Fergusson argued in his 
study on Lesotho, the development agencies that worked in such contexts, down played political 
conflicts within a nation-state because resolving such conflicts did not fall within their domain of 
expertise or authority.
38
 The experts associated with the developing agencies, Tania Murray Li 
argues, ‘are trained to frame problems in technical terms. Their claims to expertise depend on 
their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solution that fall within their 
repertoire.’ 39 The Food Minister Subramaniam’s approach to the food question is another classic 
example of the kind of development logic that both Li and Fergusson discussed in their 
respective books on Indonesia and Lesotho.  
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         Subramaniam as the food minister emphasized that the real answer to the spiraling prices 
was to increase production. He urged the government to return to the market approach of 
providing price incentives to private investment, while substantially increasing outlays on yield-
enhancing inputs, especially chemical fertilizers.
40
 In January 1965, Subramaniam presented the 
framework of the new agricultural policy to the annual session of the Congress Party at 
Durgapur. In the meeting he vociferously argued that even though the ‘immediate’ concern, in 
face of the food crisis, happens to be food distribution, ‘the food problem cannot be solved 
unless the agricultural production programme is attended to and we achieve results and produce 
more to increase the availability of food to meet the needs of the people.’ He defined the ‘future 
programme’ of Indian agriculture entirely in terms of ‘need for scientific agriculture’ that would 
be composed of extensive fertilizer use, bigger seed farms, plant protection, improved elements 
etc. He planned the growth of entire administrative, research and extension sectors to facilitate 
the use of the aforementioned components of what he called ‘scientific agriculture’.41  
      But it did not prove easy for Subramaniam to push through his plans for scientific 
agriculture. As he later reported, the main bone of contention in the session was, whether the 
new emphasis on production through capital-intensive means in his plans amounted to 
abandoning Socialist principles and the goal of social equity. The State Chief Ministers 
supported Subramianiam and his policy, whereas, the more left inclined members of the 
Congress Party demanded a return to what they called ‘Nehru’s ideals.’ The session, however, 
ended on a compromising note. A resolution was passed that reaffirmed the goal of making 
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progress towards an ideal socialist society, but at the same time recognizing the need for rapidly 
stimulating the base of farm production. 
42
 
     Subramaniam realized in 1965 that if he could successfully reorganize the ICAR, along 
the lines recommended by the Agricultural Research Review Team, that would make his task 
easier of reorienting India’s agricultural research establishments to fit his plan for scientific 
agriculture and also make the institutes more responsive to immediate local requirements. The 
first step towards that was taken when he replaced the civil servant who was in charge of ICAR 
with a scientist, Dr. B.P. Pal as the Director General. By replacing a bureaucrat with a scientist at 
the helm of ICAR, Subramaniam hoped to ensure that future agricultural research establishments 
would not be tied down by unnecessary red tape or limited by a narrow administrative mindset. 
As a career scientist, Pal was expected to display a better grasp of any problems facing a 
researcher or a research project and take quick actions accordingly. Next, Subramaniam 
transferred all the national agricultural research institutes, including IARI, out of the Department 
of Agriculture and to the new jurisdiction of ICAR. Through this move, Subramaniam intended 
to achieve two objectives, to facilitate centralization while also restricting bureaucratic influence 
on agricultural research, education and extension services. Through centralization, he hoped to 
increase the influence of international experts in reshaping India’s agricultural research. The 
more decentralized a research structure is, the more difficult it is to impose a homogenous 
model. Under the FAO initiative, India was already involved in international germplasm transfer, 
and Subramaniam hoped that his initiatives at reorganization and centralization would further 
strengthen such efforts.  He discouraged fragmentation of research efforts and urged scientists to 
concentrate scientific resources on solving a few basic questions that were thought to be closely 
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related to problems of increased production. As a mark of highest technocratic triumph, the 
ICAR was given all the  necessary  powers  to  develop  and  administer  a  national  program  of  
agriculture  and  food   research  that would be commensurate  with  the  country’s  needs. 
Through disassociating agricultural research institutes from rest of the civil administration, by 
narrowing down its focus on technicalities and concentrating expertise only on solvable 
problems, the new agricultural strategy successfully accomplished a thorough technical 
rendering of the food crisis.  
      Agriculture was placed under the concurrent list of the Indian constitution, making the 
center and the states jointly responsible for its development.
43
 Thus to ensure that the new 
policies had an all-India effect, Subramaniam took measures reforming the ways that state 
agencies conducted agricultural research and extension. Once the government placed the central 
research institutes under the jurisdiction of the Union Ministry of Agriculture, policymakers also 
moved to place the state-level research organizations under the jurisdiction of the respective 
State departments of agriculture. In fact, Subramaniam decided that the best approach would be 
to transfer the entire research function out of the state departments and into the new agricultural 
universities which were to be established in every state. 
44
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     More  than  31 million U.S. dollar,  11 million Indian  rupees, 700 man  years  of  U.S  
staff  time  were  spent  in  helping  India  build  this re-envisioned system  of  agricultural  
research  and  education,  including  the  creation  of  eight  new  agricultural  universities. Six 
American land-grant universities helped establish India’s new agricultural schools. 45 Both 
India’s host  government  and  the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
wanted to ensure the survival of India’s new schools; they worried that  political  instability  
made  it  virtually  impossible to  sustain  a  high  level  of  support  for  a  developing  
institution  for  much  longer  than  two to three  years. In supporting India’s new agricultural 
universities, USAID wanted to ensure that its technical assistance had a direct impact on the 
country, both politically and economically.  They hoped their aid would snowball, through a 
‘critical mass effect,’ and formulated several indicators to measure the value. One priority 
assigned to India’s new universities was to produce more master’s degree graduates 
and doctorates.  The  professor’s  primary  function  was  defined   as  the  creation  and  
accumulation  of  new  knowledge; in devoting intensive effort to improving the  quality  of  
research, India expected its scientists to focus on identifying and solving the country’s most 
significant  agricultural  problems.  Through improved physical facilities and higher pay scales, 
universities hoped to induce better professors to stay. The universities made changes  in the  
curriculum  to  ensure  that  all  students  acquired  a basic  fundamental  understanding  of  the 
State’s  agriculture  and  the  underlying  basic  sciences. This new structure was intended to 
allow  greater  flexibility  for  both students  and  professors, and  to eliminate  all  of  the  
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previous  duplication. In emulation of America’s land-grant institutions, extension was defined 
as an important activity of India’s new agriculture universities.  But during this phase, the 
experts made no attempt at two-way communication; there was no interest in incorporating 
farmers’ knowledge in the improvement of Indian agriculture. The focus of the new agricultural 
institutes was to ‘develop’ experts in the western mould, who would be dominating arbitrators of 
change, rather than facilitators of cooperative efforts; they visualized the farmer as a passive and 
malleable recipient of technical information. 
46
 
Mexican Agricultural Program: Model for Developing Countries 
         Subramaniam wrote in his memoir that in the spring of 1965, Dr. Ralph Cummings of the 
Rockefeller Foundation came to visit him as it became known that the Minister was prepared to 
consider new approaches to agriculture based on the new advances in science and technology. 
The Rockefeller Foundation had already been testing the high-yielding wheat and maize seed 
varieties in various experimental farms of IARI, following the success of their Mexican 
program.
47
 Twenty years of work in developing, first, the disease resistant seeds and then, the 
fertilizer-responsive dwarf varieties of wheat, convinced the scientists and officials associated 
with the Mexican project that, doing the same in case of India would help to significantly raise 
yield and eventually make India self-sufficient in food. In the transfer of technology, therefore, 
the experts assumed a certain uniformity of contexts. They assumed that the success of a piece or 
a package of technology could be replicated with investments in training scientists of the 
developing countries at land-grant institutions, modeling institutions of the host countries in 
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accordance to the philosophy of the former and in molding attitudes favorable towards 
capitalization of agriculture. This is not to say they started with a deliberate intention of 
replication. But their objective was to disseminate those practices, institutions and technology 
that they have seen to succeed in their own country.
48
  
      The success of the new technology, in significantly bringing down Mexico’s corn and 
wheat import went a long way in boosting the claim that, technology on being effectively used 
could modernize agricultural production and thereby fight hunger. Historian Deborah Fitzgerald 
argued in her article that though as early as 1948 Mexico stopped importing corn, due in large 
part to the use of improved seeds, less than 12 percent of Mexican farmers used hybrid seeds to 
cultivate their land, even as late as 1963. Most of the corn in Mexico continued to grow in 
subsistence level farms, which were not in a position to adopt that were expensive practices such 
as hybrid seeds, fertilizers and irrigations mandatory in the new cultivating practices. In contrast 
to the corn project the wheat program was more successful because, Fitzgerald showed how the 
wheat farmers in terms of their affluence, access to resources, and interest in experimental 
practices resembled American hybrid corn adopters rather than other Mexican farmers.
49
 
      Moreover, at the euphoria of the moment no body stopped to ponder whether freedom 
from food import is equivalent to freedom from hunger and whether Mexico was at all successful 
in achieving the later objective. The scientists, bureaucrats and politicians who harped on the 
technical success of the Mexican program in boosting up production, did not enquire whether it 
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was followed by an efficient food distribution chain and if the people had the purchasing 
capacity to buy the food thus produced. The complexity inherent in the question of hunger was 
deliberately reduced and dealt only in terms of production, because it was the only part that was 
amenable to a technical solution, with which the experts were familiar. 
      This conviction, that the new research developed for Mexico could be beneficial in 
addressing India’s national farm crisis, appeared quite plainly in the arguments of American 
scientists in mid-1960s.  In 1967, for example, American scientists E.C. Stakman, Richard 
Bradfield and Paul C. Mangelsdorf wrote a book crediting science and technology with creating 
an ‘agricultural revolution’ in Mexico from 1943 to 1963 that succeeded in conquering hunger. 
Their account read like a fairy tale, with the good (in this case, technoscience) winning over evil 
(hunger), thanks to the valiant struggle of the heroes, the scientists. Their moral-laden account 
linked modern science to efficiency and contrasted hard work versus laziness in producing 
striking contrasts of wealth and poverty. This book promised that modern research could ensure 
a bright future for all, other than the traditionalists who were too non-enterprising or too 
skeptical to embrace change.   
        Stakman, Bradfield, and Mangelsdorf suggested that the triumph of science over hunger 
in Mexico could be extended to various other parts of the world, including the developing 
nations of South and Central America and Asia. 
50
 Not coincidentally, all three authors had 
helped lead the Rockefeller Foundation’s agricultural program in Mexico, and their account 
reflected their dual convictions that their efforts had directly led to raising agricultural yields in 
Mexico and that the principles held equal promise to do the same in other parts of the world.  
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       Similar to the literature on food-population discourse, the authors used graphic metaphors 
to give an account of technoscientific mastery over vagaries of nature and population explosion. 
The authors in extolling how science and technology helps man to fight destructive elements of 
nature-from pests/diseases to soil infertility- reiterated the conviction of the developmental 
theorists. We need to remind ourselves, as we discussed in chapter one, Rostow’s belief that 
development especially technology and science would help developing countries to overcome 
their dependence on nature and attain a mastery over it.  This definitely held much promise for 
the developing countries which had been fighting too long the ravages of nature in form of 
droughts, floods and pests attack. The means to tame nature to human needs looked so accessible 
and alluring.  
      Religious references, especially biblical anecdotes were repeatedly stressed to drive 
home their arguments on the benevolent nature of the new technology and how a man, in being 
enterprising with the technology, would be performing his religious duty and not doing so 
amounted to laziness and thus being irreverent towards biblical injunctions. By helping the 
destitute, they suggested, the agricultural scientific revolution was embracing a Christian duty. 
By giving a poor country agrarian self-sufficiency, the scientists wrote, technoscience fulfilled of 
the prayer ‘Give us this day our daily bread.’51 They argued that the ‘heart-warming revolution’ 
had helped to make the land more bountiful for the land-loving Mexican farmers. Unlike a 
political coup, this revolution had been ‘bloodless,’ with a ‘constantly accelerating momentum’ 
that brought more and more benefits to its neighbors, both near and far. The authors’ celebration 
of the apolitical nature of the new technical revolution further vindicates Fergusson’s observation 
that in the development rhetoric, questions that are rendered in technical terms are 
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simultaneously rendered non-political. The success stories of so-called technical revolutions 
came to be bleached of its political and social content. Such de-contextualization helped to show-
case that the new technology was applicable with same success in any parts of the world. 
      In proclaiming the gains achieved through a scientific revolution in farming, Stakman, 
Bradfield, and Mangelsdorf made assertions that played into a larger context of international 
political arguments over agriculture. During these years, theorists such as Wolf Ladejinsky 
vigorously urged the need for land reforms to counter communist infiltrations in the developing 
countries.
52
 These scientists, like the members of the Ford Foundation team suggested, instead, 
that while land redistribution might satisfy the hunger of the landless for land, such measures did 
not automatically satisfy their hunger for food.  This argument proved to be an effective ploy 
against the Communist call for giving more land to the people in the developing world.  
    Like India in the early 1960s, Mexico in 1940 was confronted with two inexorable facts: 
mounting population and relatively fewer arable lands. Apart from the problem of having little 
per-capita land under cultivation, the yield per acre was also low, and there was very little land 
still available for possible reclamation. Speaking as American scientists, Stakman, Bradfield, and 
Mangelsdorf argued that such difficult circumstances made the use of technoscience as the only 
logical step, that the ‘wise’ leaders of Mexico felt obligated to help their people by initiating a 
technical revolution in agriculture.  To supplement land reforms, Mexico’s Minister of 
Agriculture and the Sub-secretary of Agriculture were ‘conscious’ that their country faced an 
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urgent need to produce more food and had the enterprise to ask for help where help was 
needed.
53
 
     In the early 1940s, the political leaders of Mexico urged the Rockefeller Foundation to 
provide them with technical assistance, and the Foundation appointed a three-man commission. 
Paul Mangelsdorf was a distinguished plant geneticist and breeder, Richard Bradfield was an 
eminent specialist in agronomy and soils, while E.C. Stakman was a plant pathologist.  Those 
three were charged with studying Mexico’s food needs and agricultural potential, and then 
assisting with the technological and scientific aspects of agricultural change.  Their operations in 
Mexico started in February 1943 and by 1956, that country had become independent of the need 
to import foreign wheat. The three scientists attributed victory in this Mexican agricultural 
revolution to a ‘Big Three’ set of technoscience measures: the adoption of better seed varieties, 
better soil management, and better protection against destructive diseases, voracious insects and 
noxious weeds. Over subsequent years, advocates would define these three biochemical 
introductions (better varieties of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) as the core of the technological 
package that they claimed could revolutionize international production and potentially eliminate 
widespread hunger. 
54
 
     The Rockefeller Foundation appointed George Harrar to take charge of its Mexican 
program.  Working with a group of Mexican scientists such as Jose Rodriguez, Leonel Robles, 
Benjamin Ortega and Jose Guevara, Harrar succeeded in breeding wheat varieties that had higher 
yield potential and were resistant to stem rusts disease. Those advantageous varieties definitely 
increased the total wheat production in Mexico for a few years.  But after 1958, the national 
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yield leveled off; observers reported that the newly improved varieties fell to the ground when 80 
kg of nitrogen or more was applied to the soil. Norman Borlaug, a plant pathologist and a wheat 
specialist who joined the Mexican program in October 1944, was already experimenting with the 
idea that use of semidwarf varieties could overcome this problem of ‘lodging’ and thus facilitate 
greater use of fertilizer in the field. 
55
 In 1954, he was responsible for initiating the first extensive 
breeding program to develop semidwarf spring wheat varieties in Mexico, by crossing Norin 10 
and Brevor lines with Mexican spring wheat varieties.
56
  Further experiments resulted in 1955 in 
a new type of wheat with higher yield potential, increased number of fertile florets per spikelet, 
and a larger number of tillers per plant. This experimental variety would serve as the basis for 
subsequent important developments in commercial wheat, such as Pitic 62 and Penjamo 62, 
which Mexican farmers started growing after 1962. These were followed by the release of 
Sonora 63, Sonora 64, Mayo 64, Lerma Rojo 64 and other varieties. 
57
 
     The story of the agricultural revolution in Mexico connects directly with the history of 
India in the mid-1960s.  This connection was not incidental but deliberate. According to S.P. 
Kohli and R.G. Anderson, the Coordinator and the Joint Coordinator of All-India Coordinated 
Wheat Improvement Programme, by the early 1960s, the new high-yielding varieties from 
Mexico came to be introduced in India. During 1962-63, scientists associated with the 
International Wheat Rust Nursery observed a number of dwarf wheat varieties of Mexican 
origin. In 1963, at the invitation of the Government of India, Norman Borlaug came to visit the 
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wheat-growing areas in India. On his return to Mexico, Dr. Borlaug sent bulk qualities of seeds 
of four Mexican dwarf wheat varieties for trial in India. Scientists at IARI sent this material for 
evaluations at several different testing stations, and based on those observations made during the 
cropping season of 1963-64, researchers selected a few new dwarf wheat varieties for further 
investigation. In particular, the Mexican wheat varieties Lerma Rojo and Sonora 64 seemed 
potentially suitable to the varying conditions prevailing in the different parts of India, and so 
India selected those two varieties for restricted seed imports during 1965.
58
 The group in favor of  
importing the new seeds from Mexico for their cultivation in India, made arrangements to bring 
in 250 tons of Sonora 64 and Lerma Rojo, to arrive in time for planting in the fall of 1966. The 
scientists hoped that this amount of seed would be sufficient to cultivate about 2900 hectares 
(about 7,100 acres) in the 1965-66 cropping season. 
59
 
National Crisis and the Dwarf Varieties 
   On April 1965, as IARI celebrated its sixtieth anniversary, Pakistani incursions occurred 
in the Rann of Kutch area at the western part of India. The volatile situation added to the national 
anxiety about the food situation. How can an army, much less a nation, face its enemy with 
empty stomach? C. Subramaniam, the Minister for Food and Agriculture, continuously argued 
that faced with this national emergency, it was even more necessary to conduct scientific work 
on these new seed varieties.  He confidently declared that given the right type of political and 
administrative support and academic freedom, India’s research workers could convert theoretical 
knowledge into tangible advances in the food sector.
60
 M.S. Swaminathan, head of the Division 
                                                 
58
 S.P. Kohli and R.G. Anderson, ‘New Amber Seeded Wheats’, Indian Farming (August 1967) pp.28-29. 
 
59
 Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution, p.241. 
 
60
 C. Subramaniam, ‘60 Years of Agricultural Research’,  Indian Farming (April 1965). 
119 
 
of Botany at IARI, pointed out how rapid advances in agronomic practices, especially in 
fertilizer application and water management, was making possible to obtain very high yields 
from the Mexican dwarf varieties of wheat.  He recounted in several occasions the stories of 
spectacular yield in trials conducted at farms in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and Bihar, where 
the varieties Lerma Rojo 64A, Sonora 63 & 64, and Mayo 64, all reportedly yielded 5000 pounds 
per acre.
61
 
     On the basis of such evidences of high yields, the members of the 4
th
 All- India Wheat 
Research Workers’ seminar judged the Mexican variety Lerma Rojo to be suitable for cultivation 
under high levels of fertility in India. Lerma Rojo reportedly gave not only phenomenal high 
yields but it was also the only commercial wheat variety available in India that was most 
resistant to rust, smut, and lodging problems. Moreover, the scientists argued that though it was a 
semi-dwarf wheat variety, its straw yields were comparable to those of the Indian varieties 
because of its profuse tillering. The researchers publicized this aspect of Lerma Rojo to make it 
more acceptable to the Indian farmers, who needed the straw for their cattle, in absence of 
adequate grazing ground. 
    Armed with all these experimental data on the yield capacity of the new cultivars, Dr. 
Ralph Cummings of the Rockefeller Foundation, (as mentioned earlier in the chapter) came to 
visit Subramaniam in 1965. Cummings reportedly expressed concerns at the persistent doubts at 
various governmental levels about the new high-yielding varieties. What dismayed him the most 
was the skepticism of the scientific establishment-significant number of researchers resented the 
introduction of the new seeds as they were not sure what sort of new pests and diseases might 
develop with the dissemination of the Mexican varieties. Cummings complained that many 
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scientists resisted the new seeds out of excess caution, even though two years had passed since 
the new seeds had been introduced, and the new wheat varieties had performed well on the 
research farms without the emergence of any adverse factors. Cummings also mentioned that 
new varieties of rice were available and were under experimentation in various laboratories and 
research farms, but that no decision had been taken at either the scientific, administrative or 
political levels as to what was to be done with these varieties. Subramaniam wrote in his memoir 
that once he heard Cummings’ message, he decided to proceed with the formulation of a strategy 
to utilize these new varieties. He established three panels: a scientists’ panel, a panel of 
agricultural economists, and a panel of agricultural administrators, to initiate a country-wide 
discussion on the suitability of the introduction of the new varieties to solve the food crisis.
62
 
     As a raging debate took place between various groups on the new seeds alongside border 
skirmishes with Pakistan, the four-year agreement that Indian leaders had made with President 
Kennedy on P.L. 480 came to an end.
63
 To make matters worse, it was apparent by late July that 
the year’s main monsoon had failed over northern India. By the middle of 1965, the food 
situation and the swirling debate around it had thrown open several important questions as to the 
fundamental causes of crisis. At both the national and international level, and between India’s 
ruling parties and the opposition, observers agreed without ambiguity that there was an essential 
agricultural crisis. Differences arose, however, over what caused the crisis. People hoped that 
identifying a cause would facilitate the process of finding a solution. This in turn would quicken 
the pace of development of modern India that got momentarily stalled by unwonted 
circumstances. 
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      National daily newspapers reflected this sense of concern at what had caused the crisis. 
The successive failures of the monsoons in different parts of India definitely contributed to the 
worsening food scenario, but the main critique against the government was that an insufficient 
monsoon should not be the sufficient cause of widespread famines that stalked Indian 
countryside. Attacking the government’s procurement policy, the Times of India argued that 
‘political expediency and the fear of doing anything which might alienate the middle range and 
rich peasant and lose the ruling party a large number of votes at the next general election have 
prevented most of the states from taking the procurement programme seriously.’ 64Thus, through 
mid-1965, the main complaint was that the famine was the result of a dismal procurement policy. 
It was argued that the Indian government did not display administrative efficiency or acumen to 
build up a food reserve to fight against possible weather vagaries. Given that droughts and floods 
were not uncommon in India, the unpreparedness of the national government became the butt of 
much public criticism. The ex-Union Food Minister, A.P. Jain and the economist B.R. Shenoy 
among others, however, joined Subramaniam in locating the locus of the crisis not in an 
administrative failure but in what they saw as the long-term technical backwardness of Indian 
agriculture. They argued that the Indian government must seek long-term remedies for food 
scarcity by investing in research for greater agricultural production. They wanted measures that 
would help farmers get financial resources, essential supplies, and cheaper fertilizers, which 
could help bring a reasonable return on their produce. 
65
    
     The day after celebrating the nineteenth Independence Day, the Indian Parliament opened 
its monsoon session on 16
th
 August 1965 amidst a ‘swirl of anxiety’ about the prevalent food 
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situation. The national dailies reported on the way in which the Opposition members took the 
government to the task. So bitter and sometime violent was their behavior that in the state 
legislative assemblies at Bihar and Maharashtra, the Speakers were forced to suspend almost all 
the Opposition members.
66
 
      In the midst of all these anxieties, the Food and Agriculture Ministry was preparing an 
Approach Paper to the proposed Fourth Plan (1966-71), which recommended a comprehensive 
outline for the new agricultural strategy, stressing not only the price incentives but also the new 
technology to be introduced. In this vision, new inputs like fertilizers and plant protection 
chemicals would be used in a few regions that had assured rainfall and sufficient irrigation, 
where such investments could return the maximum production.
67
 That policy would mean 
‘favouring’ areas which were already comparatively well developed with regard to irrigation. 
There was huge opposition from the Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry
68
 who 
argued against it on two grounds; adopting the new agricultural strategy would have meant 
sidelining long-standing issues of regional equity and socialist principle that defined Nehruvian 
India and it would also have meant greater demand on tight foreign currency situation for 
importing the expensive inputs. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture, however, overrode 
significant opposition to adopt the new strategy. The proponents of the new technology 
effectively used the critical food and political situation to argue that their model of agricultural 
development would be successful in increasing agricultural production and thereby fight both 
enemies-hunger at home and the invading army at the border.  
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      On September 6, 1965, a sense of emergency descended on the nation, as the President of 
Pakistan, General Ayub Khan declared a full-fledged war against India, escalating from the 
intermittent border skirmishes that had already been taking place. A week later, the U.S. 
suspended all military and economic aid to both belligerents. In the context of the Cold War, the 
suspension of aid did not go down well with the members of India’s political establishment. H.N. 
Mukherjee, the communist M.P from West Bengal, considered the suspension of aid as the 
American way of ‘arm twisting’ the Indian government. He argued that the U.S. attitude towards 
the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir had shown ‘where we are likely to stand if we depend 
on aid.’ 69 
      In October 1965, in a speech to the nation, the Prime Minister correlated the need for 
greater food production with the preservation of India’s freedom. He told listeners that just as the 
jawan (soldier) is ‘…staking his life for the country’ similarly, the kisan (farmer) should ‘…give 
their toil and their sweat.’ Shastri’s speech brought out the desperation of India’s situation. He 
urged that every bit of land should be cultivated, ‘a well-kept kitchen garden should be a matter 
of pride to every household…’ He asked ordinary consumers to practice self-restraint and not to 
hold parties, dinners and lunches, because these ‘are not in tune with the time at all.’ He wanted 
public opinion to ‘encourage austerity’. He called upon women to economize on consumption of 
wheat and use instead maize, barley or gram. 
70
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Fig. 3.1 Food and Defense: With the war going on between the Indian and the Pakistani army, defense 
and agriculture were considered ‘uppermost’ needs of India. In the words of the Prime Minister, Shastri, 
the food front is almost as vital as the military front. 
       
Shastri anticipated that the winter of 1965 would serve as a crucial turning point. He 
warned that whatever India would be able to do in the agricultural front during the coming three 
or four weeks would determine the fortunes of the country in the coming year. He wanted 
agricultural work to be undertaken on a war footing. To underline the gravity of the situation, 
Shastri drew close parallels between the war front and the food front. The Prime Minister talked 
about a scheme in which groups of villages would be entrusted to officials whose responsibility 
it would be to keep in close and direct touch with the farmers and to do everything possible to 
125 
 
resolve their difficulties. He urged entire districts to work as a team, with ‘a sense of dedication 
in the same manner as a soldier on the battlefront.’ Shastri visualized the District Officer as 
equivalent to a military commander, who had to organize the drive and achieve the production 
target. The Prime Minister assured his audience that these efforts would be successful if officials 
‘apply themselves to the task not merely as a part of their duty but also as a part of the deep 
obligation which they owe to the country at this critical hour.’ 71 
     Subramaniam stood by the Prime Minister, promoting the greater use of modern 
agricultural science and technology as vital to the nation’s security and development. He pointed 
out that ‘the inadequacy of our agricultural production has thrown a grave challenge to the nation 
engaged in the task of its economic growth and in the increasing responsibilities of its defense. It 
is a challenge to our will to live in prosperity and freedom…Our men of science are called upon 
to provide the ideas and leadership for bringing into the field methods and techniques which will 
effect a breakthrough in our agriculture and sustain its dynamic growth.’ 72 At another occasion, 
the Food Minister pointed out more categorically that, ‘…we must remind ourselves that there is 
an enemy lurking still-the enemy of ignorance, poverty and obscurantism. This enemy has to be 
fought and fought to a finish…The scientific revolution has a great role to play in making our 
society strong and successful. Research has to be organized in a bold and purposive manner to 
this end.’ 73 
     For the first time in the nation’s history, the scientists were under an intense political 
spotlight. Those researchers who were pinning great hopes on the Mexican dwarfs knew they 
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had to show some impressive results, in order to justify this huge import of seeds and chemical 
fertilizers during a period of acute foreign exchange crisis. Gradual worsening of the food 
situation made their task doubly difficult. In November 1965, the central government declared 
that its policy would be to prioritize conservation and equity, meaning that whatever food was 
available should go around as equitably as possible. Food shortages reached such an acute 
proportion that Prime Minister Shastri had to request each Indian family to skip a meal every 
week. This was no temporary or one-time request made by the Indian Prime Minister. The 
Government of India officially dubbed it as the ‘missing-a-meal’ campaign. Indians had long 
been used to fasting because of religious reasons. Moreover, Gandhi had given fasts a political 
significance in fighting the British rule. But it was striking to have an independent, democratic 
government officially incorporate fasting as a strategy to overcome a desperate food shortage. 
Government publicity campaigns sought to project the move in a positive light, emphasizing that 
nations seeking development and facing crises of scarcity and security have always demanded 
extraordinary sacrifices from their people. Indian traditions had long unquestionably established 
austerity as a high virtue, a cultural fact that came in handy to justify the ‘missing-a-meal’ 
campaign. Columnists in national dailies, with surprising glibness, argued the ‘virtue of missing-
a-meal’ in cutting down on overly-rich diets, wherever there is ‘excess consumption as to create 
a climate of austerity and sacrifice.’ The Shastri government also advocated a reduction in 
entertainment to grapple with the food crisis. The idea was to curtail food consumption as an 
integral part of any social and religious ceremony in India. 
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     As winter was setting in, the specter of having to further curtail food rations from 12 
ounces to 10 or even 8 ounces per day was turning into a reality, unless India could manage to 
get more food from the U.S. as part of the P.L.480 agreement. In the second week of November 
1965, Subramaniam, the Union Food Minister, had to admit publicly that while every effort 
would be made to reduce India’s dependence on food imports, the country currently had no 
alternative but to import as much food as possible. The minister emphasized the gravity of the 
situation; due to the drop in agricultural production in 1962-63 and 1963-64, he reported, India 
had already exhausted all buffer stocks of food grains. The recent widespread droughts seemed 
likely to cause a further fall in production in various parts of the country, especially in the Hindi-
heartland of northern India, which had always been the sheet-anchor of the Congress Party in any 
election. US food shipments, which would allow the Government of India to provide cheap food 
to the masses in the Indo-Gangetic plain, thus became a guarantee of political stability in India 
and indirectly underwrote the continuation of its Congress government. 
    Under the circumstances, the Indian Cabinet authorized the Union Food Minister to 
accept standing offers of American technical aid and to reach an understanding with Orville 
Freeman, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, in order to ensure adequate supplies of grain. 
75
 On 
November 1965, Subramaniam and Freeman were both in Rome to attend a FAO meeting. They 
took the chance to sign a memorandum of understanding. The terms of the ‘Treaty of Rome 
1965’ were kept secret until 1976, but according to Subramaniam’s version, he told Freeman that 
India would need about 10 million tons of grain. Freeman did not make a specific commitment 
but suggested that Subramaniam should visit Washington towards the end of December. At that 
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point, Freeman hinted, ‘some sort of agreement might be reached…with regard to the steps 
which…India would be taking and correspondingly what USA should do to assist in the 
implementation of the Plan and in the interim period.’ 76 
     India had been receiving food under the P.L. 480 since 1954, 
77
 but Freeman’s reluctance 
to commit immediately to the possibility of further food aid can be traced back to a gradual shift 
in policy regarding foreign aid in the Johnson administration since late 1963. Orville Freeman, 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, played a crucial role in molding the U.S. 
policy towards India’s food scarcity.  In later years, Freeman recalled that it was during the 
Johnson era that American policymakers began to think about the idea of making internal 
agricultural development a condition of Public Law 480 for the recipient countries. Freeman 
made repeated public pronouncements in the tune that ‘we’ve (USA) got to get the agriculture of 
these countries moving because of their total economic development depends on their 
agriculture, and yet they are ignoring their agriculture…’  According to Freeman, the US 
administration began to realize that these countries were not efficiently utilizing the food aid that 
they were receiving and were not ready to invest in their own agriculture.  There was a concern 
that poor nations were getting to depend on this food, as if America would ‘always be there to 
bail them out and they could put their resources to something else…’ Once American 
policymakers identified such trends as a problem, they began to shift from the way in which 
America had been handling its aid towards India.
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         As the American President procrastinated over releasing the food aid, the delay added to 
the misery of the common Indians and infuriated the political establishment. On December 1, 
1965,  participating in the Parliamentary debate over the food situation and drought conditions, 
Indrajit Gupta, a Member of Parliament belonging to the Communist Party of India (C.P.I), 
explicitly ‘deplored the continued dependence of the government on import of food grains…’ He 
urged the government not to keep the Parliamentary debate confined to the matter of finding a 
short-term solution to a crisis linked to the failure of rains or occurrence of droughts in any 
particular year. He instead urged the government to tackle food scarcity as a grave long-term 
problem. Mr. P.K. Deo, an elected member from Orissa, one of the poorer states of India, 
emotionally argued, ‘I had the misfortune of seeing the Bengal Famine…let there not be a 
repetition of that famine in free India. At that time we criticized the British raj and that it was a 
man-made famine. But if such a thing is allowed to be repeated in…free India, all the fingers 
will point at these gentlemen who are responsible for taking this country to this abyss.’ Even 
K.D. Malaviya, a senior member of the Congress Party, unhesitatingly pointed out that this 
dependence on P.L. 480 was ‘grossly unjust and inconsistent (with the) slogan of self-reliance’ 
that India had raise after the Indo-Pakistan War. 
79
 
   National dailies published innumerable letters to the editors highlighting the ignominy of 
the situation. For example, one view, as published in the Times of India on December 6, 1965, 
suggested that ‘both politically and economically it would be extremely dangerous for India to 
continue to depend on the US for a solution to the chronic food problem.’ Readers lashed out at 
the government for its ‘platitudinous assertions about the goal of self sufficiency’ at the 
beginning of each year and how the Food Minister always had to eat his words at the end, when 
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for one reason or the other the goal remained as elusive as before. 
80
 Thus shades of mood 
betrayed in all these instances was one of impatience at government’s ineptitude in handling the 
situation, anger and frustration at being subjected to ignominy of foreign pressure and sadness at 
the realization that even independence has failed to alleviate hunger. The general tone was that 
something effective must be done and that too without delay. The dominant trend of institutional 
reform that was expected to change the agricultural scenario did not deliver-not in time and 
certainly not in desired efficacy. The effort of the Indian scientists also appeared insignificant in 
face of enormity of the present crisis. The alternative that looked promising was the new inputs 
that several agencies started pushing at this point. It was not entirely the success of the new 
varieties but to a great extent the failure of the other means to quickly and effectively diffuse the 
crisis that influenced the decision in favor of the former. 
     It was apparently only with one positive note that the year came to an end: the war 
between India and Pakistan reached an inconclusive end. Lal Bahadur Shastri flew to Tashkent 
to sign a treaty with Pakistan under Soviet mediation. The treaty was successfully concluded, but 
Shastri very suddenly died the very next day on January 11, 1966. What followed Shastri’s death 
was a long and intense power struggle between several factions, intrigue, disappointments and 
the subsequent succession of Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, as the Prime Minister 
of India. In order to tackle the food situation and the internal and external pressure arising out of 
it, Indira’s leadership would continue the significant changes started by Shastri in science and 
agricultural policy. But changes did not amount to an entire overhauling of the value system that 
guided the Indian governance in the first two decades after independence. During the late 1960s, 
changes and continuities coexisted in complex ways.  
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Famine, Overpopulation and Technoscientific Solution 
     Indira Gandhi’s coming to power in India coincided with the food-population debate 
reaching a climax in the developed world. From 1960 onwards, as a series of food crisis and 
even famines visited several parts of the Third World with alarming consistency, a string of 
publications by various observers tried to reach a consensus on the possible solution of the 
situation.
81
 India, with her long history of hunger and starvation, was at the center of this food 
and population discourse. 
82
 
      In 1966, the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America arranged a 
symposium at Washington D.C. on the Prospects of the World Food Supply. Roger Revelle of 
the Harvard Center for Population Studies described the world food supply as precariously out of 
balance with the rising population. Humanity as a result, he thought, was living at ‘the edge of 
the knife’. That metaphor dramatically brought out the uncertainty of the age. Nobody knew for 
sure how soon the delicate balance between the population and food supply would reach the 
point of no redemption. Population experts who were basically statisticians, policy makers, and 
agricultural scientists and thus used to scientific and factual certainty were troubled by this living 
on ‘the edge of the knife.’ 
    The food-population discourse introduced new markers of identifying the developing 
world. Along with the conventional use of calculating the per-capita Gross National Product to 
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evaluate how a country was faring in comparison to the world’s developed nations, it also 
became the norm to distinguish underdeveloped countries in term of their birth rates. Statistical 
analysis suggested that in almost all cases, underdeveloped countries had a birth rate of more 
than 34 per thousand people per year. In comparison, the birth rates in developed countries had 
always been less than 30, ranging downward to 13. Moreover, populations in the underdeveloped 
regions doubled in an average of just 18 to 27 years; whereas in the developed nations, doubling 
occurred over 55 to 88 years. Consumption patterns even differed; Third World peoples ate 
mostly cereals instead of the high protein, vegetable and fruit-concentrated meals that had 
become normal in the developed countries. 
83
 
      Scholars prescribed ways for these developing countries to bring about a better balance 
between population and food supplies in the future. The depth of the crisis, the population 
experts claimed, merited the seriousness of steps taken in a wartime footing. Roger Revelle’s 
expert advice was that underdeveloped nations needed to attack the problem on four fronts: 1) a 
vigorous campaign of human fertility control to reduce the rate of population growth,  2) 
expansion of the area of cultivated land and an increase of cropping intensity to the maximum 
extent possible,  3) increases in crop yields per unit area of cultivated land,  and 4) development 
of all economically feasible ways of increasing the amount of high-quality protein in the average 
man/woman’s diet. 84 
    The proposals were an embodiment of extreme measures. Promoters advocated a 
vigorous mobilization to gain an effective control over human fertility. This proposed reduction 
of the rate of population growth should be accompanied by measures directed at increasing the 
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land yield to ‘the maximum extent possible.’ Thus, land fertility was a desirable outcome, as 
opposed to human fertility. Control over humans’ reproductive system was desirable, vis-à-vis 
expansion of the area of cultivated land. The underlying argument was that uncontrolled 
population growth and food scarcity were destroying the harmonious relationship between man 
and land. To bring back that harmony, ingenuity was needed, to make land productivity outpace 
the needs of man. 
       In 1966, the U.S. President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) started a fresh study 
of the world food situation. The study had special importance because it appeared at a time when 
the world was very concerned about the second consecutive year of drought in India. The PSAC 
summarized its concerns and solutions in four basic conclusions: It argued that the scale, 
severity, and duration of the world food problem were so great that a massive, long-range, 
innovative effort unprecedented in human history would be required to master it. The PSAC 
conveyed a palpable sense of urgency, without prescribing a shortcut solution to the problem. It 
was not still widely evident whether the potential use of technoscience would succeed against 
this chronic concern.  Furthermore, economists and population experts had already confronted 
the US government with scathing criticism, suggesting that over the long term, negative effects 
resulted from ameliorative measures such as short-term food aid and superficial technology 
transfer that was not properly integrated into a developing country’s native soil. The PSAC 
responded by pointing out that for the immediate future, the shortfall in food supply was critical, 
and therefore that developing nations should immediately initiate programs of population 
control. PSAC’s next recommendation was that agricultural development and economic 
development should be undertaken simultaneously, rather than as alternatives.  The report 
suggested launching a two pronged attack on the population and food problems, since the two 
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matters were inextricably connected. In this all-out mobilization against the world food problem, 
the PSAC gave a clarion call for a united approach. They wanted the U.S. government to use its 
food aid to make countries such as India to reconsider their ways of boosting agricultural 
production. 
      Indira Gandhi, under tremendous pressure at home and from abroad, was raring to 
produce tangible results without allowing for much ado. To her, the immediate crisis made it a 
dire necessity to use science and technology for more utilitarian purposes, rather than for the 
sake of education and culture as had Jawaharlal Nehru, her father. 
85
 Her frustration and anguish 
became clear in her speech to the nation on 12 June 1966: ‘A combination of circumstances, 
aggravated by war and drought, has temporarily slowed down, almost halted, economic 
growth…The balance of payments crisis has rendered industrial capacity idle and compelled 
retrenchment…Exports have come to a rest. Prices have moved up steeply. There is frustration, 
agitation, uncertainty. Above all, the people are in distress.’ 86 At this moment of desperation, 
she constantly reminded fellow politicians and scientists that the need of the hour was to increase 
production, especially food production. She pointed out to the Chief Ministers and agricultural 
ministers that ‘Unless we increase agricultural production rapidly, control our population, and 
thus achieve self-sufficiency in the next few years, we will have forfeited our right to call 
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ourselves a free country, let alone a great country. We must become self-reliant. Aid and help 
should be a temporary phase.’ 87 
    Both Subramaniam and Swaminathan later recounted that Indira Gandhi gave them the 
full support necessary to implement the ‘green revolution’ technological package in India. Under 
tremendous pressure, both at home and from the outside world, to show perceptible increases in 
production in the agrarian sector, the Prime Minister grabbed onto the promises made by the new 
technological package. The new technology seemed well suited to the priorities of the 
contemporary agricultural policy, such as building adequate grain reserves, and stimulating 
greater production through science-based research.
88
 This commensurability of means and goals 
helped the supporters of the new technological package to champion wider dissemination of the 
new seeds from Mexico and start new research projects at IARI and CRRI to facilitate better 
adaptation of the new varieties. This political support proved to be crucial for India’s embrace of 
the fledgling technology. Drawing on his vast experience of working with several government 
agencies, Norman Borlaug was categorical that ‘technology alone isn’t the answer. It’s got to be 
hooked to economic and to political decisions.’ 89 
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   Fig. 3.2 Prime Minister with IARI scientists:  Dr. M.S. Swaminathan introducing the IARI scientists to 
the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, 1968 
     
For about the next couple of years, droughts would continue to haunt several parts of 
India, but at the same time reports started pouring in about how much more the new seeds 
yielded in comparison to the traditional varieties. Though the success of the new varieties were 
crucially depended on having adequate irrigation and sufficient fertilizer, which were 
unfortunately lacking in India, these positive accounts gave proponents of the new technology 
extra ammunition to push for its further dissemination. By January 1966, in issues of The Indian 
Farming, scientists were well into discussions of the relative merits and demerits of the earlier 
varieties vis-à-vis the newly introduced Mexican wheat varieties. The high-yield capacity of the 
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new varieties became the lynchpin of the publicity campaign that soon became a part of the 
dissemination effort. 
90
   
       Despite the news of spectacular yield being achieved disparately by individual farmers, 
Swaminathan expressed dismay in Indian Farming that it is not being replicated in other parts of 
India to avert famine. In fact, in the fall of 1966, the national dailies were reporting that Uttar 
Pradesh was experiencing the ‘worst drought in history.’ Failure of monsoon rains had caused a 
loss of more than 1.1 billion rupees in that autumn alone. The government estimated that a 
population of 60 million in 75,000 villages would find it difficult to make both ends meet.
91
 On 
October 17, the executive committee of the Congress Parliamentary Party expressed ‘serious 
concern’ at the ‘unprecedented drought.’ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Subramaniam, the 
Union Food Minister, admitted that the food situation in the neighboring states of both Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar were ‘extremely difficult’. Rice crops had completely dried up in the area. 
There were difficulties in feeding the cattle because fodder was not available. 
92
In other parts of 
India, the food situation was equally grave. In Madhya Pradesh, 6.3 million acres of cultivated 
land lay fallow in the middle of 1967 as severe drought stalked the land. Cultivators refused to 
sow, since under such conditions, seeds would simply dry out. By the summer of 1967, headlines 
in the national dailies announced that acute food crisis posed a threat to West Bengal’s 
government.
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     It was only after 1966-67 that adoption of the new varieties started to show results after. 
The area planted with the new varieties spread from 504,000 hectares in 1966-67 to over 10 
million hectares in 1972-73. Correspondingly, India’s reliance on food grain imports began to 
drop, from 4.7 percent of its total food supply in 1960-61 to 0.8 percent in 1972-73. Similar 
changes occurred with rice production, as dwarf varieties that responded well to fertilizer came 
into production. 
93
 
Table 3.1 Rice: Agricultural Production Area of India (May 1970) 
All units are in hundred thousand 
 Rural 
Population 
Crop 
Land** 
Food-
grains*** 
Rice 
*** 
Yield(Rice)** Farm size, 
average** 
E. Uttar P & 
Bihar 
75,750 15,670 16, 960 7,840 8.41 1.6 
W. Bengal, 
Coastal Orissa 
& Andhra P 
41,100 8, 910 8,620 6,800 11.50 1.7 
Assam, 
Manipur, 
Tripura 
13,740 3,130 2,390 2,270 9.69 2.0 
Interior Orissa, 
E.  Madhya P & 
Maharashtra 
24,840 12,650 10,880 6,670 9.37 3.5 
Coastal Andhra 
& Madras 
28,250 7,290 6,330 3,740 14.41 3.5 
W. Coast Area 28,500 7,200 3,470 2,050 14.17 2.0 
* This table was prepared by Carl C. Malone, May 1970. UIUC archive Box.26 
**Measured in hectare 
***Measured in quintals 
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Table 3.2 Wheat: Agricultural Production Area of India (May 1970)* 
                                                                                                                    All units are in hundred thousand 
 Rural 
Population 
Crop 
Land**  
Food-
grains*** 
Wheat 
*** 
Yield(Wheat)** Farm size, 
average**  
Punjab, 
Haryana, 
N.W. Uttar 
Pradesh 
29,890 10,740 10,090 3,360 12.03 3.3 
Central & 
W. Uttar 
Pradesh, N. 
Rajasthan, 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
33,730 11,190 12,770 2,580 8.64 2.1 
W. 
Madhya 
Pradesh, 
S.E. 
Rajasthan 
20,490 10,060 9,930 3,150 6.38 3.7 
*This table was prepared by Carl C. Malone, May 1970. UIUC archive Box.26 
**Measured in hectare 
***Measured in quintals 
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Looking back at the turbulent last two years, in a speech to the scientists at IARI on 
February 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi observed that ‘A large part of the work of a 
modern government has to do with science. It is only through science that we can transform into 
reality the hopes we have held out to our people…the agricultural scientist has a specially vital 
contribution to make to our plans of economic development.’ It was through public 
announcements such as this that the political establishment acknowledged the growing role of 
technical experts in the solution of national problems. Casting national problems in technical 
terms made them amenable to technological solutions, without bringing in a whole set of social-
economic and political issues. The likelihood of eradicating hunger by means of new technology 
(just because it resulted in greater crop production) impressed the national leaders sufficiently 
into thinking that technoscience would provide further leeway of solving other complex and 
persistent problems.  Gandhi was glad that rural India had shed its ‘apathy’ in adopting the new 
technological package, and she credited the scientists for making this possible. This she thought 
could be done in other fields too if the countrymen could be convinced of the potential of science 
and technology based solution and educated to accept such expert solutions. The Prime Minister 
declared that ‘…the greatest task before the agricultural scientist and before the Government in 
general is to ensure that there is no set-back in the new program.’ She was anxious that if the 
new seeds failed to function as promised, the ‘farmer’s hard-won trust in modern practices will 
be shaken and he might retreat into his shell of traditionalism.’ 94 Such failure in the agricultural 
front would not only be disastrous for the food question but would affect negatively other areas 
of state policy-making. But a technical rendition of the food problem did not solve the whole 
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slew of issues that would confront the scientists as the new technology would be set for 
dissemination in different parts of India. The next chapter would discuss how the scientific 
establishment grappled with those issues, using various technologies available to them, with 
mixed success.  
 
 
143 
 
                                                                Chapter 4 
                             The New Technology: Promises, Problems and Prognosis 
Since its introduction in the 1960s, the green revolution technology had been the subject 
of much debate that had cut across the boundaries of nations, disciplines and professions. 
Considering how long the technology had been in use in a wide range of countries and social 
systems, the assessments understandably had been varied and often contradictory too. 
Proponents of the technology have primarily praised it for easing the food situation in terms of 
high yield and for bringing economic benefits to many. It continues to be courted as a symbol of 
technological breakthrough that helped to ‘modernize’ agricultural sector of the developing 
world. Many saw in the green revolution technology not only a mean to raise yield, but also way 
to transport farmers from their pit of ‘traditionalism’ to a sunlit zone of modernity. Convinced of 
its beneficial impact on society and economy, some scholars see the new technology as a work of 
philanthropy by its patron.
1
 Its critiques, however, see in its dissemination a cause for further 
stratifications along economic lines, widespread and irreversible environmental degradation, and 
also an act of political conspiracy.
2
 Notwithstanding the almost staggering amount of work 
written on the green revolution, the impact of the technology on the agricultural scientists and the 
                                                 
1
 Soma Hewa and Darwin Stapleton ed., Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society: Toward a New Political  
Culture in the Twenty-First Century (Springer, 2005). 
 
2
 Vandana Shiva, The Violence of Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics (Zed Books, 
1992); Biplab Dasgupta, Agrarian Change and the New Technology in India (UNRISD Report No. 77.3, Geneva, 
1977); B.H. Farmer, ‘Perspectives on the ‘Green Revolution’ in South Asia’, Modern South Asian Studies, 1986, 
Vol. 20, No.1, pp.175-199; C.J. Baker, ‘Frogs and Farmers: The Green Revolution in India, and its Murky Past’, 
pp.37-51 in Bayliss-Smith and S. Wanmali eds., Understanding Green Revolution: Agrarian Change and 
Development Planning in South Asia (Cambridge University Press, 1984); Andrew Pearse, Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of 
Want: Social and Economic Implications of the Green Revolution (Clarendon Press, 1980); Michael Schluter, 
Differential Rates of Adoption of the New Seed Varieties in India: the Problem of the Small Farm (Cornell 
University, 1971); E. Feder, 'McNamara's Little Green Revolution: World Bank Scheme for Self-Liquidation of 
Third World Peasantry', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.11 pp. 532-41; A.G. Frank, 'Reflections on Green, Red 
and White Revolutions in India', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.8 pp.119-24; Kathleen Gough, 'The ‘Green 
Revolution’ in South India and North Vietnam', Social Scientist no. 61 pp.48-64. 
144 
 
work they did to make it acceptable to the farmers and consumers is yet to be studied. Working 
on the new technology and contributing to its successful dissemination became the mark of a 
good scientist, as cultivating the new varieties became the sign of being a ‘progressive’ farmer. 
Placing the new technological package at the heart of India’s food crop research and cultivation, 
would, however, carry serious issues of marginalization that the chapter wishes to study. 
The introduction of the green revolution technology in India was largely facilitated by a 
shift in the government’s planning objectives. Apart from adoption of such policies as price 
support to the farmers, fertilizer subsidy etc, there occurred what Francine Frankel has termed as 
‘retreat from social goals’ of planning.3 The impact of the simultaneous shelving of the active 
perusal of the goal of social equity and adoption of the principle of ‘selective’ application of 
capital-intensive agricultural inputs on agricultural research have not been substantially studied 
by scholars so far.
4
 The slogan of the new technology evidently was ‘to build on the best’ and to 
ensure market profitability of the new crops as well as private gain of the individual. A study 
focusing on the interaction of research work of scientists with the economic objectives of the 
new technology brings out the embedded environmental, cultural and social biases of the 
modernization project, which significantly changed India’s agricultural landscape. 
Political economists working on Indian agriculture have already pointed out that the 
demand for the new varieties did not come initially from any organized interest group or social 
classes;
5
 there is no evidence to argue that a market for the new technology already existed.  
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Thus, in order to create a market demand, the ‘experts’ first needed to demonstrate that the 
cultivators would profit from sowing the new dwarf seeds and in applying fertilizers. 
Agricultural scientists needed to create, what historian Nick Cullather has termed as, the 
‘psychology of abundance.’ Instances of spectacular growth and hence of private profit would, 
experts believed, help the Indian farmers to transform from the ‘pathological, leisure-oriented’ 
being to the profit-maximizing ‘rational man’.6 Thus, annual reports of CRRI and IARI are 
strewn with instances of researches conducted on economy of fertilizer applications, level of 
fertilizer applications and gross profit that could be incurred from such applications of inputs. 
But, not all farmers would be initially convinced or have the capacity to make the 
transition to a more capitalized ways of farming. Endowed with limited resources and much 
infrastructural constraints, the government was not only selective about regions where the new 
technology would be introduced, but wanted to draw up a psychological and cultural profile of 
farmers who would be interested to take the ‘risk’ of adopting the new varieties. These farmers 
would become the so-called pioneer users of the new technology and showcased at various 
points of time for their success with the new technology.  The search for the ‘progressive’ 
farmers willing to take the risk of trying a new technology, unlike others who were too cowed 
down by the spectre of crop failure, however, carried a strong possibility of marginalization. 
Though it had been a point of intense argument among scholars, policy-makers and government 
officials as to whether such marginalization was intentional, it had, however, definitely led to 
policy-formulations benefitting those who could take advantage of the technology, rather than 
improving the conditions of those who fell outside the scope of the new technology. 
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The stories of cooperation among members of the scientific community dominated most 
account of the green revolution in India. But, people who played significant role in the 
dissemination of the new technology admit of stiff resistance that came not only from 
bureaucrats and policymakers but also from scientists. And this sounds obvious, considering the 
fact that rarely in history of scientific and technology was there innovations, without some 
amount of resistance. However, the main problem with such accounts of resistance in case of the 
green revolution technology in India is that these are generally very generic. Rarely were 
researchers specified who opposed to the introduction of the new technology; neither were their 
argument part of robust academic debate among peer professionals. The dismissive approach 
taken towards the critique of the new technology prompted me to ask whether, the community of 
agricultural scientists at this juncture experienced a cleavage based on the assumption as to who 
could be labelled and trusted as ‘experts’ on the new technology and the nameless ‘detractors’ of 
the new ways of farming who were constituted as the ‘other’. This chapter, therefore, takes up as 
one of the theme the process of consensus building around the green revolution technology 
among the agricultural scientists in India. 
Accomplishing the ‘real revolution’ 
In the summer of 1965, Borlaug enthusiastically announced to J.A. Pelissier, the Head of 
the Product Research Division of ESSO Research and Engineering Company-a significant 
member of the Rockefeller group of industries that ‘with the application of fertilizer on an 
enormous scale,’ he and his researchers were at the verge of ‘trigger(ing)’ of a ‘real revolution’ 
in wheat production.
7
 His enthusiasm about the fertilizer-responsive varieties made him 
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confident that soon farmers of the developing world would realize the benefits of increased 
fertilizer use, and start ‘clamoring for fertilizers.’  The success with the new technology in 
Mexico made Borlaug confident and somewhat aggressive-he was reluctant to gradually increase 
the levels of fertilizer use in South Asia, instead, for India he was ambitious to create 
demonstrations that would be ‘spectacular and shocking to both farmers and government 
officials.’ ‘We want to kill old ideas and methods’, Borlaug wrote expectantly, ‘and substitute 
dynamic new methods in one stroke. We want these first semi-commercial demonstrations to be 
so shocking that they will destroy old ideas of wheat production at one sweep.’ Borlaug strongly 
advocated that the fertilizer industry, specifically ESSO representatives, should play an 
‘enormous role’ in the upcoming revolutionary changes. His advice was ‘selling’ to the 
governments of developing nations the overall merits of policy of promoting more fertilizer 
production, pricing, and credits arrangements that were in balance with the basic prices paid for 
wheat grain.
 8
 
Many agricultural scientists, working on the green revolution technology in India was no 
less keen on using chemical fertilizers to accomplish a ‘dramatic’ increase in yield, as well as to 
create a ‘dramatic’ psychological impact on the minds of the farmers involved.  J.S. Kanwar, the 
Deputy Director General of Soils, Agronomy and Engineering division of the IARI, was one to 
share Borlaug’s enthusiasm for chemical fertilizers. He considered fertilizers to be the ‘kingpin’ 
of the new agricultural strategy, which would provide a much-desired end to India’s nagging 
food crisis and population pressure on land. Without any foreseeable increase in the country’s 
amount of land under cultivation, India could only grow, he believed, by increasing the 
                                                                                                                                                             
communists groups had been working for. William Gaud was more explicit about it when he coined the term ‘green 
revolution’ as opposed to the ongoing ‘red revolution’. 
 
8
 Borlaug to Mr. J.A. Pelissier, July 26, 1965. Box 5/20 Norman Borlaug Papers, Special Collections, Iowa State 
University. 
148 
 
productivity per unit area and per unit time, which could be achieved only through intensive use 
of fertilizers. Borrowing from the work of American researcher Donald G. Ibach, Kanwar made 
the following observations that where average fertilizer application had previously been very 
low, applying one ton of nitrogen could yield the same results as cultivating 20 to 25 hectares of 
unmanured wheat or paddy fields. To Kanwar, the ‘most important barometer of the agricultural 
progress’ of the country turned out to be how much fertilizer Indian farmers were consuming.9
  
 
Fig.4.1 Happy Farmers, Helpless Farmers: These two advertisements published roughly around same time 
in an agricultural periodical show the revolutionary changes that fertilizers are capable of bringing into 
the life of the farmers. It would produce increasing amount of yield with balanced application of NPK 
fertilizer mixtures. The figure on the left shows how the grin on the farmer’s face turns into a hearty laugh 
as he shifts from using nitrogen alone to a mix of nitrogen-phosphate and then to nitrogen-phosphate-
potassium. The figure on the right represents the assumption popular in the pro-fertilizer lobby as to how 
the use of synthetic manure has freed the farmers from the uncertainties of Indian monsoon. 
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Scientists who held similar views, such as Kanwar’s, argued that many farmers in India 
would find high doses of fertilizer use acceptable if the following conditions were met: farmers 
need to get loans to buy fertilizers, if fertilizers came at a cheaper price, and if the use of 
fertilizers could be shown to be profitable. Amidst much debate and discussion, the government 
of India took steps to subsidize the cost of chemical fertilizers in the late 1960s so that the 
farmers could gain access at a relatively economical price and enjoy the resulting profit from 
higher yields. Policymakers also moved to provide adequate amounts of credit; the central 
government recommended giving each farmer a credit amount of Rs. 202 to buy fertilizer for 
every acre that he cultivated. In 1966-67, when the Agriculture Department and the Cooperative 
Department of the Punjab State government worked out their estimates for bringing 250000 
acres under the new HYV program, they calculated that the new system would require fifteen 
million kilograms of nitrogen, seven and a half million kilograms of phosphate and five million 
kilograms of potassium. Under the government’s tentative credit scheme, supplying that amount 
of fertilizer would require cooperative credits worth Rs. 50.5 million, out of a total estimated 
expenditure of Rs.75.5 million in Punjab alone. The Central Government could see the enormity 
of the demand in the light of limited resources.
10 
 But this did not apparently dissuade the 
government. The financial commitment though enormous, however, appeared a lighter burden to 
have, rather than the perpetual food crisis that one scholar argued, had put the government in 
face of a ‘crisis of sovereignty’11 
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These were the days of rising prominence of agricultural economists as it was in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century in the USA. Agricultural research was not the only field, 
however, that experienced an increasing role of economists; from the mid-1960s there was this 
general concern as to whether Indian research laboratories were adequately responding to the 
economic ‘needs’ of the nation-state. In his last visit to India, P.M.S. Blackett wanted Atma 
Ram, the Director General of CSIR to propose a new advisory body with an economist in it for 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi so that research could be more closely related to economic growth. 
He strongly argued that ‘…scientists are not free to do whatever they wish, certainly not in the 
field of applied science…’12 Moreover, to facilitate an in-depth communication between the 
economic and scientific goals, a body of scientists was closely integrated with the administrative 
apparatus of the state.
13
 
Thus, as economically profitability became the crux of doing scientific research, 
agricultural economists with researchers from other branches of agricultural science developed a 
new ‘framework of persuasion’ based on their endorsement of high-doses of fertilizer 
application. They marshaled evidence by which ordinary people would be ‘inclined to change the 
way they did things, and in particular to adopt a product or practice that was developed or 
promoted by a rationalizing elite’.14 Bill C. Wright, an agricultural economist of the Rockefeller 
Foundation and R.B.L. Bharadwaj used data gathered by agronomists of the All-India 
Coordinated Wheat Improvement Project to argue that fertilizer use on irrigated dwarf wheat was 
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highly economical for farmers. They calculated that with the price of wheat at Rs.75 per quintal 
and nitrogen at Rs. 2 per kilogram, farmers would gain a net profit of Rs. 825 per hectare for an 
application of 40 kg per hectare, a profit of Rs. 547 for 80 kg of fertilizer, and Rs. 112 for 120 
kg. It was only when use of nitrogen went beyond 120 kg per hectare that there was a negative 
return of Rs. 157.50 for every forty kilograms of additional fertilizers.
15
 P.N. Saxena, another 
scientist of IARI, also emphasized the great monetary returns of chemical fertilizers. He 
calculated that new varieties of grain, combined with the advantages of nitrogen fertilizer, could 
give Indian farmers a net profit per hectare in the range of Rs. 900-1000, a sharp contrast to a 
per-hectare profit of only around Rs. 300 for the local varieties. He calculated that Indian farmers 
would achieve the highest return by cultivating the Mexican variety, S-227, which would give 
back Rs.6 for every rupee invested.
16
 Agricultural economists argue that their numerical and 
quantitative insight into the agricultural questions would help the farmers to rise above the 
‘romantic and impractical ideas’ that usually guide farm practices.17 
The primacy accorded to economic profit in the work of agricultural economists set off a 
chain of event that impacted other branches of agricultural science. It not only prompted a whole 
new set of agronomic experiments on fertilizer placements, recording fertilizer responses and the 
like, but also encouraged plant morphological research to go in a particular direction. It was seen 
by the scientists that high fertilizer responsiveness of the new varieties was chiefly due to its 
short stiff culm, which helped the plant to withstand lodging better than the tall indigenous 
varieties. The short and stiff culm of the new varieties is because of dwarf-inducing-genes. With 
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increasing number of this particular type of gene in the plant meant even shorter and stiffer culm 
and thus more immunity to lodging. Scientists therefore portrayed the progress in cereal research 
as a consistent advance from the one-gene to two-gene and subsequently three gene-varieties. By 
1968, the two-gene varieties that had been released for cultivation could not withstand nitrogen 
doses above 100-120 kilogram per hectare; scientists considered these varieties to have reached a 
‘yield plateau’. In a constant pursuit of higher yields, the scientists found it unacceptable, when a 
certain yield level became a constant or the norm, because it then fails to indicate advancement 
any more. It thereby exposes the limitations of existing technology as a savior and deliverer from 
hunger. 
Researchers therefore quickly undertook projects in developing three-gene dwarf lines to 
break the yield barriers.
18
  To give additional validity to their work, scientists working on the 
new seeds pointed out that the short varieties were better suited to the plants’ water requirements, 
especially in the main wheat areas of north-west India, where the temperature rose fast and hot 
and dry winds began to blow from the end of February. Consequently, the plants were prone to 
lose much energy through respiration. Ideally, irrigation in March-April should have been of 
great help in promoting good grain development, but such watering caused tall varieties to suffer 
lodging problems. By contrast, scientists pointed out, introduction of dwarf varieties let farmers 
irrigate plants during their latter stages of growth without causing lodging.
19
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  Fig 4.2 The Normal and the Dwarf: Normal wheat plant (1) and plants having one, two and three genes 
for dwarfing 
 
Notwithstanding the economic and ecological justifications that the scientists forwarded 
endorsing the cultivation of the new varieties, the political context of its introduction continued 
to create furor in the minds of many Indians. Especially, chemical fertilizers as one of the basic 
ingredient of the technological package remained the butt of widespread controversy. On 
December 10, 1965, when President Johnson authorized a shipment of 1.5 million tons of wheat 
to India to help fight the famine situation, he also gave a loan of $50 million to the Indian 
government so that the latter could import fertilizers from the US. According to the terms of the 
food loan, the Indian government would contribute a matching amount for the purpose of 
154 
 
fertilizer import.
20
 The U.S. government also wanted Indira Gandhi to devaluate the rupee, in 
order to facilitate private fertilizer companies hoping to increase business in India. The Indian 
government in turn had to assure a climate conducive to private investment in the country.
21
 In 
the minds of many Indians, these measures evidently taken in response to American pressure did 
not go down well with the image of a sovereign nation. The opposition parties and the members 
of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) were vehemently critical of the Central 
Government for bowing down to international pressures. Critics of Subramaniam described his 
fertilizer policy as based on ‘bondage to the U.S.A’. Many delegates to the Congress Committee 
meeting at Jaipur in Rajasthan demanded scrapping the collaboration schemes involving 
partnership with foreign companies which happened to be mostly American. The members 
suggested that India concentrate on resolving its agricultural problems through alternative 
indigenous solutions, such as greater use of native organic fertilizers, greater reliance on 
domestic companies and government operation. Critics despaired over the prospect of India’s 
continued dependence on food imports and dependence on foreign companies for fertilizers. The 
members of AICC directed their heaviest barrage of criticism at Subramaniam for having agreed 
to give fertilizer companies considerable freedom in pricing and distribution, particularly in 
those new segments involving foreign collaboration. The Congress President, Kamraj, singled 
out the American International Oil Company’s plans to establish a fertilizer factory in Madras as 
a bad example. He objected to the ‘blank check’ the Government had given such foreign private 
firms in the matter of marketing chemical fertilizers. Kamraj said that to allow these firms the 
freedom to sell a scarce and vital commodity ‘at any price they could get was wholly 
unacceptable’. In his Presidential address delivered at the beginning of the conference, Kamraj 
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had restated the familiar socialist goals of public sector production and price control over 
essential commodities. The political pressure placed on India’s government by Kamraj and his 
colleagues was so intense that the Union Food and Agricultural Minister reportedly offered his 
resignation.
22
 
No less than the political furor, technical crisis of various types made the prospect of 
synthetic fertilizers production appear rather dim at the time. The country continued to face 
serious power shortages, especially in the drought-affected areas, which hampered the 
electrolytic hydrogen processes of the fertilizer plants. The difficulties in importing sulfur 
continued, along with problems in obtaining rock phosphate for fertilizer manufacturing. US 
Department of State, however, remained confident that notwithstanding all the initial hiccups and 
resistances, the Indian government would continue following the desired lines. The impetus 
behind the change, many in the US administration felt, was coming from multiple influential 
sources in India consisting of scientists, bureaucrats, ministers and eventually from politically 
important farmers’ parties. One State Department representative, for instance, pointed out in a 
February 1966 confidential aerogram that ‘an influential group within the Government of India is 
pushing for many of the reforms in fertilizer, credit and seed production which the U.S. is also 
urging…’ The letter also said that the State Department would be willing to go as far as to assist 
in the installation of production equipments in fertilizer plants of India. The State Department’s 
interest in use of chemical fertilizer was equally matched by the enthusiasm shown by a group of 
agricultural scientists, who wanted to build on the ‘spectacular breakthrough’ achieved through 
the new technology. 
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It seemed plausible to scientists that with high doses of synthetic fertilizers and use of 
dwarf varieties they could increase the yield by four to fourteen-folds. They believed that even 
farmers with small parcels of land could achieve that gain with increased use of fertilizers, 
adequate irrigation, and short-duration varieties of crops. Given India’s limited land supplies, use 
of intensive fertilizer along with multiple cropping seemed to be the best option to them.
23
 
Members on the Indian government’s Fertilizer Distribution Enquiry Committee, headed by B.S. 
Sivaraman, shared the same view. This Committee argued that chemical fertilizers were 
particularly important where land for cultivation per family was limited to a small acreage, as in 
India. These leaders warned that the intensive cultivation of crops, as practiced in India, would 
deplete the soil unless the nutrients were replaced by massive doses of chemical fertilizers. The 
Committee wrote that given the ‘unrestricted growth in our population,’ needs for greater 
agricultural production had made it imperative that farmers use chemical fertilizers.
24
 
Thus, the initial success of chemical fertilizers and the new seeds in raising the yield in 
selective parts of India completely changed the dynamics of the fertilizer-use debate. So long 
reservations were expressed from different quarters against excessive dependence on chemical 
fertilizers on the ground that its capital-intensive nature might act as a deterrent to its use by the 
small farmers, who dominate the Indian countryside. Now, on the contrary, small acreage was 
considered conducive to its use. Moreover, the constant anxiety about soil depletion because of 
excessive use of chemicals, as we have seen, was widely prevalent in the policy-making and 
scientific establishment. Now the argument was turned on to its head to point out that without 
adequate amount of fertilizers, soil depletion would get worse. 
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With the launching of the new package, India’s agricultural policy-makers initiated a 
program of concerted and centralized research to adapt its constituent ingredients to Indian 
conditions. To make the package popular with farmers and teach them how to use the new 
resources to get the best result, the government encouraged national demonstrations, extension 
services, and training programs. The Division of Agricultural Extension that was set up in 1960 
gave training to post-graduate students on techniques of extension. The extension officials 
applied teachings of rural sociology, educational psychology, home economics and audio-visual 
medium to instruct the farmers on the new techniques.
25
 
At the advice of the Scientists’ Panel, the Union Minister of Food and Agriculture 
initiated the All India Coordinated Research Projects on wheat in 1964 and on rice in 1965.  
These projects encouraged interdisciplinary and inter-institutional co-operations. Plant breeders, 
geneticists, agronomists, agricultural chemists and plant protection scientists worked in close 
collaborations to ensure that the disciplines had a combined impact towards the success of the 
new techniques. In each project, research scientists from the central institutes such as IARI and 
CRRI, from several state departments of agriculture, and from nine of the country’s leading 
agricultural universities worked as a team with an ICAR-appointed project coordinator who was 
the research leader, responsible for fostering cooperation and coordination among participating 
institutions. The scientists aspired to develop a system, which had a built-in mechanism for 
continuous assessment of achievements and impediments in the form of an annual workshop, 
attended by participating scientists.
26
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R.G. Anderson of the Rockefeller Foundation later recalled in a meeting with the 
agricultural scientists of India that by late August 1966, they had successfully ‘revamped’ the 
entire crop testing system. Under the old ‘static’ system, Anderson noted, Indian scientists in a 
series of micro-and macro trials essentially tested the same seed varieties for a successive three 
seasons in five agro-climatic zones of the country. The reorganization instead called for a series 
of low-cost tests that would initially screen many varieties at just a few locations. In the next 
year, scientists would then choose those varieties that performed best for more complex tests 
known as the Uniform Regional Trials, tests conducted in each of India’s five agricultural zones.  
The superior varieties in these wide zonal adaptation tests were finally tested in a National Trial 
on a countrywide basis. To release any new varieties the scientists, however, did not wait until 
the results of such National trials were available to them; they started promoting new varieties 
for cultivation based on the Uniform Trial results.
 
These structural changes in the way 
agricultural tests were conducted before the introduction of new varieties indicate two things: the 
scientists who were patronizing the new varieties were very eager to introduce them for large 
scale cultivation as soon as possible. Driven to register a tangible increase in production they 
were impatient to linger the trial for long.  Secondly, the seeds were not meant to be cultivated 
over a wide agro-ecological variation across the nation. Thus, the emphasis was on conducting 
regional experiments with ‘uniform’ characteristics, rather that subject the seeds to the wide 
variation. Thus, following Anderson’s account, the sole purpose of the national trials was to 
provide exposure about the new varieties to scientists in other zones.
 27
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‘A cooperative movement among scientists’ 
The Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations and the Technical Cooperation Mission, were 
closely involved in the dissemination and further improvement of the new technology in India. 
These agencies brought in scientists from abroad to work with their Indian counterparts in 
multiple aspects of cereal research. They provided training opportunities for India’s scientific 
staff, plus equipment to facilitate ‘production-oriented’ work in Indian laboratories.  This 
external support proved instrumental in bringing in most of the new germplasm to Indian 
laboratories from CIMMYT and IRRI. Some of the key Indian scientists associated with the 
green revolution technology, such as Swaminathan, Joshi and Gautam, fondly remembered that it 
was almost like a ‘cooperative movement among scientists.’28 
At the time of the introduction of the new technology, individual episodes highlight the 
way foreign scientists worked with their Indian counterparts. For instance, in 1965-66, when 
agronomic work with dwarf wheat began in India, Bert A. Krantz of the Rockefeller Foundation 
was primarily responsible for developing the initial agronomic trials. These trials helped to 
demonstrate the production potential of new exotic varieties and clarified new agronomic 
practices that were required for these dwarf varieties. After Krantz’s departure, his Rockefeller 
colleague, Bill Wright became responsible for expanding the scope of experimentations 
conducted on the dwarf seeds. More than that, Wright trained Indian workers in the proper field 
plot techniques and assisted workers in laying out and planning the experiments. In the initial 
years after the introduction of the new technology, he even helped to transport seed drill and 
other equipments to each location. Anderson later gratefully remarked that, Wright’s supervision 
                                                 
28
 M.S. Swaminathan ed., The Wheat Revolution: A Dialogue (Macmillan 1993). 
160 
 
‘greatly increased the precision of these experiments and the reliability of reported data.’29 
Scientists who worked with Wright later corroborated this account of cooperation between 
Rockefeller representatives and Indian participants.
30
 
Indian and foreign scientists similarly collaborated on cases of plant pathology and cereal 
improvement projects. For instance, in 1967-68 when ICAR initiated an all-India wheat rust 
surveillance project at the IARI, the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations assumed major 
responsibility for bringing in experts to work in the project. Responding to the request by the 
IARI Director, Foundations’ scientists such as B.L. Renfro, R.D. Wilcoxson and Eugene Saari 
came to India to guide research on wheat pathology. The Rockefeller Foundation took a further 
initiative to train considerable numbers of young Indian scientists, providing several with 
fellowships and scholarships to receive advanced training in the new technology and scientific 
practices. With Rockefeller funding, Indian researchers traveled to American universities and 
also to CIMMYT and IRRI, to learn new techniques. 
IRRI was set up with the multiple purposes of help speeding up the development and 
dissemination of improved rice production technology for the humid tropics; it also shared with 
the government of the developing countries the responsibility of training staff and strengthening 
rice research institutions and extension services in rice growing countries.
31
 Once India initiated 
the All India Coordinated Rice Improvement Project in April of 1965, the International Rice 
Research Institute started assisting the project by making available valuable breeding materials 
and providing short-term consultancies of Institute scientists. Multiple contracts were signed 
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between IRRI, US-AID, and the government of India ensuring that staff scientists of IRRI, 
would move to Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University at Rajendranagar to cooperate with the 
rice project. 
International agencies that offered technical assistance and training for Indian scientists 
helped to create a core group of Indian researchers who maintained and promoted faith in the 
promise of the new technology. A good number of Indian scientists was no keener to receive 
advance training in international institutions as it promised them exposure and possibilities of 
professional accomplishments. It gave them a foray into some of the best agricultural research 
institutes of the world and they grabbed the chance to collaborate with prominent scientists in 
their field.
32
 A closer probing into the interactions of the Indian agricultural scientists with their 
foreign counterparts during this period shows that the dynamic of the relationship was, however, 
not amenable to simple characterizations. For instance, it was not solely an act of intellectual 
dependence on the part of Indian scientists; similarly, it would be a mistake to essentialize the 
involvement of international scientists as an act driven solely by hegemonizing intent. Though, 
international recognition, especially recognition coming from foreign experts was held in high 
esteem in India, the Indian agricultural scientists proved highly skilled in making this 
international contacts work to their advantage. They used it not only to further state patronage in 
favor of the new technology, but also to curve out an influential niche for them. 
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In 1964, just few months before the launching of the All-India Coordinated Program on 
Wheat Research, M.S. Swaminathan sent a letter to Norman Borlaug, fervently requesting him to 
attend a symposium of Indian wheat scientists. He pointed out to Borlaug that the Coordinated 
Program was being initiated along the lines Borlaug had advocated; it was, therefore, ‘essential’ 
for Borlaug to pay Indian scientists a visit, so that he could ‘review all that had been done and to 
decide the lines on which (Indians) should proceed further.’ Swaminathan praised Borlaug for 
playing a ‘very significant role in changing the face of Mexican agriculture,’ suggesting that his 
guidance and presence would similarly be very important to India-’struggling to learn how to 
increase yields.’ An uncritical reading of Swaminathan’s mail might portray him as representing 
the lower rung of an international hierarchy of technoscientific expertise, with Borlaug as the 
archetypical dominating ‘West’. But, what Swaminathan says later in his mail would help to 
change our interpretation of this apparently simple equation. 
Swaminathan stated that he was keen to use Borlaug’s presence to provide an ‘impetus to 
the progressive forces’ that favored the use of the new techniques as opposed to critics, who 
condemned the use of capital-intensive resources as it was incompatible with the principle of 
social equity. Swaminathan hoped that Borlaug’s visible support would help convince the Indian 
government to continue its policy of using high-yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, and other 
means of intensive cultivation. In particular, Swaminathan wanted India’s Union Minister for 
Food and Agriculture to hear Borlaug’s lecture about the advantages created by coordinated 
research on new seed varieties on agricultural production, to impress the minister with the 
importance of this topic.
33
 It was not uncommon to find more such examples of scientists from 
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developing countries using the stature, aura and the influence of the scientists from the West to 
push their own agenda or gain a better leverage in their bargain with other institutions of the 
state.
34
 The face of a more renowned scientist often helped agricultural scientists in India to give 
more coherence to their fledgling community and add prestige to their discipline, which was 
definitely not at par in terms of resource and autonomy accorded to industrial or atomic research. 
This is clearly expressed in a letter that S.M. Gandhi, a wheat specialist working on dryland 
varieties of wheat around the western state of Rajasthan in India, wrote to Borlaug. In the letter, 
Gandhi enthusiastically pointed out that Borlaug’s winning of the Nobel Prize would be a 
decisive factor in accelerating the Green Revolution and in turn vindicate the position of the 
Indian scientists working with the new technology. 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, other Indian scientists would address letters to 
Borlaug, treating him as a preceptor, a kind of ‘guru’ from whom the Indian scientists were keen 
and happy to receive any instructions on the new technology and scientific practices. Dr. S.M. 
Gandhi wrote to Borlaug in 1971 that the ‘Indian programme is fortunate in having your active 
association and whatever little has been achieved, is mainly because of your blessings and 
guidance.’ Gandhi was proud of the magnitude and dimension of the Indian program and was 
almost sure that there was an immense possibility of bringing out still better varieties. But 
Gandhi believed that such progress could only come if India continued working with 
CIMMYT.
35
 Statements like these were indicative of the pride that the Indian scientist took in 
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being associated with international institutes. Such attitudes were revealing of the power 
hierarchy that had always been deeply embedded in any international exchanges of men, 
material, and knowledge.  The one located at the receiving end displayed, more often than not, a 
keenness to be recognized and approved by the imparting agency, which could be an individual, 
institution, or a country. 
This gratification at winning recognition from agricultural scientists of developed 
countries (of whom Borlaug was the most important representative) often evoked strong 
emotional responses from Indian scientists. In December 1970, after receiving a commemorative 
medal for his contribution to research on high-yielding varieties, Ram Dhan Singh, former 
cerealist and the principal of Punjab Agricultural College and Research Institute at Lyallpur, 
wrote to Borlaug, ‘My vocabulary fails me to find adequate words to thank you for your 
letter…and for the gift of a silver medal…’ To researchers such as Singh, Borlaug’s 
achievements appeared extraordinary, almost magical.
36
 Singh addressed Borlaug as the ‘Prince 
magician of wheat breeders’, a ‘savior of many human from threatening hunger’ who was even 
destined to be canonized for his efforts.
37
 Sing’s communication with Borlaug was far from the 
measured tone of professional exchange of courtesies among peers. The eulogies that Singh used 
to refer to Borlaug makes it clear that it was not the recognition that he received for his work 
alone that moved him so much, as did the medal coming from Borlaug himself. 
Though, the awards were surely not designed to overwhelm the recipients, but it did more 
than recognizing their talent. It played an important role in distinguishing those scientists, who 
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worked, amidst much odd, on dissemination of the new technological package, apart from other 
agricultural scientists. It was instituted by the Mexican government to commemorate the 
achievements of the green revolution technology and was meant to be specifically awarded to 
those scientists who have furthered the cause of the technology. Thus, in 1970 Borlaug wrote to 
Swaminathan, sending him a few coins for distribution among Indian breeders and scientists who 
have played a ‘major role in capitalizing the yield potential of the dwarf wheats’, as a token of 
‘his deep appreciation and regard’.38 
The practice of rewarding scientists associated with the Green Revolution continued even 
at the non-governmental level. In 1972, R. Glenn Anderson, the wheat scientist in charge of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s program in India, wrote to Dr. M.M. Rao of the Coromandel Fertilizer 
Limited Company, giving his ‘strictly confidential’ assessment of the top Indian scientists who 
had been working on the new technology.
39
 Anderson’s list primarily praised those breeders who 
had helped to either introduce or improve the high-yielding varieties. Anderson promoted 
scientists such as V.S. Mathur, whose program was responsible for contributing most of the 
high-yielding varieties released in contemporary India; J.P. Srivastava, who was responsible for 
increasing seed production at a critical period of the new program; D. R. Vasudeva, who 
developed the variety C-306 that was subsequently grown across much of dry North India; and 
S.P. Singh, who evolved varieties suitable for dryland cultivation in Madhya Pradesh. In addition 
to those key researchers, Anderson also highly recommended Indian coordinators in charge of 
the high-yielding varieties program, such as S.P. Kohli and M.V. Rao. He gave further tribute to 
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the pathologist L.M. Joshi, who collaborated with Dr. Saari of the Ford Foundation in developing 
good disease surveillance throughout India, and agronomist R.B.L. Bhardwaj, who worked with 
B. Krantz and Bill Wright of the Rockefeller Foundation.
40
 
This account of a close collaboration among agricultural scientists might give a false 
impression that within the research community itself, there was no substantive opposition or 
challenge to the introduction of the new technological package. In reality, the first-generation 
scientists working on ‘green revolution’ technology faced a very challenging situation. They 
bore the responsibility to prove that the technology was capable of increasing the yield and could 
be adapted to Indian conditions, making it worth the investment of money. Sensitive of any 
criticism of their approach, most of these early proponents interpreted opposition only as an 
expression of malice towards the new technology, reflecting a stubborn unwillingness to change. 
For instance, sharp debates arose between researchers who favored using high-doses of 
fertilizers, and those who criticized this approach to increasing yield potential.  In 1966, David 
Hopper, the economist appointed by the Rockefeller Foundation at the IARI, pointed out that 
research results suggested that new agricultural technology simply did not raise output to any 
significant level above the practices that the top 20 per cent of Indian farmers were already 
using. Hopper concluded that at the current prices and with expected risks and rates of return, the 
use of fertilizers was only ‘marginally profitable’ in India.41 Given such data from on trials 
conducted on several Mexican varieties such as Sonora 63, Sonora 64 and Lerma Rojo in the 
crop year 1964-65, Hopper wrote to Borlaug, the Planning Commission of India had come to 
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question the Agricultural Ministry’s policy of concentrating the use of nitrogen, which was in 
short supply, primarily in the areas where the exotic varieties would be grown. Hopper insisted 
that scientists still needed to come up with ‘hard information that will indicate the potential of 
the Mexican varieties to respond to nitrogen (and other nutrients)…’ 42 Hopper’s criticism did 
not go down well with his counterparts working directly in agricultural science. A.H. Moseman 
of the Technical Cooperation Mission wrote to Borlaug, ‘Dave (David Hopper) seems to feel that 
we lack reliable field data to support the increases in yields and also the economic justifications 
for the higher applications…I feel that economists and other professional people with little or no 
experience with biological factors are furnishing superficial assessments of a problem area they 
understand poorly.’43 
Yet even within the scientific community, doubters spoke up. Dr. R.H. Richharia, 
director of the Central Rice Research Institute (CRRI) in Cuttack, developed clonal propagation 
of rice, a method that improved indigenous varieties by instilling hybrid vigor in them. Yet 
Richharia understood that each region in India already used seed varieties which were suited to 
the soil, climate and other variations of the area, varieties that should not be neglected, in favor 
of dwarf varieties, in the pursuit for greater yield. He opposed the introduction of the dwarf 
varieties, which he felt were susceptible to pests and would not be suited to Indian conditions. 
Due to this criticism, Richharia was shunted out of CRRI, and the Madhya Pradesh Rice 
Research Institute (MPRRI) which he headed was also summarily shut down. In fact, the only 
memory of his extensive work is the germplasm bank at Indira Gandhi Agricultural University, 
                                                 
42
 David Hopper to Norman Borlaug, letter dated 10 February, 1966, Box 5/41 Norman Borlaug Papers (Special 
Collections, Iowa State University). 
 
43
 A.H. Moseman to Norman Borlaug, letter dated 10 February, 1967, Box 5/41 Norman Borlaug Papers (Special 
Collections, Iowa State University). 
168 
 
which now contains over 22,500 accessions of rice from Madhya Pradesh, over 19,000 of which 
were collected under his supervision and called the Raipur collection.
44
 
The controversy that spilled out in 1971 over the claims made by Swaminathan on the 
protein content on a dwarf mutant variety, Sharbati Sonora is another example of how the 
question of yield was prioritized to dismiss charges related to any other aspect of the new 
technology.  In the July issue of that year, the editorial article of the ‘Young Scientist’-a bulletin 
published by the Pusa branch of the Association of Scientific Workers of India, questioned the 
IARI’s ‘tall claims’ about the protein content of the new dwarf mutant variety, Sharbati Sonora. 
Although the Director of IARI, M.S. Swaminathan, reportedly claimed that ‘the protein content 
of wheat has thus been made highly comparable to the protein content of milk,’ that claim 
remained unsubstantiated by the ‘CIMMYT News of July-August 1969. The ‘Young Scientist’ 
editorial also expressed a disappointment at how the wheat revolution had actually aggravated 
the problem of protein deficiency, by causing a drop of 16 per cent in pulse production. The 
journal asserted that ‘India’s present need is to increase the production of pulses that they are 
available to the poor at a low price.’45 Facing such criticism, the scientists working on the new 
varieties closed rank to refute the allegations vehemently. A sympathetic Borlaug wrote to 
Swaminathan with a sense of camaraderie, ‘I resent the way that my name and that of my 
organization CIMMYT, was used in the Times of India article to discredit you and IARI…’ 
Borlaug’s contention was that whoever has doubted Swaminathan’s research ‘does not have 
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IARI’s, or the Government of India or the people of India’s interest at heart. It is obviously 
organized by someone who has little regard for the future role of agricultural science to the 
improvement of the standard of living of the people of India.’ Borlaug found it ironical that the 
new agricultural technology should encounter such criticism, after the ‘tremendous achievements 
that have been made in increasing wheat production’ and the ‘very great role’ that Swaminathan, 
personally, and IARI had played in ‘revolutionizing’ wheat production.46 
When confronted with criticism, agricultural scientists working on the new technology 
became generally defensive; the tendency was to denounce the critics as opponents of progress, 
who had little to do with science and did not keep in mind the best interests in India’s peoples. 
On a separate occasion, Borlaug wrote to Dr. M.S. Randhawa, the Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab 
Agricultural University, that ‘I have been trying to battle against their vicious campaigns as best 
as I could, but nor always effectively, for they can devote their entire tine to writing about such 
nonsense while my colleagues and I must spend most of our energies and time on conducting 
research and extending the Green Revolution to other countries.’ Borlaug insisted that the 
scientists working on the new technology should always ‘keep up the good work,’ continuing 
their research without being distracted by the impulse to answer critics. Producing techniques to 
ensure ‘record breaking yields,’ Borlaug thought, would be the most fitting reply to any 
criticism.
47
 Evidence of sheer productivity, he supposed, would be sufficient to erase any other 
deficiencies of the new technology. 
The ‘ideal’ type: farmers, farming tracts and flavors 
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In 1967, Kanwar Mohinderpal Singh, a farmer from the Delhi region became a familiar 
name to many. His claim to fame rested in the fact that he harvested nearly 8.4 tons of crops per 
hectare, which was the highest yield so far recorded anywhere in the world in 1967 for a crop of 
150 days duration. Eager to project Singh’s achievement as an instance worthy of emulation by 
other farmers, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, the Director of IARI and Dr. S.P. Kohli, the Coordinator 
of the All India Coordinated Trial often mentioned him in their reports. Singh was even 
introduced to Borlaug, perhaps with an intention to convince the scientist of the potential of 
Indian farmers with the new biochemical inputs. Similar other anecdotes continued to circulate 
over the years about how farmers who had started growing high-yielding varieties in their fields 
had experienced miraculous growth. In one of his article in the Indian Farming,  Swaminathan 
accounted to the readers what a principal of a leading agricultural college in India recently said 
to him about the yield capacity of the new varieties. The principal is said to have remarked that 
had a student in 1963 answered an exam question about how much wheat yields were possible 
with a reply of ‘50 maunds (1850kg) per acre’, the principal would have surely failed him. But 
time has changed, the principal reflected, and if today a student had answered ‘150 maunds 
(5550 kg) per acre’, the principal would not be able to dismiss the answer, knowing that such a 
yield could very well be a possibility because of the green revolution. 
48
 These anecdotes make it 
clear that of all the characteristics of the new technology, its capacity to give a much higher 
yield, was the most coveted one. 
Reports started to come in various parts of India on farmers cultivating the new varieties, 
but as earlier accounted, it was still not enough to cover all the food shortages reached due the 
droughts of the last few years. More farmers need to take to the new varieties and scientists and 
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policymakers needed to know as to who would and who wouldn’t. They wanted systematic 
studies explaining farmers’ response towards the new seeds and use of chemical fertilizers. This 
information was imperative for the successful dissemination of the new technology in targeted 
regions of India. 
In 1967, Indian Journal of Agricultural Science reported a study conducted on the 
‘attitude of farmers’ toward ‘Taichung Native I at the University of Kalyani at West Bengal. The 
study was evidently done by a couple of researchers to explain how the nature and the extent of 
the farmers’ participation determined the success of the new varieties. A positive attitude, 
scientists pointed out, could very well imply the farmers’ willingness to try the new 
technological package in their farm. The study specifically tried to locate the role certain social-
cultural variables play in shaping farmers’ response to the new technology, especially the dwarf 
hybrid varieties. The study conducted over twelve villages, selecting twenty farmers from each 
village, used Chi-square test to find out possible association between the farmers’ attitude and 
each of the social and cultural values. At the end of their study, they could in fact statistically 
confirm their hypothesis that it was ‘comparatively younger, school-educated farmers who are 
members of a joint family, have cultivation as the main occupation and possess medium land and 
medium income are generally more favourably disposed toward the high-yielding varieties of 
rice.’ In confirming the social and cultural characteristics of farmers accepting the new 
technology, the study stated that it was ‘progressive farmers (who) adopt(ed) the high-yielding 
varieties for improving their financial conditions.’ Studies like these would help those working 
on the new technology to specifically focus on those farmers who came from similar social, 
economic and cultural background at the expense of those who did not. Those who adopted the 
new technology, therefore, were portrayed by the supporters of the new technology as 
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‘progressive’ or ‘risk-taking farmers’ as opposed to the more traditional-minded ‘risk-averse’ 
cultivators. 
Whether farmers were willing to take ‘risks’ or at least approach the question of investing 
in the new technology with an extent of ‘risk-neutrality’ became an important topic of discussion 
over the green revolution years. A ‘risk neutral’ farmer was good for capitalist development in 
agriculture, because such a farmer, regardless of the extent of variability in returns, would try to 
maximize average or expected net returns, resulting, according to the agricultural economists, to 
the highest returns over long run. In contrast a ‘risk-averse’ farmer would not be keen to invest 
and would be willing to forego some expected returns, if that meant reducing the variability of 
his income stream. As instilling higher production through investment in the new technology was 
slowly gaining ground among professional circles of agricultural scientists and economists, the 
image of a ‘risk-neutral’ farmer gained significance. This might help us to understand the 
importance that scientists accorded to Kunwar Mahinderpal. He was applauded not only for 
receiving high-yield, but also for proving that with investment comes the return.
49
 
Some economists wanted to see such an attitude not only among farmers, but also on the 
part of the state administration. One of them pointed out- with exasperation and some amount of 
urgency- that time in India is of ‘desperately’ short supply, as the country had been caught in a 
‘fateful race between population growth and economic development.’  Thus, India could not 
learn through experimentation any more, as had been the case in the last two decades after 
independence, with a ‘callous squandering of her precious time.’ It, instead, needed to take 
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‘calculated risks.’ The author went on to remark, with certain amount of relief, that it was 
precisely what the country did when it decided to adopt, so widely and so successfully, the 
miracle rice and wheat on a massive scale. In doing so, the author pointed out, ‘it dispensed with 
the much longer process of initial trials and experiments under local conditions, ran the risks of 
diseases to which the new varieties might have been susceptible and took whatever precautionary 
measures she could to cope with whatever diseases might break out.’ He considered this ‘trade-
off-of traditional safety for the time she could salvage’ as ‘perfectly sensible’ and deserved to be 
repeated in a great many other programs and activities.
50
 
Without adequate measures of crop insurance, encouraging farmers to invest in the new 
varieties definitely indicate that the proponents of the new varieties were encouraging the 
farmers to ignore the possibilities of crop loss, and put more faith on a better economic return. 
No matter how good might had been the economic prospect of the new technology, the 
possibility of crop failure was no less in the early days of green revolution in India. Focusing on 
the dissemination of the new varieties in the water-assured areas alone might have diminished 
the chance of crop loss due to droughts, but the threat of pest attack or outbreak of diseases was 
very much present. The infrastructure to fight widespread pest or disease incidence was absent or 
at best in a rudimentary state in different parts of India. Under such circumstances, a resourceful 
farmer like Kunwar Mahinderpal, might be willing to take the risk of cultivating the new 
varieties, because one crop loss would not have turned him to a destitute, as it would in case of a 
more resource-challenged farmers. In case of the latter he would be more ‘obsessed’ with some 
particular set of problems involved in pursuing livelihood, rather than the more ‘straightforward’ 
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dream of making a profit.
51
 Based on such observations, many studies on the green revolution 
technology in India have commented on its class character, arguing that the technology had been 
biased in favour of the ‘rich’ farmers, who not only had resources to invest in higher return from 
soil, but were also better equipped to fight the risk of crop loss through greater expenditure in 
buying pesticides.  In its portrayal of enterprising and progressive farmers, the proponents of the 
new technology, however, refused to see any class biases. In their appraisal of the technology 
too, they saw no inherent class preference. Sen, for instance, used statistical data to argue that 61 
percent of the beneficiaries of irrigation-a necessary component of the technological package, 
were the small farmers, owning less than an acre to five acres of land.
52
 
If the psychological profile of a progressive farmer came to dominate the rhetoric of 
many scientists, economists and politicians with the introduction of the new technology, a 
similar trend was noticed in the search for fertile and well-irrigated farming tracts that conformed 
to the slogan that the new technology would be ‘build on the best’. The package nature of the 
inputs-each sharing a symbiotic relationship with others, made it crucially important that to get 
most out of the new technology, use of high doses of fertilizers should be complemented by 
regular irrigation and use of pesticides. The first two inputs were meant for high-yield and the 
last one protected the lush growth of the crop from pest-attacks that became more frequent with 
the introduction of the new varieties. Unlike chemical fertilizers, which had for long been part of 
national debate on agricultural development, the introduction of the new technology brought into 
sharp focus the necessity of well-irrigated farms. The Central Government at New Delhi made it 
very clear to the state governments that they should only select blocks for further development 
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that already had eighty percent of the cultivable area under irrigation and with an adequate 
drainage facility to keep the area immune from floods. 
Table 4.1 India: HYV Wheat 
                                                                                                                                                                        Percent 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
Punjab Bihar Haryana Other Total 
1966/67 67 11 5 3 15 100 
1967/68 54 22 6 3 15 100 
1968/69 53 21 6 5 15 100 
1969/70 33 30 9 9 20 100 
1970/71 30 24 14 10 23 100 
1971/72 28 22 15 10 25 100 
1972/73 31 19 16 10 24 100 
1973/74 31 18 15 9 27 100 
1974/75 33 16 14 9 29 100 
The figure demonstrates how the cultivation of HYV wheat was highly concentrated in certain regions of 
India. Source: Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 96 p.37 
 
Scholars writing on the economic impact of the green revolution pointed out that the 
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adoption of new technology was centered almost entirely on Punjab, Haryana Western Uttar 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu- regions that had irrigation, proper drainage, and sunny seasons, and 
that did not suffer from attacks of pests and disease, which could benefit from the new 
technology.
53
 Focused more on increasing yield through implementing the new technology, 
rather than overcome its rigid input specificities, majority of agricultural scientists during this 
period showed certain consistent trends. For instance, they directed their breeding effort mainly 
in evolving varieties suitable for fertile, irrigated tracts; the period saw little effort to breed 
varieties suitable for either moisture-stressed or flood-prone region of the country, though such 
regions were common than irrigated ones. From the point of ecology, it resulted into 
monocropping and enhanced the possibility of widespread pest attack. With overcropping in 
irrigated tracts, it also brought down the water-table of the regions, and resulted, as some 
scholars argue, in inter-regional economic disparity. 
The difficult anomaly between the water requirement of the new seeds and the general 
irrigation situation in India became apparent in its North-Eastern states of West Bengal, Orissa, 
Bihar and Easter Uttar Pradesh. Over sixty percent of India’s rice production came from these 
states, yet introduction of dwarf rice seeds were very slow in the region because of its scant 
irrigation facilities. The rainfall pattern of the eastern region simply could not support intensive 
winter cropping. With the available implements and draft animals, unless there were pre-
monsoon showers, farmers found it difficult to prepare the land for timely sowing.
54
 The meager 
irrigation facilities of the Northern Hill Zone posed a similar kind of hindrance in the 
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introduction of S-227 and E.5878. These Mexican wheat varieties were termed the ‘Hill wheats 
of the future’ by the scientists for their high yield that went up to 75 maunds (2775 Kg) per acre. 
With ‘high requirements’ in terms of irrigation and fertilizer these varieties, however, found little 
scope in the North Hill Zone. 
In insisting on irrigation to create the ideal farming condition, the scientists and other 
proponents of the new technology have had ignored existing class-caste politics and bad 
maintenance that made farmers’ access to water a problematic issue even in regions with assured 
water supply. In a study of Indian irrigation policy for UNRISD, Elizabeth Whitcombe reported 
that in tours of more than 600 Blocks, it was rare to find more than a third of the state tubewells 
in working order. She also reported that state tubewell users complained of too little water, 
especially the problem of reductions without warning, and poor servicing of machinery. 
Meanwhile, it was only the larger farmers who had good access to the private tubewells.
55
  
Power shortages and a low availability of electricity in the rural areas further limited the 
development of tubewells and their actual advantages.
56
  In a study of agricultural problems in 
India’s eastern region, researchers Kahlon and Singh pointed out that of the 197,550 shallow 
tubewells reported in West Bengal, only 24,900 were energized.
57
 
In the years following the introduction of the green revolution technology, agricultural 
scientists in India made intermittent effort to grapple with the problem of moisture-stress, mainly 
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through breeding, morphological restructuring and soil compaction methods. The challenge came 
in finding ways to grow the new crops in upland areas that had on average less than 1100 mm of 
rainfall and that often lacked reservoirs, where in any case slopes made it hard to store the 
precious water received during monsoons.
58
 In 1966, scientists at CRRI started experimenting 
with the use of a proctor compactor, to test whether soil compaction could help increase grain 
yield by decreasing downward slope runoff and by increasing the soil’s capacity for water 
retention and the uptake of fertilizers such as nitrogen, phosphorus and native iron.
59
 
While CRRI conducted these experiments on the potential advantages of soil compaction, 
their primary research concentrated on the ongoing search for new varieties that could give high 
yields under moisture stress. Plant physiologists, soil scientists, and plant breeders collaborated 
to develop a series of early maturing rice varieties such as CR. 125 and CR. 143, which they 
hoped would be well adapted to upland areas with low rainfall.
60
 Researchers in the laboratories 
of Punjab Agricultural University and IARI also worked to breed new varieties, such as C.306, 
K.65, N.P.889, and N.P. 890, specifically designed to withstand moisture stress and yet give high 
yield. In several rainfed centers of the zone, researchers started special coordinated trials of the 
Mexican wheat variety S.227, to find out whether the high yield of that dwarf strain could be 
replicated under moisture stress.
61
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In 1967, the agronomists at CRRI started experimenting with breeding drought-resistant 
high-yielding rice varieties. Scientists tested several crosses of rice seeds made between proven 
drought-resistant varieties (such as N.22 and Ch.45) and Taichung Native 1 (TN1), the short stiff 
variety that responded well to high levels of fertilizer application. In developing rice varieties for 
moisture stress conditions, scientists particularly sought to incorporate the characteristic of rapid 
senescence or ‘biological aging’ of leaves, which helped reduce both the amount of oxygen 
transported to the rhizosphere , the soil surrounding the root of the plant and the loss of energy 
through respiration, particularly during key stages of grain development. 
Plant physiologists made a distinction between varieties that had drought tolerance and 
varieties that could be designed to be made capable of avoiding drought.
62
 Under the leadership 
of M.S. Swaminathan and R.D. Asana, scientists at the IARI used the new genetic tools that were 
available to them to reconstruct the morphological architecture and developmental rhythm of 
crops to help varieties such as Chotti Lerma (a selection of the Mexican variety, S.331) and 
Kalyansona (a selection of the Mexican variety, S.227) not only survive but also produce well 
under low moisture availability. Asana and his IARI colleagues developed wheat varieties 
capable of avoiding drought. These varieties had a large number of grains in the main tiller, a 
good root system that helped them draw water from far below the surface, and about seven 
leaves horizontally-set to block sun rays and retain the dew in the ground. IARI research showed 
that without irrigation, plant varieties tended to lose some tillering capacity, meaning that plant 
population largely consisted of main axis shoots. To compensate for this problem, Swaminathan 
and his associates at the IARI evolved grain varieties that had fewer but larger ears or that had 
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branched ears. Scientists were also working on developing ‘Triticale,’ a hybrid form of wheat 
and rye well-suited for non-irrigated areas; triticale offered all the characteristics of wheat, while 
incorporating the drought resistant quality of rye.
63
 
Notwithstanding these instances, the period witnessed a far more systematic and intensive 
effort at evolving and testing varieties for fertilized and well-irrigated soil of specific agro-
ecological zones of India. It comes out clearly in the wide variations seen in the number of 
national trials conducted in the country’s different agro-climatic zones. In the crop cycle of 
1970-71, scientists tested their new varieties in the high fertility-irrigated areas under the five 
zones. The North Western Plains zone, which had the advantages of highly fertile soil and 
widespread irrigation, received nine different trials.  By contrast, scientists conducted only two 
trials in the North Eastern Plains zone, which had fertile soil but relied on water supplies from 
rain. Researchers also performed only two trials in the Peninsular zone and the Northern Hills 
zone, while the Central zone was lucky to get four.
64
 During the following year, researchers 
continued this skewed distribution of effort, conducting eleven trials in the North Western Plains 
zone, six at the Central zone, five in the Peninsular zone, four in the North Eastern Plains, and 
just two trials in the Northern Hill zone.
65
 
Scientists looking back at the first phase of the green revolution in India have later tried 
to explain the reasons behind neglecting the rain-fed regions in contemporary research work. 
Scientist K.S. Gill admitted that up to the late 1970s, scientists concentrated on developing 
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varieties suited to high-fertility conditions. Breeders developed only eight varieties specifically 
appropriate for rain-fed growing regions with low fertility.
66
 In the 1970-71 coordinated national 
trials, researchers conducted only twelve tests under low fertility-rainfed conditions, compared to 
twenty-one trials conducted at high fertility-irrigated regions. Researchers themselves admitted 
that they would need to increase the number of trials conducted in the unirrigated regions in 
order to be able to draw any ‘worthwhile’ inferences on the adaptability of the new varieties to 
moisture stress.
67
 But they failed to take this next step; in fact, in later years, the number of trials 
for the low-fertility rainfed regions actually decreased to sixteen and of that, only eleven trials 
officially submitted data.
68
 
By the late 1980s, scientists who were associated with the Green Revolution in India 
(including Norman Borlaug) had the chance to reflect on the successes and limitations of the new 
technology. In the course of the conversation, Dr. Tandon admitted that the development of 
rainfed varieties was one area where scientists had done very little. He blamed this on the lack of 
research facilities and a lack of dedicated scientists who were willing to work on the problem for 
a length of time without expecting quick results. Under the existing system of research 
assessment, there was little backing for experimenters who labored for a decade or more without 
tangible progress. Tandon admitted that scientists had been keener to conduct research under 
irrigated conditions, where their efforts bore quick and visible fruits. But as Tandon also noted, 
even when scientists did develop a few good varieties to grow in rainfed conditions short on 
irrigation, India had no seed production program to make those seeds widely available. Tandon 
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lamented that not a single variety had entered the seed production chain for many years. He 
linked the problem to economics, noting that ‘…by and large, the rainfed farmer is a poor 
farmer. He is not capable of purchasing seed, and unless there is a demand, the commercial 
agencies do not go in for seed production…The seed producers want high profit… (They) would 
like to produce varieties with a better yield than the one ton that can be obtained under rainfed 
conditions.’69 
Irrigated and well-fertilized land, which promoters of the new technology hailed as the 
mark of true progress, however, became a source of concern for many as they proved to be 
conducive to pest incidence. To maintain the appropriateness of these fertile irrigated tracts for 
the cultivation of the new seed varieties, there arose the additional need of pest control, which 
scientists planned to achieve primarily through application of high doses of pesticides. Necessity 
of using chemical pesticides, not only intensified the critique that most of the inputs are beyond 
the purchasing capacity of small farmers, but also brought forth sharp retort from 
environmentalists. 
While on an official tour of India’s northern hilly states, M.S. Randhawa, the Director 
General of the country’s Intensive Agriculture Area Program, drew a sharp contrast between the 
new grains and traditional varieties. Randhawa wrote, ‘Below the white mountains was a stretch 
of terraced fields covered with dark green and pale green strips of wheat. The dark green wheat 
had been fertilized with calcium ammonium nitrate and super-phosphate and gave promise of a 
bumper crop. The pale green wheat was not fertilized, and had a poor stand and the size of the 
ears was also small.’ Randhawa surmised that nitrogen was changing the landscape of the Punjab 
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Himalaya and found this change very gratifying.
70   
The fields sown with the new rice and wheat 
varieties uniquely displayed to many, just like Randhawa, ‘the arrival of modernity’.71 The dark 
shoot, stubby looking plants aside the thin pale-green strips was a visible metaphoric 
representation of modernity and tradition. What remained a less appealing feature and perhaps, 
therefore, not mentioned in the writings of Randhawa was that the new varieties with ‘dark green 
leaves’ produced an ecological condition in the fields that was more favorable to diseases and 
pests. 
A large number of dwarf wheat varieties, such as Kalyansona, PV 18 and Sonalika 
though highly resistant to rusts under field conditions at the time of their release, soon became 
susceptible to a new virulence of the rust pathogen.  This caused great concern among many. For 
instance, in 1966 A.H. Moseman, the assistant administrator for the Technical Cooperation and 
Research, observed that although important people in the Indian administration such as the 
Agricultural Secretary Sivaraman might think that availability of the Taiwan rice and Mexican 
wheat varieties had largely resolved India’s food problems, the country was really facing a 
potentially ‘unhealthy situation’ of practicing large-scale ‘one variety’ agriculture. Moseman 
wanted still wider dissemination of the dwarf varieties, but what ‘seriously concerned’ him was, 
India’s lack of technological capability to meet the challenges of a series of destructive new 
diseases that might attack the crops. He wrote to international institutes, such as the IRRI to help 
strengthen India’s national research capacity to fight such calamities.72 In response to 
Moseman’s request, in October 1967, a team of four scientists from IRRI and Japan surveyed the 
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rice crop to assess the effect of diseases and insects on the new varieties grown in India. They 
too observed that the high-yielding varieties IR-8 and TN1 often had ‘more plant hopper and 
cutworm infestations, which appeared to be due to their lush growth and thick stands.’ The team 
expressed anguish at the inadequacy of existing pest-control practices of average Indian farmers 
to handle this additional burden.
73
 
Within a year after the establishment of the Division of Agricultural Chemicals of the 
IARI, the scientists reported in 1967 of successfully developing a thiocyanate group of 
insecticides, using ‘indigenous’ raw materials and technical knowhow. The India’s National 
Research Development Council (NRDC) offered an exclusive right for the production of the 
material to Camphor and Allied Products, a public-sector undertaking at Bareilly in Uttar 
Pradesh. In its 1969 scientific report, the government’s Division of Agricultural Chemicals 
reported that commercial production of this pesticide in India was saving the country foreign 
exchange worth 2 million annually in Indian currency.
74
 In a similar effort, researchers converted 
domestic industrial wastes to develop a pesticide, ‘Solbar’, to fight against powdery mildew in 
wheat. 
In 1971, the Ford Foundation sponsored an outside review team sent to study the plant 
protection scenario in India. After concluding their study, the review team endorsed the principle 
of extensive use of pesticides.  The team advised India’s national government to build up a close 
cooperation and mutual understanding with the pesticide industry, which would help that 
industry prosper and supply farmers with good quality formulations. In response to the review 
team's report, Ford Foundation urged India’s policy-makers to take steps to popularize the use of 
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pesticide. It advised the government to develop larger domestic agro-industries for the 
production of pesticides, which would generate additional sources of employment for the people 
and also employ local villagers in the ground application of pesticides.
75
 
However, in practice, farmers’ use of pesticide remained far from satisfactory. By March 
1974, the level of pesticide consumption was only 45,000 tones.
76
 Several reasons influenced 
low consumption of pesticides in Indian agriculture. Farmers could adopt such techniques only if 
they had access to chemicals at affordable rates and individual Indian farmers rarely had the 
means to own the equipment for aerial spraying.
77
 Though much cheaper than aerial spraying 
equipments, non-availability of dusting and spraying equipment also discouraged the uses of 
pesticides. Although arrangements are frequently made by the development block officials to 
keep some equipment in their offices for use by farmers, the frequent complaint was that their 
number had been inadequate, their breakdown rate was high and users did not return them in 
time.
78
 
Moreover, the spraying of chemicals over a vast acreage under various agro-ecological 
conditions posed larger environmental questions. The option of aerial spraying was already 
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spurring much criticism in the United States.
79
 The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
was already causing much commotion in the America. In the 1970, for instance, there were 
already questions being raised in the Lower House of the Indian Parliament about the safety of 
using DDT specifically and pesticides in general. Several MPs repeatedly exhorted the Minister 
of State for Food and Agriculture, A.P. Shinde to reply why India was continuing with its use of 
DDT when many other countries have stopped using it on grounds of toxicity. The Minister 
pointed out that under the Insecticides Act
80
 passed by the Indian Parliament steps had already 
been taken to look into the matter and a joint committee of CSIR and ICAR was constituted to 
intensify research efforts ‘to prevent the harmful effect of insecticides.’81 In 1973, Robert F. 
Chandler, the Director of IRRI himself admitted that pests had been adapting to selective 
breeding; in Mexico, races of wheat stem rust changed six times between 1943 and 1965.
82
 
As agricultural scientists tried to find cheaper alternatives to imported chemical fertilizers 
through uses of indigenous resources, they similarly tried to control crop loss through breeding 
pest resistant varieties and biological control. Dr. V.P. Rao, the entomologist-in-charge of the 
Commonwealth Institute of Biological Control at Bangalore, argued that although the initial 
expense of biological control might appear to be somewhat high for India, it would still cost less 
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than the investments needed for using insecticides. By the early 1970s Indian scientists were 
trying to use indigenous parasites for biological control of rice pests.
83
 Just like in the US, 
however, integrated pest control (IPC) measures, rather than biological control became the 
preferred mean among the Indian scientists.
84
 The latter, scientists argued, gave them a chance to 
perfect an ‘appropriate’ admixture of chemical, genetic, agronomic and biological methods. This 
judicious combination of various means, they argued, would be an improvement on both 
chemical and biological ways of control. Biological control was already under attack from 
various scientists for being marginally effective against targeted insect pests.
85
 Moreover, a 
reduced dependence on chemicals in IPC meant less danger to the consumer and environment.
86
 
Other than these methods, agricultural scientists at IARI and CRRI who were involved with the 
All-India Coordinated Rice Improvement Project (AICRIP) worked on breeding pest and disease 
resistant varieties. 
Scientists were more successful in breeding disease resistant varieties. Though, there 
were few of pest resistant rice varieties, CR.94, MR.1550 and MR.1624, which gave multiple 
resistances to gall-midge, leaf-hopper, stem-borer, bacterial blight and tungro-virus, use of 
pesticides gradually increased in India, especially in those parts with widespread cultivation of 
the new seeds, high use of fertilizers and intensive irrigation. One such place was Punjab, where 
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the new technologies had been widely disseminated. By the early 1980s, environmental activist 
Vandana Shiva pointed out that previously insignificant insects and pests gradually grow into 
major problems. In 1964, scientists first recorded rice leaf folder, enaphalorrocis medinalis, as a 
‘minor’ infestation. By 1967, however, it had appeared in epidemic form in Kapurthala, and by 
1983, had spread to all rice-growing areas of the state and caused heavy losses. Shiva cited 
similar instances of the white-backed plant hopper (Sogatella fureifers), which evidently first 
appeared in 1966 but became severe from 1972 onwards.  Similarly, problems with the brown 
plant hopper (Nilanparvate lugene), rice thrips, earcutting caterpillars, and other new insect pests 
turned from minor to major problems.
87
 
As the production of an ideal farming tract-well irrigated, free of pests, and highly fertile 
continued to be fraught with widespread controversy, so was the search for old flavor in new 
varieties. In addition to worrying about fertilizer responsiveness, yield, and resistance to disease 
and pests, agricultural scientists also had to consider making the new grains palatable to the 
consumers. A significant section of the middle-class Indian consumers found the red-seeded 
Mexican wheat and the small grains of Philippines rice with high gluten content to be 
incompatible with their taste preferences. Villagers in India, especially the farmers, had been 
accustomed to red and thick-grained rice, because that helped them to keep full for a longer time 
in the fields. The demand for slender, scented rice and amber wheat had been largely limited to 
the urban population and middle and upper middle class of rural India. But in an emerging 
industrial society, these were sections, which dominated economically and socially. It was, 
therefore, clear to the scientists that the success or failure of the new seeds at the consumption 
junction depended on whether consumers would be willing to buy these varieties. If the farmers 
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found the new varieties not appreciated in the market, they would refuse to grow it, even if they 
received high-yield from these varieties. 
 
Fig 4.3 Prime Minister at the Gamma Garden: The Prime Minister observing the chromosomes of wheat 
at the IARI Gamma Garden. It was by affecting the chromosomes through Gamma rays that the wheat 
variety Sharbati Sonora was evolved. 
 
The scientists’ prediction about consumer reaction and farmers’ responses turned out to 
be correct. Dr. S.P. Kohli, the coordinator of the All India Wheat Improvement Program, wrote 
to Borlaug in 1967 that the farmers preferred to cultivate the amber-seeded dwarf wheats to the 
red-seeded ones, because consumer preferences for amber wheat meant that red wheat was 
fetching Rs.15-50 less per quintal. Though farmers grew amber-seeded wheat varieties on almost 
2000 acres of land in the winter of 1966, it proved to be inadequate to meet demand. According 
190 
 
to Kohli, the farmers who grew the red-seeded varieties did so only reluctantly.
88
 The prospect of 
the red wheat varieties received a further set back from the initial decision of the Indian 
government to pay higher procurement prices for amber grain. Realizing that this could act as a 
tremendous detriment in the popularization of the new dwarf seeds, especially at a time when 
there was not enough dwarf seeds with desirable characteristics to substitute the Mexican ones, 
Dr. M.S. Swaminathan persuaded the Union government’s Food Secretary to equalize prices in 
1968. Reminiscencing years later, Swaminathan pointed out that this decision turned out to be 
very significant in persuading Indian farmers to grow the red-seeded high-yielding varieties.
89
 
In terms of technology, agricultural scientists at CRRI and IARI used the technique of 
hybridization and induced mutation to make the new varieties look and taste like the old ones. 
CRRI scientists collected varieties of scented rice from all parts of India, but realized that all the 
existing varieties were tall and weak at straws. Such morphological characteristics made these 
varieties, as have been earlier pointed out, potentially low yield. They therefore started crossing 
scented varieties with high-yielding types, trying to reach the goal of breeding short and stiff-
strawed selections with scented grain.
90
 
Research on induced mutation was conducted in various parts of the world in the 1960s, 
especially in Japan, Korea, France and Italy.  Many scientists were exploring the idea of using 
atomic rays to induce mutations that would bring quick desirable changes in crops. In 1964, the 
FAO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European 
Association for Research on Plant Breeding, organized a technical meeting on the use of induced 
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mutations in plant breeding. In the meeting, scientists discussed the possibility of using artificial 
mutagenesis not only to supplement conventional methods of plant breeding, but also serve as a 
powerful means of developing a ‘more fundamental approach to the improvement of 
domesticated plants through the possibility of re-patterning their genetic architecture and so 
moulding them even more closely to the increasingly stringent requirements of man.’91 In India, 
agricultural scientists working at the IARI with Dr. Swaminathan, found induced mutation useful 
tool for changing the color of Mexican wheat from red to amber. The use of atomic mutation for 
agricultural purposes helped to reinforce government of India’s commitment to peaceful use of 
atom.  Homi Bhabha, the architect of the atomic program in India was a member of the scientific 
advisory committee of the IAEA too; Bhabha and the atomic energy research institute (BARC) 
that he helped to set up in India would contribute significantly in the use of atomic technology in 
agricultural development, as would the IAEA internationally. 
Though application of induced mutation to change grain color was helpful in advancing 
the acceptability of the new varieties among farmers and consumers alike, Borlaug did not seem 
keen to invest research time in exploring aesthetic qualities, such as grain color or slenderness of 
varieties. He thought these characteristics of seed to be of secondary importance compared to 
grain yield. He considered the whole aspect of quality preference to be more academic than 
scientific. He, however, did endorse research on improving the chapatti-making and chapatti-
keeping qualities of the new high-yielding varieties because chapatti, like Mexican tortillas, was 
very integral to Indian meal especially in the North-Western states, the wheat-belt of the nation. 
He also insisted that Indian scientists start working on ways to produce grains with 13 to 15 per 
cent of protein at a yield level of 80 pounds or above. Borlaug considered this aspect of research 
                                                 
91
 The Use of Induced Mutations in Plant Breeding: Report of the FAO/IAEA Technical Meeting (Pergamon Press, 
1965). 
192 
 
to be vital; since Indian diets consisted primarily of cereals, scientists aimed to improve the 
average person’s nutrition by increasing the protein content of cereals. This, however, became 
problematic with the high-yielding varieties, because scientists found to their dismay that 
increasing yields made the percentage of protein in cereals drop. The high-yielding varieties 
therefore faced the challenge of being nutritionally deficient. The scientists started working on 
increasing protein content and protein quality through breeding.
92
 
With assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation, geneticists at the IARI in 1966 set up a 
new laboratory fully equipped with automatic amino acid and protein acid analyzers. 
Researchers used these machines to screen large exotic collections of wheat with high protein 
content and then crossed the material with indigenous varieties such as N.P. 839 and C.306. 
These crosses resulted in wheat with protein content of 19 to 21 per cent in the F1 generation. 
The protein content that was thus achieved was as high as in certain pulses.
93
 In the case of rice, 
scientists used the local variety, Dular, which scientists found to possess about 12 per cent 
protein, as a donor to improve the high protein cultures of rice. In 1973, researchers tested these 
enriched protein varieties to see how these performed in terms of yields. The objective was to 
make quality commensurate with quantity in all the new varieties of rice and wheat.
94
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Fig 4.4 A Group of Happy Politicians: An exceptionally happy Prime Minister receiving the special 
postage stamps, celebrating the success of the green revolution from the Union Minister of 
Communication, 1968 
 
Driven by evidence of high-yield and claim of good quality, the dissemination of the 
green revolution technology seemingly went uninhibited till the mid-1970s. The aggregate wheat 
and rice output increased from 10.39 million tons to 23.83 million tons and 32.59 million tons to 
42.23 million tons respectively during the period from 1965/66 to 1970/71.
95
 Import of food crop 
dwindled carrying with it the impression that India’s sovereignty was now safe. No one-either an 
institution or individual-could anymore theoretically hold its government or its people in ‘short-
tether’. Whatever the new technology symbolized-high yield, ‘progressive’ farmers who were 
receptive to new inputs, irrigated and fertile soil, carried an appeal to other countries which were 
seemingly standing at a cross-road of traditionalism and modernity, just as India supposedly did 
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in the mid-1960s. Out of this heart of complacency, however, rose the most significant 
economic, political, social and environmental critiques of the green revolution technology. A 
significant thread that ran through most of these critical reviews tried to explore the relationship 
of the farmers with the new technology. Farmers’ knowledge, farmers’ participation, farmers’ 
marginalization-all became very crucial issues in the appraisal of the new technology. The 
conclusion of this dissertation would, therefore, not only problematize what it meant to be a 
farmer in independent India, but also dwell on its fractured identity and often incompatible 
interests to understand the nature of its participation in India’s agricultural development since 
independence through the green revolution. 
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Coda: Where is the Cultivator in Indian Agricultural Research? 
     
       The history of agricultural research in postcolonial India from 1947-75, analyzed in this 
dissertation, has demonstrated that the scientists and the policymakers repeatedly referred to the 
cultivator’s interests as an important criterion of policy-formulations. As achieving social equity 
had been an important goal, references to farmers’ interests especially that of the small farmers, 
were abundant in policy documents. In deciding the ways and means of modernizing Indian 
agriculture, the planners made arguments based on their understanding of peasants’ interest. This 
however brings forth two important questions: how did the governmental agencies determined 
accurately what would be in the interests of the peasants, especially, when the Indian farming 
community is so deeply stratified based on its economic means?  In various regions of India 
subsistent farmers had been coexisting with big landlords but they definitely did not pursue 
similar economic interests. The other question is: In a deeply stratified world of the Indian 
countryside whose interest came to dominate over the other? In various chapters of the 
dissertation, I have repeatedly mentioned, how administrators and political leaders often 
considered Indian farmers to be as object of reforms rather than any active agent of change. In 
the conclusion, I will summarize how this attitude influenced the farmers’ role in the formulation 
of policies and dissemination of the new technology. 
     Before going in to a detail sketching of the farmers’ role or lack of role, let us briefly 
discuss the agrarian structure at the time of independence.
1
 In 1947, at the apex of the agrarian 
structure was a landlord class, not necessarily owners in the strict sense, since they might be 
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occupancy tenants, but with superior property rights in the soil which allowed them to lease out 
land and to extract a surplus in the form of rent.  Within this class, there were two broad groups, 
which could be found in all parts of India: a class of large, usually absentee landlords, who 
tended to hold land in more than one village; and one of smaller normally resident proprietors, 
who typically held land in one village. India’s agrarian structure had two other major 
components, a peasantry and a class of landless laborers, and a third, a stratum of village artisans 
and craftsmen. 
     Among the peasantry some differentiation was fairly evident, varying in degree from 
region to region, and being most marked where commercialization had penetrated furthest. Rich 
peasants were part-owners and part-tenants, whose land was frequently fragmented. They 
accumulated capital to a certain extent, were market oriented, and were substantial employers of 
wage labors. Rich peasants were not ‘masters of the countryside’ at independence and they were 
not to be clearly seen in all parts of India.
2
 But they did, however, have some of the attributes of 
dominance. The middle peasant stratum was also made up of part-owners and part tenants. They 
held their land in scattered pieces, were not market oriented, and employed small amounts of 
wage labor at peak periods. Poor peasants partly owned and partly rented, but were tenants to a 
greater degree than other peasants. They were particularly likely to be sharecroppers and 
especially so in eastern India. Among poor peasants, fragmentation was rife; access to credit was 
via the village moneylender, at usurious interest rates, and the level of indebtedness was high; 
market orientation took the form of marketing a ‘distress surplus’ rather than a true commercial 
surplus. An important characteristic of poor peasants was the degree to which they had to supply 
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their labor to others in order to survive. Such labor might be forced, unpaid labor, extracted by 
landlords as a condition of tenancy. 
    There had been landless laborers in India since Mughal times, that is, from around 
fifteenth century. In 1950-51, fifteen per cent of all agricultural families in India were without 
land. Among laborers it is important to distinguish two categories: permanent or attached 
laborers, or those who were hired for a single crop season for a single operation, or on a daily 
basis.
3
 At independence, there were, of course, virtually no mechanized operations for such labor 
to work on. It is important to remember that the rural proletariat was composed of both totally 
landless laborers and poor peasants, but that the latter’s possession of land effectively prevented 
a correspondence of interests between the two. 
      Between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s, India’s agrarian structure underwent certain 
changes. Despite a remarkable range of delaying tactics and a host of devices to retain more land 
than the law allowed, the largest semi-feudal landlords, who had been allies of the British in 
British India and the bulwark of the princes in princely India-experienced, via land reform, a 
blow from which they never quite recovered. From among them a small group emerged which 
was ripe for transformation into capitalist farmers. The medium-to smaller landlords, who were 
often resident and sometimes cultivating, received no such blow. Here was another, larger group 
within the landlord class which might take to capitalist farming if conditions were appropriate. 
But these tendencies within the landlord class were nowhere on a scale sufficient to suggest the 
possibility of widespread ‘capitalism from above’. 
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    There was a quickening of differentiation among the peasantry over these years. 
Agriculture grew at around three per cent per annum, there was some extension of the irrigated 
area, some limited development of the forces of production and some rise in commercialization. 
By far the greatest beneficiaries of these changes, and of land reform, were the rich peasants.  
They were stabilized as independent proprietors and were on the way to becoming, in many areas 
of India, the new dominant class in the emerging agrarian structure. Rich peasants were well on 
the way to becoming masters of the Indian countryside especially in northwest India, in Punjab, 
Haryana, and western U.P. Since these were the location of the largest concentration of marketed 
surpluses rich peasants had growing influence in the polity. They showed themselves to be 
eminently capable of exercising political power, not only in the village, but also at the level of 
district, state, and center. Middle peasants must have participated, to a degree, in any 
advancement, but poor peasants, landless laborers, and village artisans and craftsmen gained 
very little from land reform or from the other changes that were afoot. In 1950s there was a mass 
eviction of tenants, when fear of future land reform was strong, and efforts were made to secure 
as much land for personal cultivation as possible.
4
 Of landless laborers the third plan document 
commented: ‘in some areas their condition may have actually worsened’.5 With such glaring 
differences in economic means and status it was not possible to have a singular policy of 
agricultural modernization. 
    Myron Weiner who studied the big landlords on the one hand and the small peasantry 
and the landless on the other concluded that neither group had any impact on policy formulation 
related to land-ceilings and cooperative farming. As for policy implementation, the landlords 
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were unorganized and powerful enough to defeat full implementation. The small peasants and 
the landless were not organized enough: they affected neither policy formulation nor policy 
implementation.
6
 This lack of farmer’s role in the making and implementation of agricultural 
policy can be explained in terms of lack of power. The Indian state and its policymakers thought 
that reforms would be successful in empowering the peasants. In spite of the good intentions the 
land reforms were not a sweeping success. Moreover land reforms can be a good starting point of 
the empowerment project but the farmers can only gain agency when initiatives come from them 
through a process of self-awareness. This is not an easy task to accomplish, not simply because 
‘the average Indian farmer is poor and backward’ but it has been argued by rural sociologists that 
people who have been under the domination of local power elites or colonial regimes cannot be 
expected-when regimes change-to suddenly be willing and able to come to a negotiation table 
with their former despots.
7
 
      Apart from facilitating cooperation between international scientists, the American 
government sent Peace Corps volunteers to aid in disseminating the new technology in Indian 
villages. Officials at Washington D.C. apprehended that it would not be easy to make the farmers 
of a traditional society like India to change their farming practices and adopt the new 
technological package. American observers perceived India to have an age-old environment, 
where traditional village societies with an all-pervasive local culture controlled even farming 
practices. Westerners considered it a radical and daring act for traditional farmers in developing 
nations to embrace innovation, contrasting them to farmers in Iowa who could switch crops or 
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machinery without undue fear of reprisal from the keepers of their own culture. American Peace 
Corps volunteers in India went to villages varying in size from fifty to about three thousand 
people. In each village, a ‘progressive’ farmer offered the volunteer free housing and a piece of 
land on which to demonstrate hybrid varieties. Each volunteer worked with three to eight 
farmers, helping them plant new hybrid varieties. The Peace Corps did not want volunteers to 
wait for the local farmers to declare their interests in high-yielding varieties; instead, the ‘best’ 
volunteers were expected to venture forth and make their expertise available by contacting 
farmers still growing traditional varieties. The Peace Corps believed that initiating a successful 
relationship between the farmers and volunteers would be helpful in promoting adoption of the 
new practices and propagation of high-yielding varieties. Peace Corps volunteers were also 
instructed to work on creating a new mentality among traditional farmers who had the bad 
reputation of being averse to new things. Beyond their duty to teach farmers how to apply 
fertilizers, volunteers in villages were also supposed to instill in each farmer the confidence to 
‘demand from the bureaucracy the supplies and advice that are rightly his…’ The Peace Corps 
program sought to create bottom-up pressure on Indian government agencies by generating a 
popular demand for the availability of more fertilizer across the country. Western program 
leaders hoped that this would force Indian policy-makers to embrace programs favoring 
agriculture centered on capital-intensive resources.
8
 
      The farming conditions in different parts of India were beset with many problems (as we 
have thoroughly discussed in the preceding chapters), the national and state governments and the 
foreign agencies undertook several projects with the hope of addressing the problems but little 
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effort was invested in enabling the farmers to ‘own the process of resolving it’9 Development 
cooperation has often ignored this fundamental notion of ownership by creating intermediating 
organizations rather than helping those who own problems to gain agency to resolve them. This 
is especially evident in the development and management of agricultural extension agency in 
India. 
 
Fig 5.1 Picture perfect: a happy farmer, a progressive farmer, a risk-taking farmer 
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The extension system has gone through several organization changes since its origin in 
the broad-based Community Development Program in the 1960s. But, it has maintained the 
norms of hierarchy, linear top-down transfer of knowledge (technology) from research, through 
extension to farmers. The Training and Visit (T&V) system is the best and most recent example 
in extension methodology, introduced as an institutional change by the Department of 
Agriculture in Indian states in the late 1970s. The T&V system rests on ‘the assumption that an 
outside agency can accurately assess what is good for rural people and that the solution to rural 
underdevelopment and poverty is the provision of science-based technical knowledge.’10 This 
institution with perfect hierarchy continues to constitute the functional basis of the ‘technology-
society interface’. The history of agricultural research reveals an implicit hierarchy in the 
generation of knowledge and technology, as well as the dissemination and utilization of this 
technology in the society.
11
 
    In the agricultural research system, scientist or research manager makes decisions for 
public welfare. This decision is informed by the economic rationale of cost-benefit analysis, 
legitimizes the public servant’s (here the experts’) capacity to make decisions about the direction 
and content of technological change in agriculture. Here, the service or mission of the 
agricultural research organization is clearly defined-it could be national food security, export 
competitiveness, or more specifically, land-saving technologies, etc. Indian farmers whose 
techniques were primitive; whose main concern was subsistence was rarely thought competent to 
play a role in national missions. They were encouraged to participate in nation-wide 
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development activities but were not expected to be partners of scientists and policymakers in 
formulating ways and means of national progress. 
    Managers and experts have well-defined roles within the administrative monolith. This 
administrative rationalism is ‘the problem-solving discourse’ which emphasizes the role of the 
expert rather than the citizen or producer/consumer in social problem solving and which stresses 
social relationships of hierarchy rather than equality or competition.
12
 
     A key instrument deployed effectively in the decision-making mode of administrative 
rationalism is the complacency of the bureaucracy and expertise. There is concern and 
reassurance. The hierarchy of science and technology, flowing from State, down to policy-
maker, scientist, extensionist, and further down to the ultimate adopter, is perfectly maintained. 
Scholars writing on agricultural extension, such as Rasheed Sulaiman have pointed out that the 
importance of client involvement in planning and management of extension has often been 
handled as tokenism.
13
 The common strategy has been of inviting farmers to some meetings. In 
most regions and crops, the clients and their representatives are too weak to articulate their 
concerns. Extension has a primary responsibility of strengthening the clients’ hands by 
facilitating the formation of strong and articulate farmers’ organizations. In India, the problem 
had been two folds: the extension agencies have rarely played the role of organizing farmers as 
an effective pressure group. The Peace Corps volunteers who went to India to facilitate 
agricultural development made some effort in organizing farmers to pressurize the government 
agencies to be more pro-active towards distribution of bio-chemical inputs. Otherwise, it will not 
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be till 1970s that the farmers organize themselves to effectively demand political and economic 
leverage. Both Ashutosh Varshney and Akhil Gupta have studied that process in their respective 
first books. The second important issue is when the farmers had been organized even then the 
deep economic stratification within the farming community made the platforms more a vehicle 
for the rich land-owning peasantry. The small peasants and the landless who constituted the 
majority still did not have any effective say in policy-formulation. 
   In evaluating, how far the extension research findings have influenced the research 
priority setting or research problem identification, I have the following observations to make: 
The relevance of organized extension was acknowledged quite early after independence. The 
external aid for agricultural development emphasized the need for extension in the 1950s. But 
the reasons that have been identified behind this extension bias has nothing to do with bringing 
the farmers into a partnership with the scientists to determine what would be the best for the 
relevant farming communities. Extension services have rather developed on the misplaced 
confidence in the relevance of modern technology and based on the view that peasant farming is 
economically irrational and that ignorance made small farmers hold on to traditional methods. 
Both assumptions led to the conclusion that the first step in agricultural development should be 
to establish mechanisms to diffuse the inventory of modern technology directly to end users. 
      Why the agricultural extension service did not emerge as an effective conduit between 
the farmers and the scientists becomes clear through this study made on agriculture and social 
structure in Tamil Nadu.
14
 The author portrayed how bureaucratic trappings have turned 
extension or in that matter any constructive communication with the cultivators a dysfunctional 
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process. During her field work the extension workers pointed out to her that they do ‘whatever 
the government says and whatever my superior asks, we do.’ This same mentality was evident 
even among the officers higher up the ladder; each followed directive from above without paying 
heed to the locales. In a graphic language the interviewee observed, ‘Commissioners and others 
are pawns in the politicians’ hands. Instead of bettering the work, they try to satisfy the Ministers 
by furnishing them with statistics, statistics of no base and truth.’15 
      The farmers remained remote from officials. It was not something that they chose but it 
was the outcome of the way that the extension officials functioned. Joan P. Mencher wrote in her 
study on Tamil Nadu that ‘On the whole… most of the agricultural extension officers [AEO] 
would prefer to avoid actually going out and talking to farmers in the field. It is more convenient, 
as well as more prestigious, to sit in one’s office and talk to the farmer’s who come, or sit on the 
verandah of a well-to-do landowner sipping tea and talking.
16
 Working with poor, illiterate, or 
semi-literate farmers requires a kind of dedication on the part of the AEO’s which, Joan P. 
Mencher rarely found among extension officials.
17
 
     I agree with Mencher’s observation that the main focus of the programs in Indian 
agriculture has been to reach production targets especially after the mid-1960s. The target of 
increasing production overtook all other social and economic considerations. The experts 
focused on understanding agricultural problems only in terms of technological backwardness and 
designed program not from the point of view of the people for whom the program was 
designated but from the successful achievement of targets, there was no self-correcting 
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mechanism built into the system.
18
 Moreover targets were never set-up locally or after taking 
local feed-back.
19
 An extension worker pointed out to Mencher, ‘You see, somehow our higher 
officers, every year, they go over and bring out a target without knowing the potentiality, but in 
the hope that something better will be done than last year.’20   
    In the early 1990s, in a round table with various scientists associated with the 
development of the green revolution technology, a researcher pointed out ‘whatever solutions we 
come up with, the farmer will have to be at the center of it. There is no alternative and no 
choice.’21 The scientist concerned insisted that all technology must be ‘based on the farmer’s 
requirement, his demands, and his ability to convert that technology into practice’. But all this 
appears to be mere rhetoric when the same scientist makes the following observation that ‘we 
have found it necessary to focus on the farmer in the irrigated, productive areas because they are 
more rewarding. We have a result-oriented program and that has to continue.’ Thus it is same 
privileged farmers of yesteryears that continued to get attention from the scientists. It is they who 
reap most of the benefits of market, price-support, credit system and advance technology 
whereas the more impoverished majority continuity to languish in face of bureaucratic and 
technocratic disdain. 
      Scholars have tried various explanations as to why apparently the research efforts are 
biased towards solving the problems of the richer farmers to the neglect of the poor. Class 
affiliations could be a strong possibility- the rich farmers and the researcher do come from the 
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same class; ‘they have an instinctive empathy’.  There had also been what is called ‘a demand 
pull for research solutions’ -the customer knew what he wanted and articulated it. He had the 
where-withal to adopt newer solutions and both the ability and willingness to take risks. On the 
contrary, poor farmers were less articulate, solutions had a larger number of constraints to reckon 
with and researchers faced a greater risk of failure in their efforts. In a limited number of 
occasions where research was successful, adoption was chancy.
 22
 
      Actors, who are involved in technology generation, are conceptually put into three 
distinct sets: the scientists, the managers of the technology generation system and the farmers. 
The last mentioned is not one but as we have discussed consist of many sub-sets. Each of them 
has a distinct point of view. Scientists generally look for peer recognition, have bias towards 
number oriented problems, like to tackle areas where there are greater chances of success and 
have been trained in a ‘telling’ rather than ‘listening’ culture. The last characteristics often made 
them impatient to criticism. We have seen in chapter four, the reluctance of scientists working 
with the green revolution technology to heed to any complaint against what they recommended. 
The managers were more often than not concerned principally about how to balance national and 
regional concerns. The farmers on the other hand had a unique risk perception not always known 
or understood by the research system. The risk perception varies with the sub-set; the poor being 
more vulnerable are not the most willing to experiment with new techniques or practices. Crop 
failure can hurt him like no other because he has meager purchasing capacity and his 
‘entitlement’ to food is based on whatever little he produces in his field. Moreover and very 
important for people involved with generating new technology is that technology preference is 
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not same among farmers. Economic conditions of the farmers, agro-ecological constraints and 
potentials of the farming conditions all determine what set of technologies would be preferred 
over the other. 
      In a study conducted to ascertain the possible sources of ideas for research projects show 
that in institutions under the ICAR and in the agricultural universities only a third of the research 
problems owe their origin in farmer problems and field observations together. Nearly twenty 
percent of the research problems in ICAR controlled institutes originate from the intention to 
make journal publications. Individuals like project leaders also played important role in 
formulation of research agenda.
23
  
     Scholars have also argued that the scientists from IRRI and CRRI, who came work in 
Asian countries, though ‘well qualified’ according to the commonly accepted standards of 
academic research, had a deep understanding or appreciation of either the logic of indigenous 
practices of rice cultivation or the socio-economic contexts in which Asian cultivators 
operated.
24
 The centralist research model followed by these international research institutes 
disregarded that valuable research and technological innovations can also originate under local 
initiative.
25
 
      Scholars who strongly argue in favor of putting the farmers first in the formulation of a 
research policy or in the establishment of an extension program do so citing instances from 
history on farmers’ role as ‘primary innovators and experimenters’. Over the previous hundred 
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years, numerous ‘unknown’ farmers had been developing and propagating new techniques. This 
trend continued even with the professionalization of agricultural research following the creation 
of the Rothamsted Experimental Station in England in 1843 and of the Land Grant Colleges in 
the USA.
26
  
     This school of scholars, however, argue that the top-down ‘transfer of technology’ (from 
now TT) approach has come to replace bottom-up ‘farmers first’ (from now FF) approaches to 
development. They point out that there exist certain fundamental differences in the two 
approaches. For instance, TT always favor ‘simple, uniform, controlled’ farming conditions over 
‘complex, diverse, risk-prone’ FF approach. The two approaches differ in their objective-the 
primary goal of TT is to ensure transfer of technology but the FF approach focuses on 
empowerment of farmers. When technology transfer is the prime motive then the type of 
technology used is strictly fixed but where the main concern is empower the farmer, the idea is to 
use what is suitable for the purpose. Gordon Conway has termed the latter approach as A la 
carte!
27
 
      In case of India the profit that came out of using the green revolution technology 
definitely benefitted a section of farmers. It is a historical fact that the farmers’ movements of the 
1970s successfully pressured the Indian government in favor of agricultural policies that were 
highly responsive to farmers’ needs. But, these farming groups had done very little to make the 
political or the techno-scientific establishment address the plight of the less-privileged farmers. 
Thus over the years of the green revolution the farming movement rarely demanded for crop 
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varieties that farmers in the moisture-stressed region would find help; farmers’ movement though 
keen to obtain subsidies on fertilizers showed utter apathy to develop cheap, locally available 
resources, which the more resource-challenged farmer might useful. Farmers’ political groups 
had been by far more concerned about fiscal benefits than in ensuring a sustainable agricultural 
policy.  It is fancy and easy to depict farmers as a group of people with uniformity of interests 
and pit them either in against or in support of the technocratic measures. But, in doing we tend to 
extrapolate the interests of the few over many and marginalize from the development discourse 
the concerns, contexts and challenge of living a life as a small farmer. 
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